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Rebuttal of Sen. Sessions’ Anti-Legal-Immigration Op-ed
By Alex Nowrasteh of Cato. Excerpts:
"Below, I look at Senator Sessions’ arguments against legal
immigration. His writings will be in block quotes and my responses will
follow.
The first “great wave” of U.S. immigration took place from roughly 1880 to 1930. During this time, according to the Census Bureau,
the foreign-born population doubled from about 6.7 million to 14.2
million people. Changes were then made to immigration law to reduce
admissions, decreasing the foreign-born population until it fell to
about 9.6 million by 1970. Meanwhile, during this low-immigration
period, real median compensation for U.S. workers surged, increasing
more than 90 percent from 1948 to 1973, according to the Economic Policy Institute.
Real per-capita GDP increased
by 95 percent during the 1880–1930 period of high-immigration that he cites.
The United States did not have closed borders from 1948 to
1973. The Bracero guest-worker visa program let in nearly five million
lower-skilled Mexican workers to temporarily labor in American
agriculture,
There is not a fixed supply of jobs
to be divided up amongst Americans: the market constantly creates and
destroys new job opportunities and increasing supplies of workers and
consumers help that process along.
Internal migration was also a big factor. About 29 million black and
white Southerners migrated to the North during the course of the 20th
century. Those migrations took place during periods of rapid income
growth around the nation. If immigrants supposedly lower the wages of
Americans, wouldn’t women also lower the wages of men and Southerners
depress the wages of Northerners and Westerners? The scale of those
migrations and the entry of women into the workforce dwarfed the
post-1968 immigration.
Worker productivity is also
influenced by the type and quantity of capital in the economy, the
differences between immigrant workers and native-born workers, and the
availability of technology. In a well-functioning economy, increases in
the supply of workers increases demand for workers, which don’t lead to
more unemployment.
This ongoing wave coincides with a period of middle-class contraction. The Pew Research Center reports:
‘The share of adults who live in middle-income households has eroded
over time, from 61% in 1970 to 51% in 2013.’ Harvard economist George Borjas has
estimated that high immigration from 1980 to 2000 reduced the wages of
lower-skilled U.S. workers by 7.4 percent—a stunning drop—with
particularly painful reductions for African American workers. Weekly
earnings today are lower than they were in 1973.
In
order to compete with middle-income Americans, immigrants must have
similar skill sets. Because not all labor is the same, a lower-skilled
immigrant who works in agriculture does not compete with a
middle-skilled American accountant. By the senator’s own admission,
immigrants are more likely to be less skilled than middle-class
Americans, so it’s hard to see how immigrants in one skill category
lower the wages of Americans in another.
Concerning Borjas, his findings
that immigrants decrease the wages of Americans are the most negative
in the economics literature. In that paper, he holds the supply of
capital as fixed–an assumption that may be fine for an academic
publication but it is not useful for analyzing policy. The stock of
capital is dynamic, increasing with population. Ignoring that important
effect would make any increase in population decrease wages. It should
further be noted that Borjas, like other economists, admits that immigration does help Americans more than it harms them, but with some distributional consequences.
Applying Borjas’ research methods to different periods of time yields less negative results. This recent paper
used Borjas’ methods but includes the wage data up through
2010, finding effects so small that they are insignificant. That is a
significant rebuttal to Borjas’ findings.
In contrast to Borjas’ work that holds the stock of capital fixed, economists Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri assume
that capital adjusts in response to immigrant inflows. They find that
immigrants have a very small effect on the wages of native-born
Americans without a high school degree (-0.1 percent to +0.6 percent)
and an average positive effect on all native workers of about +0.6
percent. The negative wage effects of new immigrants are concentrated on
older immigrants. Unsurprisingly, new immigrants compete with older
immigrants who both share similar skills while native-born Americans
benefit from a larger supply of lower-skilled workers.
Research
by Peri and Chad Sparber finds that increases in lower-skilled
immigration induce lower-skilled natives to specialize in jobs that
require communication in English while the immigrants specialize in jobs
that are more manual-labor intensive. Communication jobs are more
highly compensated than manual-labor jobs. This complementary task
specialization reduces the downward wage pressure because natives react
by adapting and specializing in more highly paid occupations, not by
dropping out of the job market. This effect decreases wage competition
between lower-skilled natives and immigrants by around 75 percent. Peter
Henry found
that low-skilled immigrants to an area induced natives to improve their
school performance so that they wouldn’t have to compete with lower
skilled immigrants. Immigrants push Americans up the skills ladder.
Yet each year, the United States adds another million
mostly low-wage permanent legal immigrants who can work, draw benefits
and become voting citizens. Legal immigration is the primary source of
low-wage immigration into the United States. In other words, as a matter
of federal policy—which can be adjusted at any time—millions of
low-wage foreign workers are legally made available to substitute for
higher-paid Americans.
If controlling immigration to the United States was as easy as
flipping a policy switch, then there would be no debate over immigration
reform. The most contentious issue, the 11 to 12 million unlawful
immigrants, wouldn’t be here.
This federal policy continues at a time when robotics and computerization are slashing demand for workers. One Oxford University professor estimates that
as many as half of all jobs will be automated in 20 years. We don’t
have enough jobs for our lower-skilled workers now. What sense does it
make to bring in millions more?
Economist, futurist, and Artificial Intelligence researcher Robin
Hanson is skeptical of the claim that 47 percent of jobs are at risk of
being automated. He wrote:
Yet this 47 percent figure comes mainly from the authors
‘subjectively’ (their word) labeling 30 particular kinds of jobs as
automatable and 40 as not. They give almost no justification or
explanation for how they chose these labels. Such a made-up figure
hardly seems a sufficient basis for expecting catastrophe.
Even if 47 percent of jobs were soon to be automated, why not let the
market decide how many workers should be added to our economy? Surely
the free market is better able to regulate labor markets than
well-meaning politicians.
Every few decades going back to the early 19th century,
concerns about machines taking away our jobs briefly push Luddite fears
to the forefront of public debate. Interestingly, an editorial adjacent to Senator Sessions’ op-ed in the Washington Post is
skeptical of Luddism. What sense does it make for the U.S. government
to base immigration policy on yet another prediction that our jobs will
soon be automated?
The percentage of the country that is foreign-born is on
track to rapidly eclipse any previous historical peak and to continue
rising. Imagine the pressure this will put on wages, as well as schools,
hospitals and many other community resources.
The economy is dynamic and adaptive, just like immigrants. They don’t
just magically appear on our shores; they are incentivized to come here
for economic, family, or humanitarian reasons. If there are few job
opportunities then fewer immigrants will come. Once here, immigrants
increase production and demand for goods and services.
As a percentage of the U.S.-born population, yearly immigrant flows to the U.S. are half of what they were during the 19th century and early 20th centuries.
Australia’s immigrants, as a percent of their entire population, is
about double what it is in the United States. Using the same metric,
Canada’s immigrant population is about 50 percent bigger than in the
United States. Australia and Canada are both wealthy, growing economies
with more liberalized immigration and migration policies than the United
States. Senator Sessions has spoken approvingly of Canada’s immigration
system in the past. Having more immigrants is correlated with a more
quickly growing economy, not increasing poverty and joblessness..
As for the pressure on government services, those must be put in to
perspective. It is currently illegal for new immigrants to get most
means-tested welfare benefits. Those barriers to welfare use should be
increased, as we’ve written about in detail at Cato. Even so, poor immigrants use much less means-tested welfare than poor-natives.
We should absolutely seek to lower those expenditures through welfare
reform, but imposing more government controls over immigration is a
difficult and backwards way to go about it. The fiscal effects of
immigration are small–mostly clustered around zero. The long-term taxes
paid by immigrants and generated through the economic activity they
jumpstart are about equal to the benefits that they consume. (Read here for a literature survey on the topic.)"
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