"Last week, the Supreme Court issued an order that left many in disbelief. The Court denied several motions for stay (a legal pause) regarding the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Clean Power Plan (CPP) 2.0 rule after granting a stay of the original CPP in 2016 and elaborating on the Major Questions Doctrine in overturning the CPP on its merits in West Virginia v. EPA in 2022.
The EPA rule, which we call CPP 2.0 because it’s the second attempt
at a CPP under section 111 of the Clean Air Act, hurts the reliability
and affordability of electricity when both are already at risk. The EPA
now requires existing coal and new natural gas power plants to
significantly change their operations or shut them down entirely. CPP
2.0 is a costly and unlawful mandate for the unproven technology of
carbon capture and sequestration/storage (CCS).
The fate of CPP 2.0 will be the same when the Supreme Court reviews
it on the merits—it will be overturned because it plainly violates the
statute it cites as authority from Congress. But it will hurt many more
Americans than it needs to because the Supreme Court took a narrow view
of “irreparable harm.”
The irreparable harm ignored by the Supreme Court is that demand for electricity in the United States is growing again
in exceptional ways (in part due to unforeseen growth in computing
load), and CPP 2.0 is preventing economic growth—and possibly causing
electricity shortages—by mandating impossible standards for existing and
new electricity supplies.
The CPP 2.0 Mandate
In its most basic form, CPP 2.0 requires existing coal and new
natural gas power plants to implement CCS on an unprecedented scale. For
existing coal-fired power plants, CPP 2.0 requires the owners of any
plant that might remain operational after 2039 to capture and store 90
percent of its carbon dioxide emissions by 2032. (Some less stringent
options are available for coal plants that will be closed by 2032 or
2040.)
Likewise, the rule requires any new combined-cycle natural gas–fired
power plants operating above “baseload” levels (at an annual capacity
factor above 40 percent) to reduce their carbon emissions by 90 percent
by 2032 by implementing CCS.
How did the EPA come up with this rule? Dating back to the 1970 Clean
Air Act amendments, Congress authorized the EPA to issue nationally
binding emissions standards for stationary sources like power plants
through section 111 using proven technology as a baseline.
Specifically, EPA’s standards of performance under section 111 must
be based on “the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality
health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.” (emphasis added)
In CPP 2.0, the EPA claimed CCS at a 90 percent capture rate had been
adequately demonstrated, which is a patently false account of the facts
on the ground. This is the key issue of statutory interpretation
relevant to CPP 2.0, and we believe the rule will fail on EPA’s
fundamental misreading of the statute and/or its misreading of the
facts in the record.
The short version of the merits argument is this: CCS depends on
a mind-bogglingly large set of new infrastructure (rivaling the existing
network of fossil fuel infrastructure itself), including CO2 pipelines
to carry enormous amounts of CO2 from power plants to injection sites.
Such infrastructure may be impossible to build and certainly has not
been “adequately demonstrated.” For more detailed legal and technical
arguments, see comments on the proposed rule.
The only power plant in the United States that captures anywhere near 90 percent of CO2 emissions is perhaps the Petra Nova
plant in Texas, which has not operated continuously and does not
technically sequester CO2 at all—it injects CO2 into oil wells in a
process known as enhanced oil recovery. Another power plant often cited by proponents of CCS (and explicitly cited by the EPA) is the Boundary Dam project in Canada, which has consistently underperformed on its CCS goal of—you guessed it—90 percent.
Thus, EPA’s emissions standard is far too stringent because it is
based on plants that are located near profitable CO2 injection and
storage sites or are falling woefully short of the EPA’s goal. A rule
mandating 90 percent CCS nationwide is therefore at odds with the part
of the statute that says the “best system of emission reduction” must be
“adequately demonstrated.”
CPP 2.0’s Irreparable Harm
The mandate to close existing coal plants and prevent the building of
new “baseload” natural gas plants is a recipe for electricity
shortages, skyrocketing electricity prices, or a mix of both. The lack
of certainty regarding which set of rules a power plant owner is likely
to face in the coming years is itself a deterrent to building or
retaining needed supplies.
In practice, the much-needed new electricity supplies
are likely to come from less efficient simple-cycle natural gas power
plants—essentially methane-fueled jet engines—which will increase costs
and preclude more efficient investments until CPP 2.0 is finally
overturned.
At the wholesale level, prices will be set
more often by these less efficient units with higher marginal costs,
meaning wholesale electricity prices will be higher than necessary.
Further, the US Energy Information Administration
(EIA) estimates only 2.6 gigawatts of new natural gas–fired power
plants will come online in 2024, while 3.8 GW will be retired.
Coal plant closures will also reduce power supplies. PJM
Interconnection Inc., the largest electricity market in North America by
revenue and volume, has issued stark warnings
about the collision course we are on between growing demand and falling
supply, stating that there is a “timing mismatch between resource
retirements, load growth and the pace of new generation entry.” CPP 2.0
exacerbates such a mismatch because it would force the retirement of
coal units, which produced 16 percent of the electricity in the United States last year.
To be clear, we don’t expect anyone at the EPA, the Supreme Court, or
any government agency to accurately predict the timing and scale of
Americans’ future electricity needs. Efforts to centrally plan electricity markets
are likely to lead to supply shortages, increased costs, top-down
rationing, and rolling blackouts. But that is precisely why CPP 2.0 is
so harmful—it allows the EPA to be the national gatekeeper for new
electricity supplies, which will have disastrous consequences.
The Court’s Mistake
In his statement about the denial of applications for stay, Justice Brett Kavanaugh argued
that applicants “are unlikely to suffer irreparable harm before the
Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit decides the merits” because
“applicants need not start compliance work until June 2025.”
Unfortunately, that is untrue. For would-be builders of new natural gas
power plants, the irreparable harm likely began in May 2023 (the date of
the proposed rule) and was cemented in the final version of CPP 2.0,
which featured an effective date of July 8, 2024.
While Justice Kavanaugh’s approach may make sense in the legal
compliance world, it ignores economic decisions that predate compliance.
As Frederic Bastiat might say, the court focused on what is seen—the
compliance measures undertaken by plants that are already built—and
failed to recognize the unseen harms.
We cannot see, for example, the business activities or consumer savings
that might have occurred if the Supreme Court had granted the motions
for stay. In other words, CPP 2.0 is already causing irreparable harm
because it’s preventing much-needed electricity supplies that would be
built in its absence. (We note that Justice Clarence Thomas would have
granted the applications for stay, and Justice Samuel Alito did not
participate.)
PJM and other grid operators articulated this harm in their amicus brief,
stating that the EPA has “failed to adequately consider the impact of
premature retirements driven by the Rule’s compliance timelines.” They
also highlighted how investments in the grid, particularly large power
plants, are based on “the expected revenues associated with continuing
operation of the unit. Unit owners may decide to retire units early
rather than incur additional expense and risk.” Premature power plant
closures—and the stalling of new supplies in an era of demand growth—are
the irreparable harm the Court failed to see.
Conclusion
Supreme Court justices clearly understand the law. However, the order
in this case demonstrated that many of them do not understand market
processes and fall into the knowledge problem
trap of attempting to assume the unknowable. By denying the motions to
stay CPP 2.0, the Supreme Court squandered a perfect opportunity to
limit executive branch overreach in the new post-Chevron era and protect millions of Americans from government-induced harm."