The golden age of airline service was also an era of restriction and
high prices. From deregulation to the downfall of no-frills Spirit,
competition exposes what travelers are truly willing to pay for.
By Donald J. Boudreaux. Excerpt:
"Prior to deregulation that began in the late 1970s, interstate
commercial air travel was governed by the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act.
With that legislation, the federal government restricted entry into the
industry. It also established and assigned interstate routes, and
regulated the fares that airlines charged passengers for seats on planes
that flew those routes. This regulation was meant to ensure airline
profitability and, thus, aimed to restrict competition among the
airlines. On interstate routes, airlines could not compete for customers
by lowering prices, which were set by the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
later to become the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
The airlines in the mid-20th century did indeed profit from the
government’s regulatory efforts on their behalf. Nevertheless, even the
government cannot prevent competition; its interventions can only divert
competition into other channels that are less beneficial for consumers.
Unable to compete by lowering fares, airlines competed on the
customer-service front. Compared to today, the standard coach seat
during the era of regulation had more legroom. Full meals were common. As opposed to today’s use of the hub-and-spoke system,
direct flights were the norm. (Although this costly feature was
required by the regulators, it likely would have been commonplace even
without being mandated.) And flight attendants were overwhelmingly young and attractive single women.
Forced to pay high prices to fly, at least customers got something in
return for the additional dollars the regulators obliged them to fork
over for the privilege of flying.
Deregulation of fares allowed market experimentation to discover how better to serve airline passengers. Airfares fell dramatically,
which seems necessarily to be an obvious benefit for consumers. But we
know this fall in airfares to be a benefit to consumers only because it
happened in a more-competitive market. Obviously, consumers would love
to pay the lower fares while still having more legroom, more direct
flights, and full meals with free booze in coach class served by
attractive and charming flight attendants.
These nice amenities aren’t free, however. They must be paid for. If
the flying public had valued those regulation-era amenities enough to
continue paying regulation-era airfares, airlines would have been happy
to continue to supply those amenities at those high fares. But the
public spoke with its purse: competition revealed that most air
passengers prefer to pay lower prices, even if doing so means fewer
amenities, than to pay higher prices in exchange for the many amenities.
(The relatively few customers with different preferences choose to
upgrade to seats in ‘economy plus’ or in first class.)
Flying today is much less costly, in real terms, than it was before airlines were deregulated. (And, by the way, deregulation did nothing to slow the improvement in airline safety.)
As such, the commercial-aviation experience today — unlike when I was a
boy and young man — is commonplace and hardly luxurious (adjusting for
the reality that, nevertheless, when in an airplane you are flying through the air while seated in a chair,
an experience that everyone before the twentieth century would have
regarded as miraculous). Even for a working-class American family today,
going to the airport simply to behold a relative boarding an airplane
is as unimaginable as going to a local bus stop simply to behold that
same relative boarding a bus.
It’s worth noting that competition also reveals the limits to
consumers’ tolerance for sacrificing amenities for lower fares. Spirit
Airlines’ business model was to eliminate as many as possible ‘free’
amenities, stripping the base ticket price down and charging separately
for virtually everything else, including carry-on bags, seat selection,
snacks, even water. Spirit also offered infamously little legroom.
Because ‘optimal’ market outcomes cannot be divined in the abstract —
because these outcomes can only be discovered through competitive
market processes in which entrepreneurs are free to experiment — it was a
good idea to run this experiment. As it happens, though, too few
consumers were willing to pay even low fares for that level of minimal
amenities. Spirit was on the verge of bankruptcy well before the price
of aviation fuel was sent soaring by the war in Iran, which is why
JetBlue in 2022 offered to merge with Spirit – a move that would have
enabled JetBlue to obtain Spirit’s equipment and landing slots.
In a monumental feat of economic ignorance, the Biden administration sued
to block the merger on the grounds that it would reduce competition and
raise fares. Spirit has now gone forever to the economic spirit world.
Here’s the view from 30,000 feet. When producers are allowed to
compete on all margins, including price, they discover the optimal mix
of prices and amenities that best satisfy their customers. When
governments obstruct that competition, it gets redirected into changing
the quality of goods and services such that the resulting price-quality
mixes are less desirable than would be the mixes that emerge without
government intervention.
After airlines were deregulated almost 50 years ago, consumers
revealed that they wanted lower prices with less quality. And by more
recently rejecting the bare service offered by Spirit Airlines,
consumers revealed that quality can be so low that even very low prices
are insufficient compensation to put up with such low quality. These
results emerged from competitive market processes and deserve respect.
But alas, just as airline regulation forced American air passengers to
buy what they would have preferred not to buy, the government’s
continuing itch to override market processes will oblige consumers in
the future — whenever such interventions occur — to suffer worse
economic outcomes."