. In particular, Book V, Chapter XI: Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-faire or Non-Interference Principle.
"V.11.8
§4. A third general objection to government agency, rests on the principle of the division of labour. Every
additional function undertaken by the government, is a fresh occupation
imposed upon a body already overcharged with duties. A natural
consequence is that most things are ill done; much not done at all, because the government is not able to do it without delays which are fatal to its purpose; that the more troublesome and less showy, of the functions undertaken, are postponed or neglected, and an excuse is always ready for the neglect; while the heads of the administration have their minds so fully taken up with official details, in however perfunctory a manner superintended, that they have no time or thought to spare for the great interests of the state, and the preparation of enlarged measures of social improvement.
V.11.9
But these inconveniences, though real and serious, result much more from
the bad organization of governments, than from the extent and variety
of the duties undertaken by them. Government is not a name for some one
functionary, or definite number of functionaries: there may be almost
any amount of division of labour within the administrative body itself.
The evil in question is felt in great magnitude under some of the
governments of the Continent, where six or eight men, living at the
capital and known by the name of ministers, demand that the whole public
business of the country shall pass, or be supposed to pass, under their
individual eye. But the inconvenience would be reduced to a very
manageable compass, in a country in which there was a proper
distribution of functions between the central and local officers of
government, and in which the central body was divided into a sufficient
number of departments. When Parliament thought it expedient to confer on
the government an inspecting and partially controlling authority over
railways, it did not add railways to the department of the Home
Minister, but created a Railway Board. When it determined to have a
central superintending authority for pauper administration, it
established the Poor Law Commission. There are few countries in which a
greater number of functions are discharged by public officers, than in
some states of the American Union, particularly the New England States;
but the division of labour in public business is extreme; most of these
officers being not even amenable to any common superior, but performing
their duties freely, under the double check of election by their
townsmen, and civil as well as criminal responsibility to the tribunals.
V.11.10
It is, no doubt, indispensable to good government that the chiefs of the
administration, whether permanent or temporary, should extend a
commanding, though general, view over the ensemble of all the interests
confided, in any degree, to the responsibility of the central power. But
with a skilful internal organization of the administrative machine,
leaving to subordinates, and as far as possible, to local subordinates,
not only the execution, but to a greater degree the control, of details;
holding them accountable for the results of their acts rather than for
the acts themselves, except where these come within the cognizance of
the tribunals; taking the most effectual securities for honest and
capable appointments; opening a broad path to promotion from the
inferior degrees of the administrative scale to the superior; leaving,
at each step, to the functionary, a wider range in the origination of
measures, so that, in the highest grade of all, deliberation might be
concentrated on the great collective interests of the country in each
department; if all this were done, the government would not probably be
overburthened by any business, in other respects fit to be undertaken by
it; though the overburthening would remain as a serious addition to the
inconveniences incurred by its undertaking any which was unfit.
V.11.11
§5. But though a
better organization of governments would greatly diminish the force of
the objection to the mere multiplication of their duties, it would still
remain true that in all the more advanced communities, the
great majority of things are worse done by the intervention of
government, than the individuals most interested in the matter would do
them, or cause them to be done, if left to themselves. The grounds of this truth are expressed with tolerable exactness in the popular dictum, that people
understand their own business and their own interests better, and care
for them more, than the government does, or can be expected to do. This maxim holds true throughout the greatest part of the business of life, and wherever it is true we ought to condemn every kind of government intervention that conflicts with it. The inferiority of government agency, for example, in any of the common operations of industry or commerce, is proved by the fact, that it is hardly ever able to maintain.. itself in equal competition with individual agency,
where the individuals possess the requisite degree of industrial
enterprise, and can command the necessary assemblage of means. All the
facilities which a government enjoys of access to information; all the
means which it possesses of remunerating, and therefore of commanding,
the best available talent in the market—are not an equivalent for the one great disadvantage of an inferior interest in the result.
V.11.12
It must be remembered, besides, that even
if a government were superior in intelligence and knowledge to any
single individual in the nation, it must be inferior to all the
individuals of the nation taken together. It can neither
possess in itself, nor enlist in its service, more than a portion of the
acquirements and capacities which the country contains, applicable to
any given purpose. There must be many persons equally qualified for the
work with those whom the government employs, even if it selects its
instruments with no reference to any consideration but their fitness.
Now these are the very persons into whose hands, in the cases of most
common occurrence, a system of individual agency naturally tends to
throw the work, because they are capable of doing it better or*109 on
cheaper terms than any other persons. So far as this is the case, it
is evident that government, by excluding or even by superseding
individual agency, either substitutes a less qualified instrumentality
for one better qualified, or at any rate substitutes its own
mode of accomplishing the work, for all the variety of modes which would
be tried by a number of equally qualified persons aiming at the same
end; a competition by many degrees more propitious to the progress of improvement than any uniformity of system.
§6. I have reserved for the last place one of the strongest of the
reasons against the extension of government agency, Even if the government could
comprehend within itself, in each department, all the most eminent intellectual
capacity and active talent of the nation, it would not be the less desirable
that the conduct of a large portion of the affairs of the society should be left
in the hands of the persons immediately interested in them. The business of life
is an essential part of the practical education of a people; without which, book
and school instruction, though most necessary and salutary, does not suffice to
qualify them for conduct, and for the adaptation of means to ends. Instruction
is only one of the desiderata of mental improvement; another, almost as
indispensable, is a vigorous exercise of the active energies; labour,
contrivance, judgment, self-control: and the natural stimulus to these is the
difficulties of life. This doctrine is not to be confounded with the complacent
optimism, which represents the evils of life as desirable things, because they
call forth qualities adapted to combat with evils. It is only because the
difficulties exist, that the qualities which combat with them are of any value.
As practical beings it is our business to free human life from as many as
possible of its difficulties, and not to keep up a stock of them as hunters
preserve game, for the exercise of pursuing it. But since the need of active
talent and practical judgment in the affairs of life can only be diminished, and
not, even on the most favourable supposition, done away with, it is important
that those endowments should be cultivated not merely in a select few, but in
all, and that the cultivation should be more varied and complete than most
persons are able to find in the narrow sphere of their merely individual
interests. A people among whom there is no habit of spontaneous action for a
collective interest—who look habitually to their government to command or prompt
them in all matters of joint concern—who expect to have everything done for
them, except what can be made an affair of mere habit and routine—have their
faculties only half developed; their education is defective in one of its most
important branches."
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