Sunday, August 2, 2020

America Isn’t a Racist Country

If we’re going to have a national conversation, we need a bold, spirited defense of our progress

By Ward Connerly. Excerpts:
"When certain Americans were denied the right to vote based on the color of their skin, that was systemic racism. When small children and college students had to be ushered to school by the National Guard, past defenders of state laws and policies that sought to maintain racial segregation, that was systemic racism. When black and white Americans were forbidden to marry, that was systemic racism—and a gross infringement on individual liberty.

Our history is the best proof that America is not a racist nation. A nation of white racists wouldn’t elect and re-elect a black man as president. Those who assert that the U.S. is racist must, at a minimum, address this historical fact.

What delivered us from the undeniable racism of the past to the election of Barack Obama? The American creed—“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal”—inspired the laws that changed our social and legal structure to make the aspiration real.

We are witnessing an all-out assault on America, not only as it was but as it is and as we seek it to become. As a society, we have been slow to respond to those who propose to transform the U.S. We have not asked, as we should have: Transform from what to what? The answer to this question may be found in the bluest of American states—among them California and Washington—where the transformation is in full bloom.

The operating thesis of a significant segment of the leadership in these states is that America is a racist nation, governed by a horde of white male supremacists who use the pretense of equality to maintain their superior position. When asked for evidence to support the claim of white supremacy,” the only response I have been given is, “Look all around.” They hold this untruth to be self-evident.

My grandfather was born a slave in the early 19th century. My father was born late in that century and lived through the era of Jim Crow. I was born in 1939, but I became a full American just after my 25th birthday, when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law. I am able to enjoy the fruits of American freedom with a slice of the American pie equal to that of every other American. This experience informs my faith in and optimism for continued progress in building our more perfect union."

"In 1961, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925, which used the term “affirmative action” for the first time. This order instructed federal contractors to take “affirmative action to ensure that applicants are treated equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”"

Saturday, August 1, 2020

Longer Lockdowns Associated with Much Worse Economic Outcomes

By Abigail Devereaux. She is a professor of economics at Wichita State University.
"This week’s second-quarter advance estimate of GDP showing the most severe projected contraction on record has led to speculation as to what exactly made the United States economy contract so much, and if this contraction was avoidable. The two obvious effects analysts would like to tease out are the relative impacts of voluntary and involuntary reductions in consumption and production, particularly in the service industry.

 A significant voluntary reduction in consumption–people staying home, shifting to remote work, and taking their kids out of school—occurred before the cascade of shelter-in-place orders and restrictions on assembly and certain businesses. Will Luther has written on the voluntary reduction in consumption and production prior to the institution of lockdowns, and in states where there were no lockdowns. Additionally, many businesses and particularly services temporarily closed shop—ceased production—before the lockdown orders.

But it’s obvious that if you restrict and ban certain businesses, they will suffer for it. Some business owners who made it through the first wave of lockdowns are saying their businesses won’t be able to survive another. This isn’t rocket science. Perhaps businesses do need to adapt to better serve their customers during this time, but they cannot do so if they are restricted or banned from operation completely and indefinitely. They can keep paying their fixed costs—rent and bills and taxes—until they can’t, anymore. Most small businesses in particular don’t have the kind of generous margins to last through one lockdown, let alone two or more.

We also don’t know how businesses might have adapted to keep themselves afloat while harmonizing their services with the safety needs of their customers absent lockdowns. Now that the economy has been largely open since the beginning of June, we’ve seen many adaptations: social distancing is the new norm, as is mask-wearing, particularly by employees in the absence of a mask mandate. Many businesses also require their employees undergo fever checks, and New York University stated recently that it will require its employees to submit negative results of a COVID test before being allowed back on campus.

Though the voluntary reduction in consumption and production started before lockdowns, we would like to get a sense for how much of the overall GDP contraction was due to an involuntary reduction in consumption and production. The hypothesis is that business restrictions attenuate the drop in consumption and production beyond the point where it is no longer viable for a business to remain closed, or where the demand for restricted products and services has increased from its voluntary drop but cannot be met.

I’ve written about how insured unemployment has progressed depending on a state’s lockdown status. Now that the first wave of lockdowns has been phased out in the vast majority of states, we can get a sense for whether or not the length of the lockdown is associated with the insured unemployment rate of each state, using that metric as a proxy for economic health. I calculate the actual start and end dates of statewide lockdowns, and associated the “end” with whatever phase lifted most restrictions on conducting any given type of business activity. That is, many states still have capacity restrictions for services, masking mandates, and other kinds of testing mandates. 
The graphs below show the insured unemployment rate indexed to 0 for each state at March 1 (the data are available at BLS.gov). The latest data reflect numbers up to July 11, 2020. I categorize states simply based on the lengths of their lockdowns, then average over that category. For states that did adopt some kind of lockdown order—and all but six states did—the shortest lockdowns were between 24 and 30 days, and then I split the categories by 10-day chunks. The longest lockdowns were between 61 and 70 days.

Before showing the graphs, here is a summary table of category averages by July 11, 2020.
The first graph shows all the lockdown-length categories on one graph, with the averages for those categories over time illustrated using bold lines. Individual state trends are also shown, in lighter and thinner lines the same color as their category. I break the categories down into their component states in graphs further down. 
The most interesting thing about the graph above isn’t that longer lockdowns were associated with higher rates of insured unemployment—though that does suggest lockdown length has something to do with the economic pain states currently experience—but that the shortest lockdown category, between 24 and 30 days, is associated with a higher insured unemployment rate than the next-shortest lockdown category, and fairly consistently.

Next, let’s break down each group and look at how the states fare within their group. First, we consider the case of states that had no formal shelter-in-place orders (note that Arkansas did have business restrictions though it had no formal shelter-in-place order):
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Next let’s consider states whose lockdowns plans didn’t have firm end-dates but rather whose phase movements would be up to the decision of the governor, states with “indefinite” lockdowns. You’ll see that California is pulling this group’s average up, with an insured unemployment rate of 13.3% (indexed) and 15.5% (unindexed).
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Next let’s look at states that had the shortest lockdowns, less than or equal to 30 days in length. Note that the shortest lockdown in this category was Mississippi, at 24 days. Georgia is the clear outlier by mid-July, with an insured unemployment rate of 15.4% (indexed) and 16% (unindexed).
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Next we look at lockdowns between 31 and 40 days. Idaho is clearly an outlier, pulling the average of this group down. Idaho’s insured unemployment rate is only 2.3% (indexed) and 3.7% (unindexed).
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Next we look at lockdowns between 41 and 50 days. Nevada is way above the rest of the pack, which isn’t too surprising, given that its GDP strongly depends on tourism and that is one of the hardest hit sectors at the moment. Nevada’s insured unemployment rate is 20.6% (indexed) and 22% (unindexed).
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Next we look at lockdowns between 51 and 60 days. There isn’t a lot of variation within this group. Note that both New York and Louisiana are in this group and have similar insured unemployment rates, even though New York was hit a lot harder by the coronavirus than Louisiana during the first wave. New York’s insured unemployment rate is 14.5% (indexed) and 16.3% (unindexed), and Louisiana’s insured unemployment rate is 15.8% (indexed) and 16.6% (unindexed).
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Next we look at the longest category of lockdowns, those that ran from 61 to 70 days. Like Nevada, tourism-dependent Hawaii was affected relatively negatively, with its insured unemployment at 20.1% (indexed) and 21% (unindexed). This group contains a lot of states who were hit differentially. Massachusetts was hit far harder by the coronavirus than its neighbor New Hampshire, even though both states have fairly similar insured unemployment rates by mid-July, with Massachusetts’s insured unemployment rate at 12.4% (indexed) and 14.5% (unindexed), and New Hampshire’s insured unemployment rate at 10.25% (indexed) and 10.9% (unindexed).
What I take away from these graphs is three-fold:
  1. States relatively dependent on the service sector were hit hard, particularly if they also had lengthy lockdowns. Nevada, Hawaii and Florida depend on tourism for a large chunk of their GDP, and Florida has done well relative to Nevada and Hawaii, which are both more than 10 percentage points worse in terms of their insured unemployment rates. Florida’s lockdown was 32 days while Nevada’s was 44 days and Hawaii’s was 67 days. 
  2. Within-category comparison of states with very different coronavirus severity is telling. New York was locked down for 56 days and Louisiana for 53 days, but New York’s virus spread was much more severe during the first lockdown than in Louisiana. Yet, they have similar insured unemployment rates relative to March 1. Similarly, Massachusetts and New Hampshire both had lockdowns of 65 days but were very different in terms of virus spread, with the coronavirus hitting Massachusetts much harder than New Hampshire. Yet, both have relatively similar insured unemployment rates relative to March 1. 
  3. Second lockdowns, such as those in California and Texas, will be further telling in terms of their individuated effect on the economy. I expect to write yet another of these articles a month or two from now, using new data that can help us suss out the effects of voluntary versus involuntary reduction in consumption and production even more precisely."

Optimal policies differentially targeting risk/age groups significantly outperform optimal uniform policies and most of the gains can be realized by having stricter lockdown policies on the oldest group

See Optimal Targeted Lockdowns in a Multi-Group SIR Model by Daron Acemoglu, Victor Chernozhukov, Iván Werning, Michael D. Whinston.
"We study targeted lockdowns in a multi-group SIR model where infection, hospitalization and fatality rates vary between groups—in particular between the “young”, “the middle-aged” and the “old”. Our model enables a tractable quantitative analysis of optimal policy. For baseline parameter values for the COVID-19 pandemic applied to the US, we find that optimal policies differentially targeting risk/age groups significantly outperform optimal uniform policies and most of the gains can be realized by having stricter lockdown policies on the oldest group. Intuitively, a strict and long lockdown for the most vulnerable group both reduces infections and enables less strict lockdowns for the lower-risk groups. We also study the impacts of group distancing, testing and contract tracing, the matching technology and the expected arrival time of a vaccine on optimal policies. Overall, targeted policies that are combined with measures that reduce interactions between groups and increase testing and isolation of the infected can minimize both economic losses and deaths in our model."

A non-technical summary of this paper is available in the June 2020 NBER Digest.

Lessons Learned from Our COVID-19 Response

COVID-19 isn't over, but it’s not too early to learn from our response

By Conor Norris of Catalyst. He is a Research Analyst with the Knee Center for the Study of Occupational Regulation (CSOR) at Saint Francis University. He has an MA in economics from George Mason University. Excerpt:

"Because of differences in local conditions, population size, time spent indoors, and other characteristics, one-size-fits-all NPIs (non-pharmaceutical interventions) will vary in effectiveness. In a recently published NBER working paper, the authors found that in Texas, over 90 percent of the reduction in COVID-19 deaths from NPIs were caused by the orders in large urban areas. There was a small reduction in deaths from NPIs in rural areas and the later statewide shutdown orders.

NPIs are dependent on changing individuals’ behavior, so the rural NPIs may have also suffered from a lack of buy-in from the residents. For communities with strong social ties and frequent close interactions, social distancing is more difficult. This also makes it more difficult to continue for long periods of time. Another NBER working paper found that less social distancing occurred in communities with strong community engagement.

Additionally, the risk of severe symptoms and death vary widely across demographic groups. Risk profiles change based on age and comorbidities. New research has found that simply targeting lockdowns based on age group was just as effective and far less costly than the blanket NPIs most states implemented. Rather than isolating everyone, states should have isolated those with the highest risk of death, the older population and those with comorbidities. The younger population could have taken precautions, but not sheltered in place.

This also highlights the importance of protecting elder care facilities, where the highest risk patients live. Even now, almost half of US deaths were in nursing homes. This was caused in large part by some states, for instance Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey, requiring elderly care facilities to accept COVID-19 positive patients.

So, what lessons can we learn from this?

First, it underscores the importance of tailoring policy to local conditions. Policymakers should rely on county health or even city officials, who have more knowledge about local conditions than state and federal lawmakers. We should focus our efforts on preventing spread where it is most likely to occur. Large urban areas are much more likely to have a higher rate of spread than more spread out rural areas.

In areas where a sense of community and frequent interaction is an important part of life, social distancing will be difficult to continue. Policymakers should work with community leaders, encouraging social clubs, churches, athletic leagues, etc. to find safe ways to interact to help reduce the cost of social distancing. Again, this requires local policymakers to be involved in the decision-making process.

Within communities, we should be sure to take care of the most vulnerable populations. We don’t only have to rely on government for this. My local grocery store, like many others, set aside special times where only the elderly and immunocompromised can shop to protect them.

Finally, we cannot allow bureaucracy to slow down the adoption of new tests or treatments. We need to be able to take advantage of breakthroughs without forcing their creators to go through arcane application requirements that only delay being able to treat patients.

This first wave of COVID-19, and our response, has given us valuable lessons for how to respond to future outbreaks. While combating such an infectious and deadly disease can be difficult, localized policies, targeted to local conditions that are not overly burdensome will help us successfully reduce spread of the disease."

Prof cleared of 'racist' behavior banned from campus a YEAR after investigation

By Jonathan McCormick of CampusReform.org.

  • Professor Javier Tapia was accused of racially profiling a fellow faculty member.
  • The school investigated and determined that the “evidence does not demonstrate” racism.
  • One year later, the university contacted Tapia informing him that he was being placed on paid leave and that he was no longer welcome on campus.
"A professor says he was “silenced” and “banished” by Virginia Commonwealth University with what he says was “no due process whatsoever” despite being cleared of alleged wrongdoing.

Javier Tapia, associate professor in the Department of Painting and Printmaking, sued three of his school’s officials over what he saw as egregious violations of his constitutional rights. His since-dismissed court complaint explained his grievances.

The controversy began when Tapia allegedly called campus security on his fellow faculty member, Assistant Professor of Art Caitlin Cherry, when he found her in an area restricted to faculty only. A letter from the school says that the two professors “did not know one another” at the time. Cherry believed that Tapia called security on her because she is black, but Tapia claimed that he mistook her for a student, due to her “youthful appearance.”

Cherry submitted a complaint with the school alleging that she had been racially discriminated against, the Richmond Times-Dispatch reported.

However, after an investigatory process, VCU Equity and Access Services concluded that the evidence “does not demonstrate” that Tapia “initiated the security check based on Professor [Cherry]’s race and/or color” and informed Tapia that he had been cleared of such charges in a letter dated Nov. 16, 2018.

Despite being cleared, Tapia received another letter from VCU one year later on Nov. 18, 2019, placing him on “paid administrative leave” and instructed him to have “no contact of any kind with any VCU faculty, staff, or students,” including “in-person contact, telephone calls, text messages, emails, Facebook, Twitter, or other forms of messaging or social media contacts.” If he or an agent of his were to disobey that order, the school threatened to punish him with “additional administrative action.”

The public university also stated that Tapia was “not permitted on university property” and told him to gather his belongings from his desk and return his university laptop and keys. They told Tapia that, while these actions by the school “are not disciplinary in nature,” he could nonetheless be fired if he violated the orders.

Upon hearing allegations from other faculty that Tapia racially discriminated against Cherry, students protested in the dean’s office, chanting “No racist faculty!” The school also says it received “received a high volume of emails” regarding Tapia’s alleged racism, but “none of these emails provided specific information” regarding him.

“No students, faculty members, or administrators have been warned or threatened with sanctions for labeling Tapia a racist,” Tapia’s court complaint reads, “The goose and the gander are clearly not being treated equally by VCU.”

In all, Tapia said that the school denied him “due process,” “liberty interests,” and the chance to defend his own reputation.

His complaint recognizes that “to brand Tapia as a racist is to effectively administer the academic death penalty to Tapia,” and make him unemployable at any other academic institution.

Mike Porter, Associate Vice President for Public Affairs, told Campus Reform, “Professor Tapia's lawsuit against VCU was dismissed by mutual agreement. Both professors are employed by VCU.”
Campus Reform has reached out to Tapia and Cherry for comment."

How FDR Killed Federal Anti-Lynching Legislation

By Phillip W. Magness.

"Roosevelt declined to champion Costigan’s measure in advance of the 1936 election out of a belief that it would imperil his support in the South. 

New York Sen. Robert Wagner made another post-election push for the Anti-Lynching Bill in 1937 and 1938 only to encounter the same problem. This time Roosevelt’s wife Eleanor publicly signaled her support for the measure, but the president himself remained silent and declined to spend his political capital on securing the bill at a time when the legislative success of the New Deal economic agenda depended on southern Democrats. The Anti-Lynching Bill once again faltered in the Senate, with Vice President Garner declining to weigh in against the filibuster. After a complex succession of parliamentary maneuvers in the Senate the measure was effectively sidelined in exchange for the southerners dropping their filibuster, which had also unintentionally impeded the New Deal farm relief bill at the top of the president’s legislative agenda.

It therefore came as a surprise when Garner floated hints to the press that he was ready to reverse positions in early 1940. A bipartisan bill sponsored by Democrat Joseph Gavagan and Republican Hamilton Fish, both Representatives from New York, was placed on the House calendar for consideration after Congress returned from the holidays, and appeared to be headed for a vote during the second week of January. Civil rights groups including the NAACP quickly mobilized a lobbying campaign to secure the measure. The Gavigan-Fish bill passed the House by a vote of 252 to 131 on January 10, and went to the Senate for consideration.

At some point around January 15, 1940, Garner’s aides leaked word that the Vice President was willing to use his influence to forestall another filibuster of the Anti-Lynching bill in the Senate. Although he would not endorse the bill outright, the maneuver would clear the way for a simple majority vote, likely passing the bill. Roosevelt could then sign the law as a retiring lame-duck president without having to face the southern electorate again. Meanwhile, Garner and the Democrats would emerge in a better position in November to make a play for African-American votes in the northern states where they expected to face the strongest Republican competition.

Expectedly, the press saw through the electoral objectives of Garner’s shifting position. As a January 16 dispatch out of Washington observed, “with his sombrero in the presidential ring, [Garner] has changed his tune to the extent of permitting a showdown vote.” Civil rights advocates nonetheless welcomed the move as their best chance in decades to secure a federal Anti-Lynching law. As the same report noted, even this clear electoral ploy represented “an important concession because only a vote is needed to put the measure on the statute books.”

Unfortunately, the plan to permit a vote faltered in the Senate over the next several months, though not for want of trying. Garner failed to account for an unexpected variable: the electoral ambitions of Franklin Delano Roosevelt himself.

At some point in mid-January, Garner approached southern Democrats Alben Barkley, the Senate majority leader, and Sam Rayburn, the Speaker of the House, to present his plan. Although Barkley had joined the southerners in opposing a vote on previous Anti-Lynching bills, he reportedly signaled to Garner that he would acquiesce to the electoral ploy. Garner then took his plan to the president in a private meeting at the White House.

The little-known story of what happened next came to light in 1947 when a former member of Roosevelt’s cabinet relayed a conversation with the president in his memoirs. Shortly after the meeting with Garner, Roosevelt directed an aide to summon Postmaster General Jim Farley to the White House for a dinner meeting with himself, the first lady, and his personal secretary Missy LeHand. In addition to his role in the cabinet, Farley was a powerful political operative. He previously managed Roosevelt’s successful campaigns in 1932 and 1936, and was serving a dual role at the time as the chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

As Farley relayed it, “the Boss” – as he called FDR – opened the conversation by telling a story. “Jim,” the president confided, “I have the grandest joke for you.” Roosevelt spoke:
“I had Garner, Barkley, and Rayburn in this morning for a conference on the anti-lynching bill. And you’ll never guess what Jack said. Very seriously he said that he had given considerable thought to the legislation and that he felt that the colored vote in the border states and in the Northern cities was such that he thought the legislation had to be passed.”
As Farley recounted, “Roosevelt threw back his head and laughed till tears came to his eyes.” The president continued: “Don’t you love it? … Jack has done a complete about face on it now that he’s out looking for votes. Don’t mention it to a soul, though.”

Farley responded: “Boss, it’s really childish not to mention it…You are going to be reading about it, because some of the Congressional leaders are bound to talk.” How the president reacted to this advice is lost to history, although Roosevelt’s instruction to maintain silence about Garner’s plan appears to have come to fruition.

On February 8, bill co-sponsor Hamilton Fish took to the House floor. The American people, Fish noted, “are entitled to know where President Roosevelt stands on the anti-lynching bill and what he proposes to do to help secure its passage in Congress.” Roosevelt demurred on an answer, and Garner appears to have effectively abandoned his plan in the absence of the president’s support. Although the Gavagan-Fish bill received a favorable report out of committee, the threat of a southern filibuster before the Senate prevented any further action. Barkley allowed the measure to linger without a vote until October 8, 1940, when he tabled the Anti-Lynching Bill and moved the body into recess for the election season. Proceeding with debate, a press report noted at the time, “would lead to a certain and time-consuming filibuster” that threatened to sidetrack the Democrats’ other legislative agenda items.

Garner’s own bid for the presidency faltered that summer when Roosevelt accepted a carefully-arranged “invitation” from the Democratic convention to run for a third term as conveyed to the gathering by a phone call to Barkley. Though it is difficult to contextualize such a dramatic event in today’s media-driven campaign environment, Roosevelt’s maneuver sent shockwaves through his own party. For months he had studiously avoided public comments on the subject of a third term, and even deceived Farley about his intentions shortly before the gathering by suggesting to the DNC chair that he was prepared to retire after the election named a new successor. In the ensuing fallout, both Garner and Farley made their own bids for the nomination, only to be sidelined at the convention when Roosevelt conveyed that he would accept the offer of a third term.

The Anti-Lynching Bill was but one small side-story to the strange succession of events, which also ended in Garner being replaced on the ticket by Henry A. Wallace, the president’s far-left Agriculture Secretary and a devoted New Dealer. Farley, who had briefly been considered as a Vice Presidential replacement as well, broke from the president on the third term issue and departed the administration a little over a month later.

Yet the Anti-Lynching Bill may also be considered a casualty of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s political ambition. As press accounts from early 1940 indicated, and as Farley’s memoirs confirm, Garner’s own electoral aims – opportunistic as they were – had the effect of creating a pathway around a Senate filibuster of the bill. Roosevelt however, wishing for a third term of his own, had but a single answer when relaying Garner’s pitch: “Don’t mention it to a soul.” His instruction helped to keep Garner’s campaign in check, but also effectively sealed the fate of the bill.

Although Farley’s account of Roosevelt’s orders would not become public for another seven years, the administration’s inaction on the measure did not go unnoticed. On October 31, 1940, only five days before the election, heavyweight boxing champion Joe Louis appeared at a political forum in Harlem. Standing in front of an audience of 4,000 and initially receiving some jeers over his public endorsement of Roosevelt’s opponent Wendell Willkie a few weeks earlier, Louis approached the podium to explain his reasoning: “If Mr. Willkie is elected…he has promised in writing to put over the anti-lynching bill. Roosevelt has been in office for eight years and done nothing about that. The people in the North don’t know how long is eight years.” The crowd at first went silent, then erupted in cheers at the boxer’s message to the incumbent president.

Roosevelt went on to win a third and fourth term. As Louis predicted, the federal Anti-Lynching bill saw no further action on his watch."

Vandalism Is Violence: Destructive Riots Are Not ‘Just Property Damage’

Property rights are human rights, and we discard them at our own peril

By Brad Polumbo of FEE.
"Chaos is consuming Portland, Oregon.

Local police declared a riot on Saturday evening after rioters once again tried to burn down a federal courthouse and launched mortars and fireworks at police officers, several of whom sustained injuries. Similarly destructive unrest has unfolded each night in the city for weeks now, with rampant vandalism, arson, graffiti, and more becoming commonplace as protests over the death of George Floyd morphed into riots over President Trump’s controversial decision to send federal officers to Portland.

Yet Portland is by no means the only city gripped by unrest and violence.

Riots have also rocked cities such as Austin, Texas, and Seattle, Washington. In Seattle over the weekend rioters reportedly set fires, vandalized businesses, smashed car windows, and assaulted a court building. NPR reports that 21 police officers were injured while trying to contain the chaos.
And this is just the most recent wave. In May and early June, rioting broke out in cities from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Dallas, Texas.

We’re witnessing a breakdown in the rule of law. In many cases, city officials have enabled or encouraged rioting while law enforcement stands down and allows wanton property destruction. Portland Mayor Ted Wheeler even joined rioters and participated in the same demonstrations that were spiraling out of control.

Meanwhile, Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkin encouraged and lauded the self-described anarchists who declared an “autonomous zone” in the middle of the city. The mayor called the no-go zone a “block party” amid a “summer of love” despite rampant destruction and seizure of property. Only after weeks of skyrocketing crime rates and multiple shootings (including one that killed a teenager) did she finally order law enforcement to clear the city's insurrectionists.

And in many of the other protests-turned-riots around the country, law enforcement stood down and watched as private property was destroyed and their city was rocked by rioters.
So how can anyone justify this madness?

Well, many left-wing journalists, activists, and commentators who are politically sympathetic to the rioters have argued that rampant destruction isn’t really a problem, because it’s “just” destruction of property, not violence against people.

One person who makes this argument is Oakland-based “racial justice organizer” Cat Brooks, who was interviewed by the New York Times.

“I don’t consider property destruction violence,” Brooks said in defense of the rioting and vandalism in her city. “Violence is when you attack a person or another living, breathing creature on this planet. Windows don’t cry and they can’t die.”

Meanwhile, New York Times writer Hannah Nicole-Jones, founder of the controversial “1619 Project,” has also defended the destruction of property and argued that it doesn’t constitute violence.
“Violence is when an agent of the state kneels on a man's neck until all of the life is leached out of his body,” she said. “Destroying property, which can be replaced, is not violence. To use the same language to describe those two things is not moral.”

An op-ed published in the Times titled “What kind of society values property over black life?” made a similar point. Several other left-wing media outlets have also promoted this argument.

For example, one recent article in The Nation headlined “In Defense of Destroying Property” drew viral attention for openly arguing in defense of vandalism.

“People are not objects; broken windows and burnt cars are simply not commensurate with the violence of state-sanctioned murder,” wrote Columbia University Ph.D. R.H. Lossin. “Plateglass windows don’t bleed. They don’t die and leave loved ones grieving. They don’t contribute to the collective trauma and terror experienced by their communities. They just break, and then, at some point, they are replaced by identical sheets of glass.”

“Disavowing property destruction and even theft because of a spurious attachment to a reified notion of nonviolence is a mistake,” Lossin concluded.

A similar piece in the left-wing journal Current Affairs likewise argued that “Destroying property is not in and of itself a violent act.”

“The word ‘violence’ should be reserved for harm done to people,” editor Nathan J. Robinson wrote. “Otherwise, we risk making the term conceptually incoherent and—much more importantly—conflating acts that do very serious physical harm to people with acts that have not physically harmed anyone.”

It is, of course, true that a rioter smashing a window is not morally equivalent to a police officer standing on an innocent man’s throat, but this is a strawman argument. (No serious person ever suggested otherwise). Moreover, these arguments rely on a false distinction between grave acts of vandalism and violence.

In reality, destruction of property does real harm to innocent people. And if allowed to continue, the collapse of rule of law that started with property destruction begets a cycle of lawlessness that will inevitably descend into bloodshed. Indeed, it has already. As famed Austrian economist Ludwig Von Mises put it, “It is in the nature of every application of violence that it tends toward a transgression of the limit within which it is tolerated and viewed as legitimate.”

Not convinced yet? Just consider the sad news reports detailing how police officers found the remains of a burned body in a Minneapolis pawnshop that was torched during riots as demonstrators cheered. Vandals may have thought what they were doing was “just property damage”—in reality, it was murder.

Sadly, this isn’t a one-off example. During the riots in the wake of Floyd’s death, at least 15 people were killed. How? What started as merely “broken windows” and “torched cars” escalated into mass violence that left police officers, private security guards, and peaceful protesters dead.

It’s simply impossible to keep a collapse of the rule of law constrained to “just property damage.” Moreover, it is deeply immoral and intellectually bankrupt to suggest that property destruction does not constitute “harm done to people.” Vandalism is also itself a violent act that violates human rights.
And remember, it wasn’t just big corporations or CEOs whose properties were destroyed in these riots. Many of the post-Floyd riots destroyed minority-owned small businesses.

Former firefighter KB Balla used his life savings to open a sports bar in Minneapolis. With the grand opening initially delayed by COVID-19 shutdowns, his dream was left in tatters after rioters looted, vandalized, and destroyed the property. Something tells me Balla—and the thousands like him whose livelihoods were destroyed in riots—wouldn’t accept the naive argument that property crime doesn’t hurt anyone.

It’s not just the owners of the property themselves who are impacted by wanton vandalism. Consider the way one African American woman broke down on camera while asked about the destruction in her community.

“They went straight to OfficeMax, the Dollar Store, and every store over here that I go to,” she said through tears. “I have nowhere to go now. I have no way to get [to other stores] because the buses aren’t running.”

The economic and emotional costs imposed by the destruction of property are borne by real people—and the reason why is quite clear. Influenced by the work of John Locke, economist Murray Rothbard explained why property rights are human rights:
Much is heard these days of the distinction between human rights and property rights, and many who claim to champion the one turn with scorn upon any defender of the other. They fail to see that property rights, far from being in conflict, are in fact the most basic of all human rights.
The human right of every man to his own life implies the right to find and transform resources: to produce that which sustains and advances life. That product is a man’s property. That is why prop­erty rights are foremost among human rights and why any loss of one endangers the others. (Emphasis mine)
What Rothbard meant was that lives depend on livelihoods—and livelihoods depend on property. Property is necessary for life itself and for survival. A mother cannot feed her child without property rights that protect her income. An entrepreneur and father cannot shield his children from homelessness if his business is torched to the ground.

The open assault on property taking place in cities across the country is clearly a campaign of violence. After all, a standard dictionary definition of violence is “behavior involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.” That’s right, not just “someone,” but “something” too. That’s not just some technicality: it’s what people generally mean when they use the word “violence.” The term has long encompassed things like burning someone’s house down. Leftist commentators are basically trying to redefine “violence” as a synonym of “assault.”

Why the word games? It could very well be for political ends. After all, much of the hard left is heavily influenced by Marxism. And one of the tenets of Marxism is the rejection of private property rights in favor of communal (in practice, state-) ownership of the means of production. By excluding the seizure and destruction of private property from the meaning of “violence,” they are able to smuggle a key Marxist presumption into our very language.

This is an ominous path. The track record of Marxism is a litany of tyranny, famine, and murder, precisely because of its hostility toward private property.

Property rights are human rights, and we discard them at our own peril."