"Even people who are otherwise enthusiastic about a free market in labor can get cold feet about immigration once redistribution enters the picture. Some are fond of quoting Milton Friedman, who famously (or infamously) said:
“It’s just obvious you can’t have free immigration and a welfare state.”
On this view, immigration is fine under fully free market institutions, but in the actual world with its abundant government-provided
benefits, immigration restrictions are justified to protect taxpayers
from the added expense that could arise if immigrants consume these
benefits. But this conclusion is
too quick, and even Friedman’s position is more nuanced than people on
both sides of the immigration debate tend to realize.
An initial point, though: the concern about the fiscal cost of immigration is overstated.
For one reason, in the United States, most welfare spending goes to the
very young or the very old. Immigrants, by contrast, are
disproportionately of working age.
Setting that point aside, Friedman’s own view wasn’t that immigration as such is harmful. He argued that legal
immigration is the problem, precisely because it allows immigrants to
access government benefits. By contrast, he thought illegal immigration
was beneficial. As he put it: “It’s a good thing for the illegal
immigrants. It’s a good thing for the United States. It’s a good thing
for the citizens of the country. But it’s only good so long as it’s
illegal.” Friedman’s reasoning was
that illegal immigration enables mutually beneficial market exchange
while limiting immigrants’ access to government benefits.
Now, many fiscal conservatives balk
at Friedman’s recommendation—namely, if the overconsumption of
government resources is the problem with lawful immigration, the
solution is to encourage people to break the law. I understand this
reaction, but I admit I don’t share it. In my view, whether it’s okay
for someone to do something doesn’t depend on whether lawmakers give
them written permission. For instance, did you know that it’s against the law
to drive on Cape Cod’s National Seashore’s beach if there’s not a
tire-pressure gauge in your car? Nevertheless, I have no moral
objection if you drive on the beach gaugelessly. Regardless of whether
government officials approve, this is just a peaceful activity that
doesn’t violate anyone’s rights.
Maybe you disagree with me. Still, as others have suggested,
there’s another way to accommodate Friedman’s general idea: admit
immigrants as lawful permanent residents but restrict their access to
certain government resources. Economists sometimes call this a “keyhole solution”—if
the problem is immigrants’ consumption of benefits, then design a
policy that narrowly targets that problem rather than restricts their
freedom to immigrate entirely.
The main objection to this sort of policy seems to be moral rather than economic. Indeed, Friedman himself was asked about it
and he replied that he found the proposal unappealing partly because
it’s not “desirable to have two classes of citizens in a society.”
That’s a good point. It’s
unfair for a government to give some citizens taxpayer-financed
benefits but not others. If two people live, work, and pay taxes within a
country, government officials should treat them equally, which involves
giving them both equal access to government resources.
Notice, though, that a policy of immigration restriction also treats
citizens and prospective immigrants differently—it gives citizens, but
not immigrants, access to domestic labor markets, private associations,
educational opportunities, and more. Consequently, a principle of equal
treatment actually seems to imply open borders. Given that Friedman
rejects this option, the task becomes that of identifying the
second-best solution. (Also, it’s not clear that Friedman can square his
objection to keyhole solutions with his endorsement of illegal
immigration, which would presumably also create two classes in a
society.)
Why think that a policy of open
immigration with restricted access to benefits is better than outright
exclusion? The reason, in brief, is that admission with conditions
treats prospective immigrants betterthan exclusion. A policy of open
immigration with restricted benefits at least gives people the option to move, and it’s hard to see how giving someone a new option could make them worse off.
Here’s an analogy. Suppose John is
entering the job market. One employer offers him a job with health
insurance and a retirement plan. The next day, he receives another
offer—this one comes with no benefits, but a much higher salary. Even if
you think he should take the first job, it seems perfectly permissible
to offer him the second. John is no worse off for having another option.
If he doesn’t want to take it, he can simply decline it. And if he does
prefer higher pay without benefits, he’s clearly better off for having
the option.
John’s case is analogous to the case of a prospective immigrant who expects to earn significantly more by moving to a country
where her access to government benefits is limited. If she prefers
having access to a wider range of government-provided benefits in her
current country to having higher earnings but fewer benefits in a new
country, she can decline to move; in this case, she is no worse off for
having the option. But if she prefers higher earnings with fewer
benefits, the option makes her better off. Just as it’s
permissible—indeed, probably good—to offer John the extra option, so too
is it permissible to offer prospective immigrants the extra option.
It’s also worth highlighting another
important aspect of restricting immigrants’ access to benefits rather
than restricting their movement entirely. Admitting immigrants as lawful
permanent residents removes the threat of deportation, among other
consequences, that accompanies undocumented entry into a country. Even
if you agree with Friedman (as I do) that the keyhole solution of
admitting immigrants with reduced access to benefits isn’t totally fair,
it’s still more fair than denying prospective immigrants the option of safely moving at all."