"While I was teaching at the John Locke Institute, our Summer School sponsored a debate on free trade between Daniel Hannon and Terence Kealey. Kealey rested his case for protectionism squarely on the classic infant-industry argument.
Kealey’s version: While free trade does indeed improve efficiency at
the moment, the long-run effect is to suppress economic growth in poorer
countries. Why? Because you don’t improve at doing things that you
don’t do.
Suppose a rich country can produce cell phones for $200 each, while a
poor country can only do the same for $1000 each. Under free trade,
Kealey’s argument goes, the poor country will produce zero phones – and
its cost of production will forever remain $1000 a pop. If
400% tariffs raise the price of foreign phones to $1000, however,
domestic phone production will launch. And once it does, domestic phone
factories’ costs will start to fall.
If you replicate this policy across a vast range of industries, the
low-productivity – hence poor – country transforms into a
high-productivity – hence rich – country. Yes, tariffs temporarily made
the poor country even poorer. In the long-run, however, the tariffs
had the opposite effect.
Kealey also combined this argument with vague claims that every rich country got rich via protectionism,
but the theoretical argument was clearly the heart of his argument.
After all, it wasn’t like he had a big multiple regression showing that
all else equal, protectionism works wonders. Instead, he looked at
history, saw tariffs, and attributed nations’ success to these tariffs.
Why did he credit tariffs, instead of the thousand other factors at
play in economic development in the past quarter millennium? Because
the theory made so much sense to him.
But does Kealey’s theory really make sense? Not really. Yes, high-cost businesses could respond to tariffs by improving their efficiency. But they could just as easily respond in the opposite way.
Why? Ponder this analogy. You ban all players over 7 feet tall from the NBA. How will the remaining players react?
The optimistic scenario is that previously demoralized shorter
players suddenly see a fantastic opportunity for stardom. They start
practicing like crazy – and improvement naturally follows.
The pessimistic scenario, however, is that shorter players realize that they no longer need
to practice like crazy to stay in the NBA. So instead of redoubling
their efforts, they slack off. Their skills stagnate – or even get
worse.
Notice: Even in the optimistic scenario, it is wishful thinking to
assume that the shorter players will eventually improve so much that
they actually become better players than the 7-foot-plus
players who were summarily banned from the sport. If you’re lucky, the
shorter players will improve for a while, then hit a plateau well below
the standards of the players they replaced. If you’re unlucky, they’ll
see the weak competition, breathe a sigh of relief, and relax.
The same goes for protectionism. If you’re lucky, protected
industries will start improving, then hit a subpar plateau. And if
you’re unlucky, protected industries will rest on their laurels, secure
in the knowledge that domestic consumers have no choice but to “buy
local.”
In wonkish terms, innovation is subject to both the substitution and income effects.
Giving firms a protected market raises the incentive to improve (the
substitution effect), but also gives firms the breathing room they need
to take it easy (the income effect). Contra Kealey, the theoretical
effect of protectionism on innovation is quite unclear.
Is there any way to gain greater clarity? You could try running bona
fide experiments, but that’s ultra-unlikely to happen. In the world of
trade policy, “experimentation” is an fig leaf for more protectionism,
not a sincere attempt to figure out if protectionism works.
The alternate path to clarity, however, is to remember that the large majority of trade is domestic,
anyway. Why? Because of (a) physical transportation costs, and (b)
poorly-connected social networks. The upshot is that every country has
powerful natural trade barriers. If Kealey is right, these
natural trade barriers should have exactly the same effects as man-made
trade barriers. Yet so far, these natural trade barriers have plainly
failed to make the vast majority of poor countries rich. Indeed, a
standard result in development economics is that being landlocked is very bad for growth.
I wouldn’t be shocked if a carefully-crafted experiment showed that
under special circumstances, Kealey isn’t entirely wrong. Once in a
while, the substitution effect for innovation might overpower the income
effect. But once you acknowledge the ubiquity of natural trade
barriers, it’s hard to believe that Kealey is right often enough to
matter. And that’s ignoring another substitution effect so prevalent in
actually-existing protectionism: When your firm’s fate rests on
government favoritism, you have a strong incentive to focus on pleasing
the government rather than your customers.
And yes, learning by doing works here, too. If the main thing you do
is lobby the government, expect to become a master lobbyist."