"California’s gasoline market—throughout the entire supply chain—is
competitive but also features isolated choke points, bottlenecks, and
government interventions that result in a gasoline production and supply
network that is slower, more rigid, and less adaptive and efficient
than it otherwise could be. The overall effect is persistently higher
prices at the pump and greater price volatility during periods of
disruption. Those consequences stem from federal, state, and local
policies by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
the California State Legislature, the California Air Resources Board,
the California Environmental Protection Agency, California governors,
local boards of supervisors, and local city councils and mayors, among
others."
"Prices at different locations for crude oil will tend to move toward
parity as arbitrage occurs (the “law of one price”). Transaction costs
represent obstacles that keep prices from equalizing in the long run
along with local events that disrupt markets temporarily. It is fair to
say that the sources of crude oil used to refine California gasoline can
be, and have been, located almost anywhere in the world, including
California."
"California’s oil and gasoline industry is in some ways an isolated “fuel
island” cut off from adjustment mechanisms that are available in other
regions of the country. Market fundamentals and institutions explain
California gasoline prices without resorting to conspiracy theories
inconsistent with economic logic and the available data."
"The policy choices of officials drive retail gasoline prices higher by
30 percent to 70 percent or more in the Golden State, acting effectively
as a regressive tax hitting hardest the state’s poorest residents"
"different refinery designs and operating procedures are best suited to
process certain types of crude, most importantly “sweet” or “sour”
crude, defined by low or high sulfur concentration, respectively."
"Gasoline spending per capita in 2021 was highest in sparsely populated Wyoming ($1,756) and lowest in urbanized New York ($754).[3]
In 2009, California ranked 13th in per capita spending on gasoline, and
by 2021 it had fallen to 21st ($1,338). The average increase in
gasoline prices nationally from 2009 through 2021 was 30.7 percent, but
California’s increased by 57.9 percent. The price of crude oil delivered
to California also increased, but by a less extreme percentage."
"a recent report by investor website MarketWatch correctly claimed that
Californians paid nearly 70 percent more per gallon than the rest of the
country"
"only recently, around 2010, did California persistently become the highest-priced western state for gasoline."
Figure 1: The retail price of gasoline per MMBtu for selected U.S. states, 1995–2020.
Sources: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, State Energy Data System, State Profiles and Energy
Estimates, Motor Gasoline Price and Expenditure Estimates, Ranked by
State, 2021, table E20; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Motor Gasoline Price and Expenditure Estimates
1970–2020, table F20; and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Primary Energy, Electricity, and Total Energy Price and
Expenditure Estimates 1970–2021, table ET-1. "California became a high-price state for retail gasoline quite recently"
"To explain gasoline prices, we begin by examining the market process of
price convergence. Figure 2 shows prices for crude oil deliveries at
three important locations during a 10-year period."
Source: IndexMundi: Dated Brent, WTI, Dubai p
When transactions that exploit localized differences are reallocated,
prices become better indicators of relative scarcity and abundance over
wider areas. Changing prices facilitate adjustments to unexpected
events.
"The successful performance of crude oil markets that experience
surprise “shocks” is perhaps best illustrated by attempts to cartelize
oil markets by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Reaction to OPEC’s 1973 oil embargo was a textbook exercise in market
economics: The price for a barrel of oil quadrupled, and prices at the
pump roughly doubled. Non-member countries responded by producing larger
amounts of new oil, exploration activities burgeoned around the world,
and by the end of the decade OPEC’s influence on prices, if any, was
difficult to spot. OPEC infighting destroyed a united front going
forward. Over the longer term, producers innovated such new technologies
as directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing, also called fracking.
As time passed and technologies changed, new reactions to scarcity
became possible. Natural gas went from a local by-product of oil
extraction to an internationally traded commodity that moved globally on
ultra-cold liquefied natural gas tanker ships and increasingly competed
with oil.
The lesson: The data demonstrate that in
mature global markets such as crude oil, prices will tend to converge
over time and move together when events impact market participants.
Transaction costs represent “obstacles” that keep prices from equalizing
in the long run. Local events, such as refineries suddenly shutting
down due to unexpected maintenance, a fire, or a hurricane, can disrupt
markets temporarily—more so in California"
"Perhaps surprisingly to many people, California’s most important source
of crude oil in 2019 was California, 28.9 percent of the total processed
in the state. Alaska accounted for another 14.9 percent of the total.
Ongoing production declines and regulatory limits on exploration and
drilling have reduced domestic oil’s importance in California such that
by 2022 foreign sources dominated, especially Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, and
Iraq."
"Mexico’s history of oil field nationalization since the 1930s and its
problematic political relationship with the United States have combined
to reduce its actual and potential exports to the United States and
California. Canada sends substantial amounts of crude oil to the Midwest
and Northeast, but limited pipeline capacity leaves it with only a
small fraction of California’s market."
"California’s relatively small pipeline networks and storage capacities
limit the state’s use of regional throughput for gasoline and blending
components to less than 7 percent of total capacity. Since general
agreement apparently exists that politics and economics are combining to
shrink California’s oil consumption, there is little prospect on the
horizon that pipeline capacity will be expanded in California.
California refiners can send gasoline out of the state but have
virtually no import capability. The state refines most of Nevada’s, and
nearly half of Arizona’s, transport fuels.
Those constraints create scenarios wherein supply and demand can
become tight. Little spare capacity further limits California’s ability
to adjust to unforeseen events, and dependence on maritime shipping
makes adjustments even slower and more expensive. Sudden changes, such
as a refinery accident, can impose costs in California that would be
mitigated by slack capacity and pipeline arbitrage in less constrained
areas.
California’s ability to adjust is constrained by the law. In many
regions of the United States, a refinery accident leads to temporary
shortages and short-term price spikes. The shortfalls are relieved by
local action, such as more outside deliveries through pipelines. But in
California, where deliveries come by ship, the federal Jones Act
(enacted in 1920) requires that transportation between U.S. ports be
made on U.S.-flagged ships built in the United States and crewed largely
by American sailors. Spare tanker ship capacity is limited, and the
entry of additional shippers often is uneconomical.[13]
The Jones Act hampers seaborne tanker shipments to California,
increasing delays and reliance on trains and capacity-constrained
pipelines.
Long-term supply issues might be minor given the world market. But local
factors might cause significant short-run price spikes and supply
shortages, which are less likely in less constrained parts of the
country. California environmental regulations that require a special
fuel blend mean that its refiners and retailers cannot simply purchase
gasoline from other states, even if pipeline capacity was sufficiently
in place.
The supply-demand balance in California determines the choices of
producers and consumers, which are made under pervasive uncertainty. The
details of those choices are critical because they determine the
benefits that originate in markets and the distribution of those
benefits. Transactions may be short- or long-term, may be seasonally
variable, and can cover flows that are secure or not (“firm” or
“interruptible”). They apply to different possible mixes of crude inputs
and finished product outputs whose values depend on market prices, to
name only a few dimensions.
Many factors also impact the market structures of refining and
retailing, and their relationships. Gasoline sales involve a complex
volumetric interdependence between oil production, refining, and retail
gasoline distribution. Crude oil and refined products are costly and
dangerous to store, and the underlying chemistry of boiling and
evaporation limits the rates at which various products can be produced.
Most important, the high costs of interruptions require that the entire
process operate continuously. Minimizing long-term cost may entail
storing crude rather than refining it immediately, or not releasing from
storage a currently salable product because future operating costs
might be higher if it were sold today. Inventories and “buffer” supplies
are costly to maintain, but cost may be even higher if the operator
must make rapid adjustments.
Continuous operation requires a dependable incoming stream of crude
oil, in terms of both deliveries and the pricing of those deliveries.
The refiner’s limited and costly storage capacity requires that the
refiner have dependable outlets and prices for gasoline, which is most
efficiently produced in a continuous stream. Recognizing the realities
of the fuel production process helps to explain seeming anomalies that
many observers have viewed as evidence of monopoly.
Volumetric interdependence motivates large refiners, also known as
“majors,” to mitigate the risk of unsold output by vertically
integrating “backward” into exploration and production of crude oil that
they will use as scheduled. To solve their own inventory and continuity
problems, refiners also contract with “independent” specialist
producers like Apache and Devon for additional crude oil supplies or to
reduce the costs of maintaining inventories.
One common solution balances the costs and benefits for oil producers
and gasoline retailers by binding them into long-term relationships with
franchise contracts that can be terminated only by mutual agreement.
The refiner sets its price in the face of market conditions (including
competition from other refiners) but cannot specify the price that a
retailer legally can charge. Under a voluntarily entered contract with
the refiner, the retailer is said to be “captive,” and, absent special
arrangements, it can deal only with that refiner. The franchise
contract, however, typically rewards efforts by gas stations to sell
goods such as tires and minor repairs as allowed by the station’s parent
brand, which itself has a reputation to protect by maintaining customer
loyalty."
As "Vehicles became more technologically complex and heavily regulated for
pollution and safety in ways that benefited auto dealerships over corner
gasoline stations, leaving retail stations with low-margin residual
business (fixing flat tires, for example) and reducing their incentives
to make gasoline-related sales efforts to win motorist loyalty."
"customers had become less loyal to established brands and increasingly
sought low prices while retail margins on gasoline fell. The “service
station” that once sold both gasoline and repairs is giving way to
enterprises (“pumpers”) working to maximize income from low-price
gasoline sales and downplaying services. Yet another consequence has
been the rise of the “convenience store,” which is typically not
operated by the fuel supplier and offers low-price gasoline to draw
people into the store, where higher-margin merchandise is sold."
"California is in many ways a “fuel island,” cut off from adjustment
mechanisms that are available in other regions of the country. Supply
shocks cause greater and longer-lasting price spikes in California
because of the state’s unfortunate reliance on capacity-constrained
pipelines and ships to move crude oil and gasoline. California’s strict
environmental fuel standards make it impossible for
gasoline refined elsewhere to be simply transported to California when
prices rise. Contractual arrangements, such as franchise agreements and
vertically integrated production and distribution structures, are not
evidence of monopolistic behavior. Rather, they provide efficiency
benefits to producers and consumers, especially as technology and
regulations have changed."
Source: California Energy Commission, “Estimated Gasoline Price
Breakdown and Margins,” July 17, 2023.
The average retail price per gallon of branded gasoline in
California on July 17, 2023, was $4.721, about $1.20 (or 34 percent)
more than the national average of $3.53 on the same date.[15]
In recent months, California’s average gasoline prices have been about
$1.20 to $1.50 above the national average per gallon. The difference was
much larger during the summer and fall of 2022, during the peak of then
record-breaking prices."
"During normal times, the average retail price for a gallon of
gasoline in California is 30 percent to 40 percent higher than the
national average. But the difference can spike temporarily to 70 percent
or more during periods of significant disruption in the supply chain
(for example, on September 27, 2023, the price difference was 54 percent
or $2.06 per gallon due to several supply shocks).
Comparing California’s percentage breakdown in Figure 6 with the national average breakdown[20]
shows that California’s price differential of $1.20 is driven by three
components: about 32 cents more per gallon explained by a higher state
excise tax (26 percent of the difference), 42 cents more per gallon
attributable to higher refinery costs (35 percent of the difference),
and 51 cents more per gallon resulting from greater environmental
regulatory costs plus other state and local taxes and fees, such as
sales taxes (42 percent of the difference). As economic theory predicts,
the crude oil price differential was just 2 cents per gallon,
supporting the law of one price. In other words, higher taxes, stricter
environmental regulations, and unique fuel island effects explain the
higher gasoline prices in California compared with prices experienced
elsewhere. The share attributable to fuel island effects surges
typically during periods of sizable disruption, such as a significant
break in the supply chain."
"Greed, however, cannot be the explanation because both buyers and
sellers invariably are self-interested. No plausible reasons can be
found for believing that producers, refiners, and retailers somehow
became greedier overnight in the summer of 2022, and then became less
greedy overnight, allowing prices to fall later in the year. Instead,
the fundamentals of supply and demand changed during that summer and
fall within California’s unique institutional regime, which explains the
behavior of gasoline prices.
Selective data frequently are cited to substantiate allegations of greed
and “windfall profits” by producers. Gasoline, however, can be
relatively abundant or relatively scarce. The relevant question is
whether oil and gasoline sellers persistently are more profitable than
those in comparably risky businesses. It is not enough to present data
on high prices or profits without showing that they resulted from
activities beyond ordinary competition. If price fixing exists, it is
subject to state and federal antitrust laws, and hefty profits await
those who spot it and succeed in court. As we have seen, global markets
tend to converge around a single price, and the recent U.S. experience
is part of it. Prices around the world were comparably high in the
summer and fall of 2022, and they moved in parallel, but the record
fails to show evidence of monopoly."
"On September 30, 2022, Governor Gavin Newsom directed the California Air
Resources Board to make an early transition to mandatory use of
lower-cost winter blend gasoline.[23]
On the same day, Newsom noted that crude oil had fallen from roughly
$100 per barrel at the end of August to about $85 per barrel during the
following 30 days, while gasoline prices had risen from $5.06 per gallon
to $6.29. He said, “We’re not going to stand by while greedy oil
companies fleece Californians. Instead, I’m calling for a windfall tax
to ensure excess oil profits go back to help millions of Californians
who are getting ripped off.”
Few if any reasons exist for believing that a windfall profits tax would
do anything more than effect minor transfers of wealth among
Californians. In 1980, the U.S. Congress and President Jimmy Carter
enacted the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act. According to Ajay K.
Mehrotra, a professor of law and history at Northwestern University, for
a variety of reasons, “[m]ost economists declared it a colossal
failure.” He went on to conclude that such excess and windfall profits
taxes “rarely deliver on their promise of greater enduring tax equity.”"
"The CEC [California Energy Commission ] and other state agencies have failed to unearth data that
would support a valid conclusion of monopoly or price fixing. Responding
to an earlier inquiry in 2019 on the causes of price increases, a CEC
report noted,
[it] does not have any evidence that gasoline retailers fixed prices or engaged in false advertising."
"As an example of the factors that must be accounted for to substantiate a
charge of profiteering, consider the summer of 2022. Retail gasoline
prices were high, but sales volumes were lower than expected.
Nevertheless, station profitability during the summer driving season was
roughly 70 to 90 percent higher than in the past three summer driving
seasons. It was among the most profitable periods on record, as the
growth in margins outweighed the decline in volumes.
"Consistent use of competitive bidding among private companies, without
union-labor and prevailing-wage mandates, to fix and build roads and
bridges could lower overall costs, allowing excise taxes or
mileage-based user fees to be reduced over time. It costs California
$44,831 to maintain each lane-mile of state roadway—the fourth-highest
rate in the nation, which may explain why California’s gasoline excise
taxes are so high, compared with those of other states."
"California leads the nation in the prohibition of new gas stations and new fuel pumps at existing gas stations"
"A consequence of fewer gas stations is that many consumers must drive
farther to fuel their vehicles, which not only consumes more gasoline,
but it can also force consumers to use gas stations in more dangerous
areas."
"Oil drilling in California has also been curtailed, and new prohibitions
have been enacted recently, ostensibly to combat climate change and
advance “environmental justice.” As early as 1969, California stopped
issuing new permits for offshore oil drilling in state waters.[40]
In 2021, Los Angeles County supervisors voted unanimously to prohibit
new drilling and phase out existing oil and natural gas wells in
unincorporated areas of the county."
"California’s summer seasonal fuel blend, intended to reduce unhealthy
ozone and smog levels, especially in the Los Angeles area, is more
expensive for refiners to produce than the winter fuel blend.[37]
The seasonal fuel blends plus California’s “reformulated gasoline”
requirement (which is designed to burn cleaner) create a “fuel island”
effect in California, since refiners and retailers cannot simply buy
gasoline from other states in a pinch to meet demand."