Saturday, April 6, 2024

Stricter occupational licensing in dentristy raised prices but did not improve quality

See Regulation Does Not Help Consumers by Dan Mitchell.

"Sensible regulation requires cost-benefit analysis. In other words, do the positive effects of a government intervention outweigh the negative effects?

For instance, a nationwide, 5-miles-per-hour speed limit definitely would reduce traffic fatalities, but lawmakers fortunately don’t impose that kind of rule because it would be absurdly costly.

And since the scholarly research shows a clear link between health and wealth, it’s possible that some (supposedly) pro-safety regulations may wind up leading to a net loss of life.

Other regulations may not have that deadly effect, but they can still be bad news because they increase costs with no concomitant benefits.

For an example, let’s go back more than 20 years to look at an academic study on dentistry. The authors, Morris M. Kleiner and Robert T. Kudrle, found that red tape was not good news for consumers.

Here are some excerpts.

We have analyzed the impact of stricter occupational licensing requirements on economic outcomes, dental prices, and earnings using dental records of the consumers of these services. …we sketched a model linking regulation to the flow of new dentists as well as to quality and prices. …Alternative multivariate statistical models were used to test the impact of more restrictive licensing provisions, first on dental outcomes and then on the prices of dental service prices and practitioner earnings. …we are able to provide some evidence on how tougher dental regulation reduces the flow of dentists to the states over time. We also show that stricter regulation raises prices, but has no effect on untreated deterioration. …more stringent regulation does not appear to affect some indirect measures of service quality, such as lower malpractice premiums or fewer patient complaints. …Our multivariate estimates show that increased licensing restrictiveness did not improve dental health, but it did raise the prices of basic dental services. Further, using several tests for the robustness of our estimates, we found that the states with more restrictive standards provided no significantly greater benefits in terms of lower cost of untreated dental disease. Our estimates…show that more regulated states have somewhat higher dental prices. …Consequently, moving toward more restrictive policies that limit customer access to these services could reduce the welfare of consumers. …To the extent that states are considering a reduction in the pass rate on dental exams or making it more difficult for out of state practitioners to enter, our analysis suggests that there would be no gains to consumers in terms of overall dental health.

This flowchart from the study illustrates what the authors were trying to measure.

The bottom line is that we have yet another case study (for others, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here) of red tape being bad news.

P.S. In recent decades, the U.S.A. has had two presidents (here and here) that pushed for less red tape."

Friday, April 5, 2024

Did Government Red Ink Make the US More Dynamic than Europe?

By Jason Sorens of AEIR.

"I like to entertain seriously views I disagree with, but it’s hard to describe a new hypothesis on the left about the United States’ economic dynamism relative to Europe’s as anything other than “cockamamie.” The claim from RogĂ© Karma in The Atlantic is that “the US economy is doing spectacularly well,” and the reason for this performance is that America is “stealing from Europe’s big-government, welfare-state playbook.” By spending $5 trillion on pandemic relief, but letting people lose their jobs, so the argument goes, the US shuffled the labor market and got people into better, more productive jobs:

This labor-market reshuffling, argues Adam Posen, the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is the most plausible explanation for why American workers experienced a sudden spike in productivity in the second half of 2023 — one that didn’t occur in Europe. ‘The pandemic response convinced people that government ultimately had their back,’ Posen told me. ‘And that allowed people to take bigger risks than normal.’

Let’s look at the evidence. If this theory is right, then productivity should have spiked just after Americans returned to work. The figure below plots percent change over the previous year in real output per hour, from the first quarter of 2019 to the fourth quarter of 2023, alongside the prime-age employment rate. We do indeed see productivity increasing in the latter half of 2023.

But what’s happening with the employment rate? It has recovered almost all of its pandemic losses by March 2022. Total quits also peaked in April 2022, implying that the job market reshuffling started slowing down then. It’s pretty arbitrary to attribute the productivity growth in 2023 to job reshuffling, when the latter process was more than 90 percent complete a year and a half before. More likely, falling inflation is the dominant reason productivity grew in late 2023.

The other piece of evidence that fits poorly with Karma’s claim is the fact that the US has been more dynamic than Europe for a long time. The figure below plots real GDP growth (percentage change from a year ago) for both the US and the Eurozone.

How can anyone look at these numbers and say that pandemic spending is what caused the US to outpace Europe? From Q4 2017 through Q1 2021 — 14 consecutive quarters — US growth beat the Eurozone’s. Then, from Q2 2021 through Q4 2022, with the sole exception of two quarters, the Eurozone outpaced the US. Only in the four quarters of 2023 has the US again taken a lead on the Eurozone. A more natural reading is that the US generally has higher growth than the Eurozone, but something happened in 2021 and 2022 to disrupt that usual pattern. One could as easily make the case that large federal deficits and inflation hurt the US relative to Europe.

Taking a step back, it’s hard for me to reconcile this new “social democratic” interpretation of the pandemic with the way that social democrats have interpreted, well, just about everything else. They want to say that mass unemployment was good this time because it allowed people to quickly find new jobs where they were more productive. That sounds a lot like the “liquidationist” perspective that influenced the Fed in the late 1920s as it crushed the stock market boom. Do Karma and Posen think that the Fed should be celebrated for having responded too late to the Great Recession that hit in 2008? That we should welcome a big financial crisis now and then? Was the Fed justified in letting the US slip into depression in the early 1930s?

Now, presumably, they would respond that mass unemployment is only good if people can get rehired quickly, which wasn’t the case during the Great Depression, nor the Great Recession. Still, the logic suggests that the workers would be better off if government periodically encouraged employers to fire many of their workers to help “reshuffle” the labor market.

On theoretical grounds, the hypothesis makes little sense either. Do businesses really keep around workers who are making a lot less than their marginal product for a long time? Do people really give up on growing in their career once they have a job? 

The new “reshuffling” thesis of American recovery doesn’t make much sense on the evidence or economic theory. It serves a convenient political purpose in helping to justify massive federal stimulus that otherwise looks like a costly waste, ahead of an election, but that’s about all that can be said for it.

For sources of American economic recovery, let’s look instead at the belated recovery of macroeconomic stability, which has allowed America’s natural dynamism to come through."

Is Freedom Falling? Take a Closer Look in Cato’s New Magazine

By Johan Norberg.

"I am honored to have written the first‐​ever cover story for Free Society, Cato’s new quarterly magazine. Titled “Through Progress and Peril: The Precarious State of Human Freedom,” the article addresses the subject that keeps lovers of liberty awake right now: The worrying decline of freedom, the rise of illiberalism at home and authoritarianism abroad, and what we can do to turn the tide.

I document the disheartening trends in personal and economic freedom in the last few years and suggest several reasons that explain why this has happened, including COVID-19 and the heavy‐​handed state actions that accompanied it. Emergencies, as F. A. Hayek argued, “have always been the pretext on which the safeguards of individual liberty have been eroded.” 

The Human Freedom Index 2023, published by the Cato Institute and the Fraser Institute, concluded that almost 90 percent of the world’s population has seen its liberties circumscribed in recent years. In terms of economic freedom, a decade of global progress was erased in the year 2020 alone.

But the picture is mixed. Throughout this time, individuals, entrepreneurs, and activists have adapted to difficulties and threats, and have crafted innovations and creative solutions to problems caused by increased government interference. The result is that indicators of human living standards are still improving at a rapid pace. 

This is where we find hope: Free men and women accomplish great things. Open societies fail only when we don’t believe in our ideals, defend them, and apply them. Authoritarians and statists have a more serious weakness: they fail when they manage to implement their ideas. Look around the world! Dictators, authoritarians, and populists are making such a huge mess out of things that they’re already writing the best arguments against their own policies—we hardly have to do it for them.

I think people are willing to listen to our case. Contrary to some commentators’ suggestions, most people have not joined the dark side; they are just exhausted with our increasingly tribal and ill‐​tempered parties and tune out. Only four percent of Americans say they experience excitement when they think of politics. 

So, the key message is that we should not despair. These kinds of backlashes against liberty have occurred regularly throughout history, but most of the time they haven’t prevailed. And they won’t this time if friends of liberty step up to the challenge and fight back. Nothing is hopeless—unless we assume that it’s hopeless and decide to give up. I know that Cato won’t and I trust that others will join us in this crucial intellectual battle for human liberty and dignity."

How new apartments create opportunities for all

By Tyler Boesch, Erik Hembre & Ben Horowitz of The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Excerpts:

"Who benefits from new market-rate apartments? While these new units are typically occupied by households on the higher end of the income spectrum, the chain of residential moves brought about by their construction benefits many more households. Today’s lower-priced rental housing was often the new, expensive rental housing of yesteryear. And it doesn’t take decades for new apartments to put downward pressure on rents elsewhere in a metropolitan area. New units help keep current prices down for everyone by opening up new opportunities for low- and moderate-income renters over a few short years through a chain of residential moves.

Imagine that a renter named Jim moves into a brand-new market-rate apartment. A renter named Maria moves into Jim’s old unit, which is more affordable than Jim’s new place. Another renter is going to move into Maria’s old unit. The chain will likely continue to include several more units, each progressively older and more affordable. It will end when someone moves out on their own from a previously shared living space.

This process of new construction encouraging mobility across the income spectrum is one piece of a phenomenon known as filtering. Theories connecting filtering to housing affordability are generally accepted among economists. For example, economic theory predicts that housing units should be relatively more affordable when the housing supply increases, as it does when new apartments open.

Owners and managers of older properties are well aware that new supply entering a market creates new opportunities for their renters to move up."

"owners and managers often cited the increased housing supply in the region as a reason why rents at their properties generally had not increased very much in the past few years. 

Evidence from economist Evan Mast, who is currently with the University of Notre Dame, has helped clearly track and document how filtering works at a granular level."

"within five years, the aggregated chain of residential moves ultimately results in about 70 new openings for renters in lower-income neighborhoods for every 100 new market-rate apartments."

"The rate at which properties filter through a housing market isn’t set in stone. Lower growth in a city’s housing supply leads to less filtering for all housing units. Unless there’s a huge drop in demand for housing, cities that don’t add to their housing supply will see more competition for fewer homes, and prices and rents will increase more quickly than they otherwise would."

"Analysis by Liyi Liu and others at the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation shows that filtering happens more slowly in places with more restrictions on construction. In places like San Francisco, filtering can even happen in reverse. When there are few homes relative to demand, older homes are more likely to be bought by higher-income households over time. This doesn’t just apply to Victorian-era mansions, but also to the less amenity-rich housing stock that used to be more accessible to first-time home buyers."

"Mast’s paper echoes research showing that high-income movers tend to create more opportunities through filtering than they take away through gentrification. His work also shows that the people who move into new housing in lower-income areas are most likely to come from other low-income neighborhoods. In a separate paper, Mast also finds that rent growth is actually slower in low-income neighborhoods after new market-rate apartments are built."

"The easier it is to build new housing, the more opportunities low- and moderate-income households will have to experience housing affordability."

Thursday, April 4, 2024

David Barker decries climate alarmists’ bad ‘science

Via Cafe Hayek. See Climate Alarmists’ Bad Science: Advocates conduct shoddy research in an effort to show that warming will reduce economic growth in The WSJ. Mr. Barker runs a real-estate and finance company. He has taught economics and finance at the University of Chicago and the University of Iowa and worked as an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Excerpts:

"I debunked research by the Federal Reserve and top academic economists on the economics of climate change. An author of a paper I debunked then said that three professors from Stanford and Berkeley had done a much better analysis of temperature and growth in an article they published in Nature. I took up the challenge and scrutinized their article. My critique appears in the latest issue of Econ Journal Watch.

The Nature article is in the top 0.1% of academic economics publications by citations, and it has received glowing press coverage. I downloaded their data and found that, as with the other articles I debunked, the results don’t hold up under scrutiny.

…..

Rather than uncovering a consistent relationship between growth and temperature around the world, their results are driven by relatively few countries. Dropping Greenland and a group of contiguous northern and central African countries, for example, eliminates the practical and statistical significance of their results.

The authors claim that there is no tendency for their results to diminish over time, because they find that the results for 1961-89 and 1990-2010 are similar. But changing the cutoff year to 1990 instead of 1989 changes this conclusion, because the data from 1991-2010 show no statistically significant relationship between growth and temperature. Because some countries are missing data from early years, a cutoff of 1990 would do a better job of matching the number of observations between the two periods. There is also evidence that if a result is present at all, it is completely reversed the following year.

I also produce simulated data with random numbers representing temperature and growth that are correlated by region, but with no relationship between temperature and growth. I find that the authors’ method is likely to indicate a statistically significant relationship even though the data are constructed to have no such relationship.

…..

The law of supply and demand applies to tomatoes and also to ideas. Demand for research that bolsters arguments for bad policy leads to supply of research. Truth provides some constraints but doesn’t always prevail.

Fortunately, such publications as Econ Journal Watch give a platform to researchers who challenge reigning propaganda. More academics and independent researchers are uncovering bias, fraud and plagiarism, bringing a bit of discipline to a field greatly in need of it."

Nothing New Thing Under the Sun: Prohibition, Drugs and the Iron Law

By Tarnell Brown of Econlib.

"Some time ago, roughly four years, I began this series on how drug prohibition only serves to create the public health crisis that such policies are supposed to mitigate. Of course, I never intended for such a large period to lapse between my last article and this one, but I suppose it is a nice demonstration of the difference between intentions and outcomes.

As a refresher, our last discussion highlighted how Prohibition-Era laws such as the Harrison and Volstead Acts begat later laws such as the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, which begat the modern War on Drugs™. Today, we will explore further the parallels between the two regime paradigms, highlighting why the continuing failure of the drug war is inevitable and wholly predictable; a Pygmalion Effect which creates what it forbids.

When the Eighteenth Amendment was passed in 1920, it was widely hailed as a watershed moment that would reduce crime and poverty, absolve the public of paying for prisons and poorhouses, and save the family from the vagaries of drunkenness. Similarly, when President Nixon declared drug addiction Public Enemy Number One in 1971, it was with his 1969 declaration  to Congress that the full forces of government must be marshaled “to cope with this growing menace to the general welfare of the United States.” Again, the nation was told, we would reduce crime and poverty, lower the scope and costs of incarceration, and stamp out a danger to the American family.

It is a vast understatement to say that these assurances were wrong, and even this is underselling the deleterious impact of these policies. Between 1916, four years before Prohibition, and 1929, four years before its repeal, both the number of cases terminated in Federal courts and the number of prisoners remanded from those courts effectively quadrupled. This, of course, led to a concomitant rise in prison spending due to overcrowding, which was a clear indication that the promised decrease in crime wasn’t coming. While proponents of Prohibition proudly proclaimed that the tide of crime had lessened, minor crimes such as vagrancy and public swearing had decreased by 50%, while more serious crimes rose precipitously; property theft by 13.2%, homicide by 16.1% and robbery by 83.3%. The tradeoff here is one between a decrease in misdemeanors likely to result in a fine or a night spent in the local jail, and felonies which greatly increased the population of state and Federal prisons.

Similarly, claims that the War on Drugs™ would reduce crime have proven unjustifiably optimistic at best. In 2020, there were an aggregate 1.1 million arrests made for drug-related offenses, of which the majority were for simple possession (Cohen, Vakharia, Netherland, & Frederique, 2022). As of 2015, the rate of prisoners as a function of the population has grown from 100 per 100,000 in the period before Nixonian drug policy to over 500 per 100,000 (Pfaff, 2015). As a result, the United States has become the world’s largest jailer, both in absolute terms and in rate. According to Miron and Waldock, expenditures related to drug prohibition – including the increase both in prisoners and the number of prisons/jails needed to accommodate them – now equals or exceeds some $41.3 million annually. 

Despite the increase in crime, prison sentences and the cost of enforcement, Prohibition had more of a shifting effect on alcohol consumption; a thing that is also true of drug consumption patterns under the current regime of criminalization. This shift, the effects of which will be discussed in greater detail in my next segment, is comprised of consumers moving away from a product of lesser potency to one of greater. This phenomenon, known as the Iron Law of Prohibition, is a result of fundamental economic principles; the creation of barriers to both entry and supply creates pressure to minimize volume while simultaneously maximizing profit (Beletsky & Davis, 2017). In effect, bulkier products with a lower degree of potency, such as beer or marijuana, are substituted by more potent, less bulky products that are easier to produce and transport, such as hard liquor and cocaine. While beer and marijuana may still be available on the black market, the price of these items rises relative to their more potent, less bulky alternatives, which tilts demand in favor of the harder stuff.

Despite the rise in crime associated with such illicit activities and the organized institutions that produce the wares, much of the distribution of prohibited items is carried out by small-scale entrepreneurs (Levine & Reinarman, 1991). While many of the headlines tout the defeat of cartels and gangs, the reality is that most of the arrests are those of small-to-mid-tier neighborhood distributors. At any given time, somewhere between 1-2 million individuals are involved in drug distribution within the U.S., while roughly a half million individuals are incarcerated for drug-related activities (Kleiman, Caulkins, & Hawken, 2011). What this means is that the average dealer-distributor spends a year incarcerated for every two to four years they engage in selling. 

A Brief Look at Social Costs

All public policy should be judged by comparing costs to benefits, including costs that are social rather than monetary. While monetary costs are easier to examine – it is a balance sheet problem, after all – social costs are no less important. Between 1973 and 2013, over $1 trillion was spent on drug enforcement in the U.S. alone. Yet, in 2016, Americans spent $150 billion on heroin, methamphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana, which doesn’t even factor in other classes of illicit drugs. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of these sunk opportunity costs is that despite a regime of increasing funding for supply-side enforcement, drug prices have continued to decline over the last four decades.  This isn’t to say that they exist in cost parity with legal substances; their prices are still higher. What it does say is that current policy does little to abate demand.

Moreover, instead of reducing crime, prohibition simply creates more criminals. Everyone involved in the drug market, from supplier to distributor to consumer, is automatically a criminal. Absent the property rights protections and dispute resolution apparatus available via normal legal channels, interested parties must resolve their own conflicts, often leading to violent means. Benson et al. (2001) find that drug enforcement is not associated with a rise in violent crime, but is also correlated with a rise in property crime; not necessarily because those involved in the drug market are committing these property crimes, but because of the opportunity costs associated with shifting resources away from one set of crimes and towards another. 

Just as it was with alcohol during Prohibition, quality control is an issue with illegal drugs. As we discussed earlier, prohibitory laws create incentives to minimize the costs of production and transport while maximizing profit, which in turn trends towards potency as the major concern. Because the product is manufactured by local entrepreneurs, however organized, there are no industry-wide safety standards. Hence, the current issue of heroin laced with fentanyl, for example. This leads to an increase in drug-related overdoses, and other related problems.

These are just a few of the more obvious social costs related to the War on Drugs™.Next, we will take a deeper dive into the issue of social costs."

Wednesday, April 3, 2024

Industrial Policy ‘Done Right’ Won’t Fix What Ails the U.S.

By Veronique de Rugy.

"Senator Marco Rubio (R., Fla.) has a new essay over at National Affairs making the case for industrial policy “done right.” He also has a piece on the issue at the Washington Post. I’m happy to see a policy-maker talking about policy. We need more of that and less of the pointless confrontation that is politics these days.

That said, it won’t be a surprise to anyone that I have many issues with his case for industrial policy. They include the usual New Right tropes that the world we lived in before Trump came to power was a laissez-faire paradise with unfettered free trade and a zero-tolerance approach to government intervention.

My issue with the pieces also include the repeated blurring of the line between national-security and economic arguments offered as justifications for the government to restructure the economy to Rubio’s liking. Indeed, it’s one thing to say that, in a world that looks more dangerous by the day, we should invest in national security. It’s a whole other thing to use the national-security excuse to justify economic policies with the objective of putting people back to work. In fact, I assume that Rubio’s industrial policy, while arguably better than Biden’s plan, will achieve neither heightened security nor put more people back to work.

I will pass quickly over the senator’s recycling of debunked evidence that industrial policy works well. See for instance his reference to the Wells King and Dan Vaughn piece that asserts that the 1980s U.S. automotive protectionism — in the form of Japanese “voluntary export restraints” — was a tremendous success. It is frustrating to see a seasoned legislator, whom I’m sure is well read, ignore Scott Lincicome’s demonstration in these very pages of the silliness of King’s and Vaughn’s argument, the flimsiness of their data, and the unseriousness of their conclusion.

Instead, I want to focus on Rubio’s disappointing unwillingness to tackle the hard challenges confronting his position: Industrial policy can direct money toward particular goals or industries, but it won’t deliver on the job promises made and it will certainly not heal our culture and communities.

Ultimately, that’s the reason why the senator wants to implement industrial policy. He sees it as a remedy to his claim, “The collapse of American manufacturing correlates with falling employment and societal decay in rural Appalachia and downtown Baltimore alike.” When he talks about the collapse of manufacturing, he is most likely talking about the collapse of manufacturing employment, because as Colin Grabow shows here, manufacturing is doing well. And when he talks about falling employment, I assume he means men who have fallen out of the labor force, because a 3.9 percent unemployment rate means that most people who want a job can to get a job. Rubio adds, “Conservative industrial policy could correlate with the inverse, breathing new life — and freedom — into a divided and downcast nation.”

Basically, the senator thinks that conservative industrial policy, as opposed to what President Biden is doing, will create a manufacturing boom that will trigger a manufacturing employment boom that will put men back to work in fulfilling and well-paying jobs.

I do not deny that many men have given up on work and that it is a problem. (They have, and it is.) I certainly don’t disagree that the best way to achieve the American dream is through work. I do not dispute either that there is a decline in manufacturing jobs. (There has been.) Manufacturing employment as a share of total employment peaked in the U.S. 80 years ago, in January 1944. And this trend, which is not unique to the U.S., is a well-documented product of innovation.

What I question is the idea that industrial policy “done right” will reverse these trends.

First, even if his version of industrial policy — which he claims will be different from the Biden version — were to produce a manufacturing boom, it wouldn’t produce a boom in manufacturing employment precisely because modern manufacturing relies heavily on automation. Let me repeat this again: Industrial policy will not turn us back into a nation of factory workers, especially one that employs the workers that the senator is concerned about.

Then what’s the plan? Does he want to force factories to retool with 1950s technology so that the resulting lower worker productivity will require many more man-hours in manufacturing work? And does he realize that, if such an outcome were to occur, the lower productivity of manufacturing workers would dramatically drive down manufacturing wages? What would that do to his plan for well-paying jobs in manufacturing?

Second, industrial policy won’t address the causes of a growing group of working-age Americans, especially the ones without a college degree, detached from the labor market. These causes are fairly well understood today. As Nick Eberstadt writes in the 2020 winter issue of National Affairs, “The more relevant pieces of the puzzle are family structure, government-benefit dependence, and mass incarceration and feminization.”

I get that the senator wants to pretend that trade is the reason behind men’s detachment from the workforce, but he will fail to address these problems if protectionism and “government investments” are the avenue he pursues. Eberstadt, for instance, writes:

The tempo of workforce withdrawal appears to be almost completely unaffected by the tempo of national economic growth, which varied appreciably over this period. Even recessions — including the Great Recession — appear to have scarcely any impact on the trend. Likewise, the NAFTA agreement, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and other “disruptive” trade events with major implications for the demand for labor in America do not stand out in this chart. The striking steadiness of this exodus, year in and year out, is fundamentally inconsistent with a demand-side explanation for declining labor-force participation rates.

Trade is a scapegoat, and industrial policy (conservative or progressive) is a distraction from doing the hard work of reforming the government policies, such as Social Security Disability Insurance, that cause or exacerbate the decline in men’s labor-force participation. The senator acknowledges that regulation gets in the way of building domestic industry (so much for the theory that we have been living in a world of free-market fundamentalism). He is right. NEPA, housing, permitting, occupation-licensing regulations, labor regulations, and so much more are suffocating this country. Why not start there instead of embracing a policy that will add to the regulatory burden, won’t look much different that Biden’s industrial policy, and won’t address the problem?"