The shale revolution is the dominant
reason for the fall. I know columnists are not supposed to say I told
you so, but I did: “Oil prices look set to fall as America exploits a
shale cornucopia,” I wrote here in 2013, when the price was persistently
high: “Shale gas is old hat; the shale oil revolution is proving a
world changer.” This was at a time when pessimistic predictions that we
had reached “peak oil” were still widespread, and many thought oil
prices would rise even further.
A combination of horizontal drilling and
much improved hydraulic fracturing, first developed for shale gas, then
adapted for oil, has unleashed a gusher from North Dakota and Texas in
particular. It has taken the United States right back to the top of the
oil-producing league, reversing a 30-year decline (of almost 50 per
cent) in just three years. This is one of the most momentous innovations
of the modern world.
The Price of Oil,
a book by Roberto Aguilera and Marian Radetzki (fellow and professor of
economics at universities in Australia and Sweden respectively),
predicts that this shale revolution has a long way to go. Although the
current low oil price is bankrupting many producers and explorers in
North Dakota and elsewhere, and many rigs are now standing idle with
jobs being lost, there has only been a very modest fall in production.
That is because the technology for
getting oil out is improving rapidly and the cost is falling fast, so
some producers can break even at $30 or even $20 a barrel and it takes
fewer rigs to generate more oil. It is one of the cruel features of
innovation that it usually benefits the consumers more than the
inventors.
This means the shale industry can now put
a lid on oil prices in future. Aguilera and Radetzki argue that not
only is the US shale industry still in its infancy, but that there is
another revolution on the way: when the price is right, conventional oil
fields can now be redrilled with the new techniques developed for
shale, producing another surge of supply from fields once thought
depleted. They also expect that other countries — beginning with
Australia, Argentina, China and Mexico — are ripe to join the technology
revolution begun in American shale.
As a result, they calculate that, barring
political crises, the oil price could well stay low till 2035 — about
$40 to $60 a barrel in today’s prices. This is in sharp contrast to both
the International Energy Agency and the US Energy Information
Administration, which forecast an oil price in 2035 of $128 and $130
respectively. As Aguilera and Radetzki point out, the shale revolution
has repeatedly made fools of forecasters, who persisted until very
recently in seeing the shale-oil revolution as a flash in the barrel.
Why is the price of oil so volatile? I
thought I knew the answer — scarcity and Opec — till I read Aguilera and
Radetzki. They make the case that depletion has never been much of a
factor in driving oil prices, despite the obvious drying up of certain
fields (such as the North Sea today). Nor did Opec’s interventions to
fix prices make much difference over the long run. What caused the price
of oil to rise much faster than other commodities, though erratically
and with crashes, they argue, was the result of one factor in
particular.
There was a wave of nationalisation in
the oil industry beginning in the 1960s. Today some 90 per cent of oil
reserves are held by nationalised companies. ExxonMobil and BP are
minnows compared with the whales owned by the governments of Saudi
Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria
and Russia. Post-colonial nationalisation affected many resource-based
industries, but whereas many mineral and metal companies were privatised
in the 1990s as their grotesque inefficiencies became visible, the same
has not happened to state oil companies.
The consequence is that most oil is
produced by companies that are milked by politicians, and consequently
starved of cash (or incentives) for innovation and productivity.
Lamenting “politicians’ extraordinary ability to mess things up”, the
two authors note “the severely destructive role that can be played by
political fights over the oil rent and its use”.
If politicians don’t get in the way, and
we have two decades of relatively cheap oil it will be bad news for
petro-dictators, oil-igarchs, Isis thugs, and the promoters of wind
power, solar power, nuclear energy and electric cars. But it is good
news for everybody else, especially those on modest incomes."
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