Friday, September 25, 2026

Family Income Continues to Grow in 2025 Data

By Jeremy Horpedahl.

"Yesterday the Census Bureau released their annual treasure trove of data from the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Loads of new data are now available for 2025 on income, poverty, and health insurance coverage. This new data allows me to update one of my favorite charts, showing the distribution of family income in the U.S. since 1967. Census releases this data by grouping families into nine different income groups, which I have collapsed into three groups, each being as close to one-third of the total as I can get using the publicly available data.

Figure 1

 

See also a similar chart from Mark Perry which uses household income (rather than family income) over the same time period.

Figure 1 shows that, adjusted for inflation, the proportion of families with income over $150,000 has grown almost seven-fold since 1967. There has been a roughly constant one-third of the population between $75,000 and $150,000, and the ranks of those under $75,000 has been cut in half since 1967. Again, these dollar figures all adjusted for inflation, using the preferred deflator of the Census Bureau.

What’s even more astonishing is when we look at the number of families at various thresholds, rather than just the share, as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2

 

In 1967 there were fewer than 3 million families with incomes over $150,000 (in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars). By 2025, that had grown to over 31 million families. If we look at the highest income threshold in this Census data — over $200,000 — the number of families has grown from just 1 million in 1967 to over 20 million in 2025. And there are fewer lower-income families too: the number of families under $75,000 shrunk, not just as a proportion of the total as seen in Figure 1, but even in absolute terms by almost 3 million families from 1967 to 2025.

Of course, some of these families do have more earners than in 1967, though we shouldn’t overstate that too much. Using other data from Census, we can see that the share of families with multiple earners hasn’t increased much since 1967, and especially hasn’t since the mid-1990s.

Table 1

 

As seen in Table 1, as far back as 1967 the majority of families in the U.S. had multiple earners. Now it’s true these were not all married couples with both spouses working full-time, and hours of work in the household have risen over time — but not much since the 1990s. This data is somewhat skewed by the aging of the population, as evidenced by the rising number of families with no earners. But even if we drop those families with no earners, multiple-income families haven’t grown much: from 58% of the total in 1967 to 63% in 2025." 

Thursday, September 24, 2026

Krugman, Stiglitz, et al Flunk Econ 101

By David R Henderson.

"Six winners of the Nobel Prize in economics recently signed a statement in favor of California’s Proposition 40, the measure that would impose a one-time 5 percent tax on California billionaires. They are Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, Peter Diamond, Esther Duflo, Paul Krugman, and Joseph Stiglitz. Their statement showed little understanding of basic economics.

In one section, they write:

Over the 2019-2025 period, the total amount of California income tax paid by billionaires amounted to only 1.6% of their $1.4 trillion wealth gain, much less than what ordinary Californians pay on their paychecks.

There are two problems here. First, they don’t know that billionaires today, the ones who would be paying the tax, got a $1.4 trillion wealth gain. There’s huge mobility in and out of the group of billionaires, especially over a period as long as 6 years. Also, someone might have had a billion in 2019 and have a billion today. That person would be taxed this special 5 percent. What’s his wealth gain? Zero.

Second, it’s a phony comparison because the rest of us “ordinary Californians” don’t see our wealth gain on our paychecks. Our paychecks are for services rendered. Capital gains, whether realized or not, don’t appear. So someone might make $80,000 on his paycheck and have had, over six years, an unrealized capital gain on his house of $200,000. But these economists don’t take account of that. Are they aware that a few million Californians are sitting in houses on which they have had huge capital gains? Or are they just incredibly sloppy or even dishonest?

They also state:

This extreme wealth has translated into extraordinary power, in California just like in the United States more broadly. During the 2000 federal election cycle, billionaires accounted for about 1% of total donations; in 2024 this number had risen to 19%. The Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, X are all owned or controlled by prominent billionaires. Sergey Brin alone has already spent more than $100 million to defeat the California billionaire tax.

But there were many fewer billionaires in 2000, for two reasons. First, even inflation-adjusted, there are way more billionaires just as there are way more millionaires. Second, inflation alone has led to more billionaires. One billion in 2024 would be, in 2000 dollars, $549 million.

Moreover, are these economists aware of why Sergey Brin spent more than $100 million to defeat Proposition 40? It’s because it’s on the ballot. If they wanted him not to make political contributions, there was a way to do it: persuade their allies not to put Proposition 40 on the ballot. These economists don’t just flunk Econ 101; they also flunk Irony 101.

The Nobelists also state:

California’s 250 billionaires are collectively worth $2.3 trillion. Their wealth now amounts to the entire annual income of all California taxpayers — some 20 million of them.

But billionaires’ net worth is their wealth, the value of all their assets, and it’s a stock. The annual income of all California taxpayers is a flow. Economists are not worth their pay, a flow, and might even not be worth their wealth, a stock, if they fail to distinguish between stocks and flows.

In his speech at the Nobel banquet of 1974, Friedrich Hayek stated:

There is no reason why a man who has made a distinctive contribution to economic science should be omnicompetent on all problems of society – as the press tends to treat him till in the end he may himself be persuaded to believe.

I’m sure he would extend his generalization to women too, so Esther Duflo isn’t let off the hook.

Actually, though, the six economists’ statement is even worse than what Hayek feared. He worried that Nobelists would pontificate “on all problems of society.” But these Nobelists get even some basics of economics wrong."

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Matthew Lilley: A bunch of Nobel Prize-winning economists have endorsed California's proposed billionaire wealth tax. I can't oppose them on authority. But I know some academics who can.

He is a lecturer at The Australian National University. This is his This is his Twitter thread.

"Acemoglu (2001) v. Acemoglu (2026)

Colonial Origins: "Protection against expropriation risk is extremely important for long-run prosperity."

Also: "Anyway, here's a 5% levy on the existing property of one narrowly defined group."
It's a one-off. I pinky promise.
 
Apparently the lesson of Colonial Origins was credible property rights are important until the property crosses ten figures.

The coefficient on expropriation risk: enormous.
 
The coef when the taxpayer owns Nvidia stock: Appendix B, Vibes

Diamond (1971) v. Diamond (2026)

Diamond–Mirrlees: Preserve production efficiency. Don't distort productive choices when other tax instruments exist.

Prop 40: tax the assets of people who own lots of productive capital?

Professor Production Efficiency: "Sounds good."
 

Banerjee & Duflo (2007) v. Banerjee & Duflo (2026)

The credibility revolution: Stop waving your hands about giant ideological questions. Find something you can identify. Run the experiment. Measure what happened.
 
And therefore, naturally: California should impose a 5% wealth tax.

The causal chain:
1. Randomize remedial tutors in Mumbai and Vadodara.
2. Observe a 0.28σ rise in test scores.
3. ???
4. Tax Jensen Huang's equity.
 
Thousands of economist-hours teaching the profession to decompose huge policy questions into narrow ones with credible identification.

Then the ballot proposition arrives:

"No RCT necessary for this one, lads. Pre vs post comparisons in an AI boom are fine."
 
Krugman (1991) v. Krugman (2026)

New Economic Geography: Firms, workers and capital respond to incentives in deciding where to locate; those choices can shift equilibria.

Location is endogenous. Agglomerations aren't laws of nature.
 
But then for California:

"Yes, location incentives exist. Yes, mobile capital exists. Yes, equilibria can shift. But Silicon Valley will obviously be fine."

Location is endogenous, but apparently not that endogenous.
 
Truly, the most robust result in modern economics is that, as ideology grows large, every theorem acquires a people-who-are-richer-than-me exception.
 
(If you don't like the jokes, don't blame me, blame my co-author GPT. He did all the work)."

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

The FTC Should Not Dissuade Personalized Pricing

By Mark Jamison of AEI.

"Imagine that you and I buy the same product from the same website at the same time, yet you pay more than I do. The difference is that the seller knows something about each of us. Perhaps your browsing history, shopping behavior, location, or some other factor suggests that you are willing to pay more than I am. Is this fair? More importantly, is it illegal? 

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is thinking about this. This issue is whether there is something about personalized pricing—pricing that treats customers as individuals rather than groups—that increases the chances of unfair or deceptive business practices, as the FTC defines them. It has proposed an enforcement policy that would scrutinize businesses that use personalized pricing. 

The concern is understandable but misplaced. Digitization gives businesses far more information about customers than they previously possessed. And machine learning makes it increasingly possible to use that information to estimate what an individual might be willing to pay. But knowing that prices can be personalized tells us little about whether consumers are harmed. 

The standard textbook example of personalized pricing considers a monopolist that knows precisely what each customer is willing to pay and charges accordingly. The monopolist makes higher profits and higher-end consumers lose the surplus they would have received if prices were uniform. This might sound ominous, but it leaves out much of what happens in actual markets. 

Start with competition. A business that knows you are willing to pay $100 for something might like to charge you $100. But another firm notices and, if feasible, might offer it to you for $90, stealing your business. If firms have similar information about you, personalization can intensify competition for your business. 

This isn’t simply conjecture. Prominent research has shown that personalized pricing can benefit consumers when market coverage is high. It also finds something especially relevant for policymakers: Consumers can sometimes be worse off when only some firms are able to personalize prices than when either all or no firms can do so. Other research reaches related conclusions, finding that consumer information can intensify competition as businesses make targeted offers to defend existing customers and attract customers from rivals. 

There is no general rule that personalized pricing harms consumers or is problematic in any other way. It might benefit firms, but it can also increase competition, bring additional consumers into the market, and improve the matching of products with customers. 

There is another issue that deserves more attention. Many of the analyses assume that the products in question already exist. But we know that when incumbents profit, rivals innovate. The same information that lets a business personalize prices can help it personalize products. This is already happening in e-commerce, entertainment, travel, and education. As the costs of customization decline, both prices and products become increasingly personalized. Regulations that make personalization less profitable will lower incentives to innovate. 

The FTC’s proposal recognizes that personalized pricing is not unlawful in itself. But it states that when consumers reasonably expect prices not to vary with personal data, businesses using personalized pricing should disclose the personalization, its basis, and the types of data used. Failure to do so, the FTC says, is likely to constitute an unfair or deceptive practice. That puts a lot of weight on “reasonable expectations” and the presumed value of disclosing trade secrets. 

People certainly care about fairness. But perceptions of fairness differ among people and change with experience. Americans do not even agree about whether our economic system itself is fair. Trying to turn such perceptions into a policy encourages arbitrary enforcement. 

Besides, consumers already have ways of responding to situations they consider unfair. Richard Thaler’s work on transaction utility shows that people care about more than just prices. They care about the nature of the deal and respond accordingly. Businesses that violate customers’ senses of fairness lose business. 

None of this means businesses should be free to deceive customers. The FTC should pursue violators based on current legal standards, applying them equally regardless of whether prices are uniform, personalized, or something in between. Research gives us little reason to believe that principles should change as knowledge increases." 

Monday, September 21, 2026

Workers who move to firms with higher well-being scores take more sickness absences, without changing healthcare usage

By Riccardo Di Francesco, Peter Hull & Seetha Menon.

"We study how firms’ orientation toward employee well-being shapes the health of their workers. Because this orientation is not directly observable, we measure it from the language Danish firms use in their public disclosures, applying language models to construct a firm-level well-being salience score. We link this score to population-wide administrative registers of health and sickness absence over 2013–2022, and exploit workers’ mobility between firms to estimate how workers respond to a change in the salience of their employer. We find an asymmetry: workers who move to higher-salience firms take substantially more sickness absence, while their use of health care does not change. Because worsening health would raise both, the absence response suggests a behavioral change rather than deteriorating health. Broadly, our results show that firms shape not only worker health but how workers act on it, and that the language of routine corporate disclosure can reveal economically meaningful features of the workplace that administrative data leave unrecorded."  

So if you make it easier to take time off workers will do that even if they don't need it. This could happen if we had national health care. 

The Tragedy of Nikole Hannah-Jones (and the problems with public education)

By Alex Tabarrok.

"Nikole Hannah-Jones famously sent her child to a predominantly black/lower-income public school in New York City. Now her child says she shouldn’t have been used as political fodder.

The essay makes for hard reading and I acknowledge NHJ’s courage in writing about her mistakes and the cost to her child. The piece is raw and true when talking about her personal choices, but the larger story in which NHJ embeds her personal history is mostly false. The problem isn’t funding. The failures she documents are failures of management and accountability, not lack of resources. NYC spends upwards of $40k per pupil on average, the highest of any large district in the country. Moreover, schools in NYC with lower-income students get more than the average. PS 307, where NHJ initially sent her child, is currently funded at just over 52k per student, far above the national average.

Nationally, there haven’t been big gaps in funding within states by race or income for decades. NHJ has reckoned with her failing her own child but she has not yet reckoned with the failure of her entire educational philosophy.

The role of ideology in blinding NHJ is dramatic. NHJ’s daughter earns high grades in her math classes but she fails standardized tests. Most parents, especially conservatives, know what that means. The classes are a lie. But NHJ is blinded by ideology and assumes it’s the standardized tests that are biased. It’s only when her daughter demands to go to a better school that she and her daughter confront the truth:

Najya knew very little algebra and had huge gaps in many of the building blocks of math that she should have learned in elementary school, like mastery of long division and fractions.

The confrontation is almost disastrous:

My child’s confidence wilted like an unwatered plant. She started to develop an almost debilitating anxiety around taking tests. She became sullen at school and began to act out. For the first time ever, I got messages from teachers about Najya’s behavior.

Fortunately, Najya battles back and recovers but much more could be said here about the costs of social promotion, DEI and mismatch on the so-called beneficiaries.

Ironically, NHJ invokes the heroic history of Black Americans integrating schools to justify keeping her own child in a segregated one. Painful.

NHJ thought that she and her husband–politically connected, astute people who were not afraid to speak up–could do well for their daughter and the other kids in the school. But in the end she has written a great piece on why voice fails–even a powerful voice–in the absence of the threat of exit. Hannah-Jones could have saved herself some grief and her child a poor education by reading my post The tragedy of Jonathan Kozol.

It’s been said that Ayn Rand’s heroes don’t exist, but her villains do. Case in point. Hannah-Jones says that she and her husband “felt an obligation to make educational decisions based on the collective good.” But she wasn’t just sacrificing herself for her ideology; she was sacrificing her child, who had no choice in the matter. “I don’t think she’s deserving of more than other kids,” she said in 2017. Nearly a decade later, Najya reminded her that in the abstract your child may not deserve more than other children, but she is nevertheless entitled to expect more from you. “Sometimes I wish instead of always thinking about other kids, you would have thought about me.” You don’t have to be a Randian to think that your child should not be sacrificed to the collective good, but it doesn’t hurt."

Sunday, September 20, 2026

College campuses need to be liberated from their administrators

Higher ed is being strangled by absurd and costly rules. What message is that sending to students?

By Barry Lam. He is a philosophy professor at UC Riverside. Excerpt:

"The promise of digital infrastructure is to be able to do bureaucratic tasks more cheaply and efficiently. In principle, just like spending on administrative staff should make the essential functions of administration less burdensome, spending on software should make spending on administrative staff less essential.

But in higher education the opposite has happened. Millions and millions of dollars are being spent on digital infrastructure and the hiring of administrative staff who must oversee and mitigate problems caused by the digital infrastructure itself.

The University of California system promised that $170 million in spending on a single digital infrastructure project would cut administrative bloat by $753 million over its lifetime. Instead, the project took seven years and ballooned to $942 million in cost — and the finished project was so poorly designed and difficult to use that an entirely new IT unit had to be created just to keep the software functional. The savings on staffing were zero."