The link between economic concentration and political power?

From Tyler Cowen.

"Our findings do not support the political antitrust movement’s central hypothesis that there is an association between economic concentration and the concentration of lobbying power. We do not find a strong relationship between economic concentration and the concentration of lobbying expenditure at the industry level. Nor do we find a significant difference between top firms’ and other firms’ allocation of additional revenues to lobbying. And we find no evidence that increasing economic concentration has appreciably restricted the ability of smaller players to seek political influence through lobbying. Ultimately, our findings show that the political antitrust movement’s claims do not rest on a solid empirical foundation in the lobbying context. Our findings do not allay all concerns about transformation of economic power into political power, but they show that such transformation is not straightforward, and they counsel caution about reshaping antitrust law in the name of protecting democracy.

Here is the recent paper by Sepehr Shahshahani and Nolan McCarthy.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.  And yes, yes I know there is much more here than just lobbying expenditures, but that it doesn’t show up in that area…isn’t supportive."