Activists love it, but it is counterproductive, has no basis in statute, and could be unconstitutional
By Joseph A. Grundfest. He is a professor emeritus at Stanford Law School. He served as an SEC commissioner, 1985-90. Excerpts:
"Investors owning as little as $2,000 of a company’s stock—about 16 billionths of the average market capitalization of an S&P 500 company—can force a vote. Average monthly rent for a New York City apartment is roughly $3,500, 75% more than the rule’s minimum. This holding requirement might be the only thing in America not suffering an affordability crisis.
Only 11% of the proposals that proceeded to a vote in the 2025 proxy season gained majority support from voting stockholders. If a proposal is approved, the corporation’s board typically declines to implement it anyway. The Access Rule thus generates toothless, performative votes.
The rule is wildly popular with governance gurus and policy advocates. It’s a free soapbox that forces management to address issues they’d rather not discuss. To buy peace, executives will often make concessions in exchange for the activists’ withdrawing their proposals. If a proposal fails, activists still demonstrate to supporters a willingness to confront the corporation. Just because a proposal is performative doesn’t mean it’s ineffective."
"The Access Rule . . . commandeers the corporate proxy to compel votes on shareholder proposals, an encroachment not authorized by federal securities law."