Monday, November 16, 2026

Jarrett Dieterle and Santiago Vidal Calvo decry the left’s hostility to the gig economy

From Cafe Hayek. 

"Seattle’s minimum-wage experience with food delivery offers even clearer causal evidence. A 2025 NBER working paper comparing Seattle delivery workers with those elsewhere in Washington found that the city’s task-level minimum-pay rule doubled average base pay per task. But lower tips erased more than a third of that gain, while highly active workers completed fewer monthly tasks. The result was no increase in their overall monthly earnings.

Unpaid idle time also increased, as did distances driven between tasks. The NBER authors attributed this outcome to free entry into the labor market: higher per-task pay attracted more workers, leaving more of them competing for a limited pool of deliveries. Workers consequently completed fewer tasks and spent more unpaid time waiting between them, offsetting the gains from higher per-task pay."

GMU Econ alum Adam Michel shares, in the Washington Post, some wise warnings about the itch to soak the rich

From Cafe Hayek.

"Despite regular reminders that wealth taxes are generally unpopular, such measures always seem in vogue. California wealth-tax advocates are already plotting a 2028 do-over, and with large majorities in Congress after January, Democrats are likely to push for similar proposals federally. Economists like me spend much of our time explaining how wealth taxes hurt employers, drive out investment and raise little revenue. But the absurd things people do to avoid them can be even more revealing.

France repealed its annual net wealth tax in 2017 after the prime minister concluded that it had driven 10,000 people with 35 billion euros’ ($39.3 billion) worth of assets out of the country. The exodus shrank the overall tax base and caused the government to lose revenue, according to one analysis. California didn’t even need to pass its version to get the same result. Because the measure was based on where a billionaire lived on Jan. 1, nearly 30 percent of the projected wealth tax base left before the vote, and the income taxes those people would have paid left with them."

Sunday, November 15, 2026

Democrat Jake Auchincloss criticized inclusionary zoning and rent control, defended natural gas and nuclear power, and backed a “supply-and-demand”-based approach to the economy

See National Democrats flock to Denver for a reality check — and a preview for the future by Seth Klamann of The Denver Post. Excerpt:

"In a Friday speech, Massachusetts U.S. Rep. Jake Auchincloss, who chairs Majority Democrats, said the group stood with “the majority alarmed by the extremes.” He criticized inclusionary zoning and rent control, defended natural gas and nuclear power, and backed a “supply-and-demand”-based approach to the economy.

“My challenge to everyone running in 2028, which might also be every person in this room, is (to) tell us which ideas you’ll stop giving permission to, the ones that defy common sense or don’t work,” he said. “Tell us which privileges you’ll confront, even if your donors and allies object. Tell us which opportunities you’ll promote so every child can share in the American promise.”"

More from a tweet by Reily Connaughton. He is a senior advisor to the governor of Rhode Island. 

"Supply and demand is a fact of reality, and the fact is when supply goes down prices go up. That means you can’t lower prices by stopping things from being built."

"Banning natural gas or nuclear power ignores the pain of high energy prices - it drives utility bills higher. Rent control or exclusionary zoning don’t lower costs or build wealth, they make housing more expensive for the middle class."

"Those who insisted that we keep our schools closed during the pandemic are now trying to cancel honors classes in the name of equity. First they held students back by closing the classrooms. Now they’re canceling classes that help students get ahead."

The 11 minute speech is on You Tube.   

Saturday, November 14, 2026

The Case for Pay-for-Value in Federal Homelessness Funding

By Christopher Sharp, Caleb Jacobs & Ryan Prenosil of The Cicero Institute. Excerpt:

"Advocates argue that ending homelessness requires more federal funding, citing rising rents and a workforce they characterize as “woefully underpaid.”1 The National Alliance to End Homelessness’s 2023 report “New Estimates Suggest that $4.8 Billion Is Needed to Bring Homeless Services Salaries into the Modern Era” advocated for an additional $9.6 billion in federal appropriations supporting the Continuum of Care Program, including $4.8 billion specifically to raise homeless service worker salaries.2

An examination of a balanced panel of 1,458 nonprofit Continuum of Care (CoC) providers shows that program budgets for compensation have increased significantly. Reported financials in both 2013 and 2024 show total compensation grew 117.8 percent and total revenue grew 123.9 percent, dramatically outpacing the 34.7 percent cumulative inflation rate and the 30.7 percent growth in the national Point-in-Time (PIT) homelessness count.3

Growth in the homelessness sector was not concentrated in a few outliers: 84 percent of providers grew compensation faster than inflation, 54 percent more than doubled it, and 29 percent more than tripled it.4 Provider compensation also grew roughly 2.7 times faster than the broader nonprofit sector benchmark on an annualized basis.5 The problem is not how money flows into the CoC system, as the National Alliance to End Homelessness’s report suggests. The problem is that the system pays for inputs (beds, salaries, services delivered) rather than for outcomes (people exiting homelessness for unsubsidized housing, employment, and treatment success). Compensation tracks revenue at a stable 36–39 percent of total income across the period, meaning the entire industry has grown together while measured outcomes have not moved.

These findings support a federal course correction, which is already underway. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) FY 2026 Continuum of Care Competition Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO), released in 2026, operationalizes Executive Order 143217 by declaring that “Housing First has been a profound failure,” making 40 percent of renewal funding fully competitive based on merit between communities, setting aside $1.3 billion for transitional housing and supportive services, and scoring providers on reductions in unsheltered homelessness, treatment, employment income, and exits to unsubsidized housing rather than the number of beds funded. This report supplies the empirical case for that reorientation, drawn from the providers’ own IRS Form 990 filings.
The data clearly shows that the solution is not more dollars spent, but rather a programmatic change that prioritizes incentives. The FY 2026 NOFO’s pivot to scoring outcomes, competing renewals, and rebalancing toward services is the right method for rewarding value and performance in homelessness assistance."

If the United States goes net zero by 2050, the world will be 0.142°F less warm in 2100 at a cost of $12.7 trillion

See Net Zero Cost Benefit. We would only get back 15 cents for each dollar spent in benefits. You can also click on any country in the map and find the same information for that country. 

If the whole world goes net zero by 2050, the world will be 2.48°F less warm in 2100. The cost would be $255 trillion and the benefit would be $24 trillion.

Friday, November 13, 2026

Can the Wealthy Buy Elections?

By Chris Freiman.

"When Elon Musk became the world’s first trillionaire (albeit briefly), many people objected. They argued that no one should have that much money when others have so much less. As Musk leveraged that fortune in an attempt to shape electoral outcomes, some despaired. Tuesday’s results indicate that was a poor investment, but it’s his half a billion to waste.

Why not? After all, inequality isn’t the same thing as poverty. Consider that there’s a huge salary gap between NFL quarterbacks and NFL punters: quarterbacks earn tens of millions of dollars a year, whereas punters usually earn a few million. But I haven’t seen protests outside of NFL stadiums demanding less money for the “quarterback class” and more for the “punter class.” Punters aren’t poor. That quarterbacks live in even larger mansions isn’t a moral problem.

Maybe you’re thinking the moral problem isn’t simply that someone is richer than others; the problem is that someone is richer because others are poorer. But this thought assumes wealth is a fixed pie. In a market economy, though, it usually isn’t. If an entrepreneur figures out how to manufacture dishwashers for $100 less, millions of people might buy one and make the entrepreneur extraordinarily wealthy. But she only became so by making others better off. Before, customers would only receive a dishwasher in the transaction. Now they have a dishwasher and an extra hundred dollars to buy something else. The entrepreneur got rich by baking more pie, not taking a larger slice for herself.

An increasingly popular argument made by critics of economic inequality focuses on political power rather than consumption. The problem isn’t that the rich can buy a mansion but that they can buy elections. And this does seem worrisome.

One issue with this objection is that it underestimates the importance of organizational advantages in politics relative to economic advantages. Mancur Olson famously argued that small groups enjoy a leg up in political competitions because of incentives, regardless of wealth. Political inequalities will arise even in conditions of perfect economic equality. Even if everyone had exactly the same income and exactly the same wealth, political influence wouldn’t be equally distributed.

Take the case of free trade. Suppose that some domestic producers are unhappy because they dislike the competition from overseas. But consumers stand to benefit from cheaper goods. Notice, though, that the producers have a much stronger incentive to organize than the consumers. They’ll donate to campaigns, hire lobbyists, and call legislators because each of them could lose their livelihoods. But each consumer stands to lose only a few dollars a month if trade is restricted. Even learning about the legislation probably isn’t worth their time, let alone organizing to fight it. The cost of becoming informed and politically active is greater than the benefit, so they don’t do it. Because the producers organize and consumers don’t, we should expect the restrictions to pass.

In this example, nobody was richer than anybody else, yet political power still ended up concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group. And this isn’t some far-out thought experiment. Small groups with concentrated interests routinely outcompete large groups with dispersed interests. This is one of the central lessons of public choice economics. Equalizing wealth doesn’t eliminate the problem because organization is a major source of political power.

Now you might reply that wealth still matters for political influence even if it’s not the only thing that matters. Running a competitive campaign takes money. But this is a different claim than saying that “money buys elections.” Campaign Finance Institute researchers Michael Malbin and Brendan Glavin write, “Money is never a sufficient condition for winning. If the voters do not like what they are hearing, telling them more of the same will not change their opinion.” Indeed, economist Steven Levitt studied repeat candidates for the US House and found that “campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes, regardless of who does the spending.” Two recent Senate primaries reinforce the point. Abdul El-Sayed won the Democratic primary in Michigan despite a nearly 10-to-1 advertising disadvantage. A couple of weeks later in Florida, Angie Nixon won the Democratic primary even though her opponent, Alex Vindman, outraised her 16-to-1.

While there is a correlation between spending and winning elections, this often reflects that money flows toward stronger candidates who are already more likely to win. That is, money tends to follow winners rather than cause them. Plus, to the extent money does influence elections, it produces greater returns for challengers than incumbents, because the latter are already well-established and well-known. So reducing money spent in elections might actually worsen political inequalities, further entrenching the advantages that incumbents enjoy over challengers.

Lastly, consider that people have the right to spend their money on politics even if their spending gives them unequal influence. More specifically, property rights entitle people to use their property (within legislated limits) to promote political outcomes. You’re within your rights to buy a candidate’s sign and post it in your yard. You can buy a stack of pamphlets arguing against rent control and distribute them to your neighbors to sway their votes. Those with more wealth may be more capable of influencing voters, but that’s not a reason to restrict their right to use their property as they see fit.

Leaving money out of it entirely, some highly influential people may exercise their rights in order to promote their favored political outcomes. Oprah Winfrey, for instance, exercised her right to speak freely when she endorsed Barack Obama for president in 2008. Researchers estimate that her endorsement produced about one million votes for Obama. While a celebrity’s presidential endorsement is far more influential than, say, my presidential endorsement, government officials shouldn’t prevent them from freely speaking in favor of their candidate. Similarly, government officials shouldn’t prevent people from freely disposing of their own property to support their candidate, even if the exercise of some people’s property rights is more politically impactful than that of others."

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Peter Pan Tariffs for Companies that Never Grow Up

When Hamilton made the infant industry argument, he at least assured us the industry would advance to adulthood.

By Phillip W. Magness & David J. Hebert.

"Of all the arguments for protectionism, the infant industry argument probably has the strongest theoretical appeal. By protecting a new industry from its more developed foreign competition, the story goes, tariffs give domestic producers the time to grow, learn, and become efficient enough to stand on their own. Domestic consumers feel the short-term pains of higher prices, but they enjoy the long-term gains of job growth and lower prices as the new industry blossoms.

It’s no secret that tariffs have driven significant price increases over the last year and a half. A study from the New York Federal Reserve finds that tariffs “contributed 2.9 percentage points to goods price inflation” and that without tariffs those prices would have slightly declined. Tariff defenders, looking for a new reason to claim these higher prices are only temporary, have reimagined the infant industry argument. Now it’s being used to support trade barriers in industries that are over a century old, but the promise is exactly the same: Domestic firms need the protection so they can compete, innovate, and cut costs until prices come back down even further than they were before the tariffs.

Michael Brendan Dougherty recently made such an argument in National Review, arguing that “tariffs can, over time, bring prices below where they started.” When economist Don Boudreaux called the argument “bizarre,” Dougherty replied that critics had failed to acknowledge the dynamic process by which markets respond to tariffs “by adapting and cutting costs.” Although he is light on specific details, he posits that the changed incentives of a “paradigm shift” in tariff policy will spur domestic competition, leading to the theorized price reduction. Of course, firms would still respond to the dynamic processes of domestic competition without a tariff wall, but the point stands.

From there, the reworked infant industry argument becomes the standard version advanced more than two centuries ago by Alexander Hamilton and his disciple Friedrich List. When Hamilton made this claim in 1791, his argument may have seemed suitable for a new nation seeking to firm up its economy and security against established European powers.

Others at the time pointed out that special interest groups—a manifestation of the “violence of faction” so thoroughly dissected in the Federalist Papers—had already begun to coalesce around the fledgling iron industry in Pennsylvania, clamoring for protective tariffs. Two years earlier, James Madison had warned about a “premature policy of stimulating manufactures” driving tariffs too high. In the end, Hamilton recommended and Congress enacted a far more moderate tariff schedule than his theoretical musings portended. American iron manufacturers received a consolation prize of a higher tariff on their competitors than the rate for most general imports. Hamiltonians have been touting the infant industry argument ever since.

Nearly 250 years later, those same infants apparently have yet to advance into adulthood. Steel, the direct successor to the founding-era iron manufacturers, remains a singular focus of President Donald Trump’s protectionist tariff policies, just as it was under former President Joe Biden. And former President George W. Bush before him. Indeed, steel has been a recurring beneficiary of protectionism for most of America’s existence.

This extended period of protectionist infancy suggests that the argument needs a new name. We propose the “Peter Pan industry argument” for companies that never grow up because tariffs make sure they never have to.

The question tariff advocates rarely ask is: Why do some American producers have higher costs than foreign rivals even in the face of lower-cost foreign competition? The answer comes down to specific rules and choices within particular firms and industries. Tariffs, and protectionism in general, address none of these. No industry illustrates this like steel, but it is far from the only one.

In 1947, United Steelworkers won a contract provision known as Section 2-B. Among other things, this barred mill managers from changing established work practices unless new technology required it. Steel companies tried to get rid of this in 1959, finding it difficult (given union incentives) to establish that technology required change. In response, 500,000 steelworkers went on strike for 116 days. This strike sent buyers abroad, causing 1959 to be the first year the U.S. imported more steel than it exported. One of the then-new technologies that was delayed was basic oxygen furnaces, which could produce steel far faster and cheaper than the open-hearth furnaces that were so common. In 1965, only about 17 percent of steel made in the U.S. was made using the basic oxygen furnace. Japan produced 55 percent of its steel with this faster, more efficient method.

Change finally came from a steel customer. Vulcraft, a maker of steel joists, grew tired of paying Big Steel’s prices and waiting for Big Steel’s deliveries. In 1969, free from steel unions and preconceived notions, the company looked for new steel-producing technologies and found the answer in the electric arc furnaces that had been adopted in much of the world throughout the 1950s and ’60s. Vulcraft’s parent company later renamed itself Nucor, and minimills like the ones it pioneered now make most of America’s steel.

So the modern steel industry was built by a frustrated steel buyer who found a way around protected companies. In other words, the U.S. steel industry has lagged behind the technologies found around the world.

We could go on, but the broad point here is that the “relatively higher domestic production costs that made the tariff ‘necessary’ in the first place,” as one critic put it, are often the result of preventing competition in the first place. It’s odd to suggest that further preventing competition through tariffs will somehow alleviate the ills of already-prevented competition.

Tariff advocates fail to acknowledge that the ability to import steel also comes with the benefit of access to cheaper steel for steel-using industries, such as manufacturing. A 50 percent tariff on steel further closes the release valve that imported steel offers. Buyers of steel are then left to purchase more of the more expensive domestic steel. Because new steel mills take years to bring online, this causes delays and longer delivery times for manufacturers.

We don’t have to wonder what happens when a country lowers its tariffs on materials used by manufacturers. India did this in the ’90s, and researchers found that newly available inputs accounted for 31 percent of the new products that Indian manufacturers introduced. And what happens when the U.S. imposes tariffs on steel? Downstream U.S. firms become less competitive. This is why American businesses clamor for exemptions to tariffs, especially for tariffs on materials like steel.

Perhaps all this could be forgiven if tariffs advanced national security concerns, as tariff advocates assert. They point out that an adversarial nation could cut off supplies of critical materials during wartime and cripple America’s ability to defend itself. Unfortunately, tariffs fail there too.

First, this conflates production with access. While domestic production does ensure domestic access, access can be secured without production. In the case of steel, the Commerce Department reports that in 2025, the U.S. imported steel from 79 countries, with Canada being our top foreign supplier. The top 10 sources of steel are responsible for 77.8 percent of America’s steel imports. None of those countries were considered adversaries—at least not until the tariff crusades pushed these friends away. What’s more, according to the American Iron and Steel Institute, only 23 percent of finished steel in the U.S. was imported in 2024. Far from being exposed to foreign states’ whims, American access to steel is incredibly resilient.

Second, this view ignores the positive effects of trade and globalization on national security. The Center for Strategic & International Studies finds that increased trade between countries reduces the likelihood that they’ll go to war against one another. Globalization helps ensure that domestic access continues unabated should war break out, thanks to the diversity of trading partners.

When Hamilton made the infant industry argument, he at least assured us that the industry would at some point advance to adulthood and stand on its own. Steel, like so many other Peter Pan industries, has proven Madison right. These industries have refused to grow up, and it’s time to stop pretending that tariffs will fix that."