How Coronavirus Overpowered the World Health Organization

The WHO spent years honing its defenses but still had deep flaws

By Betsy McKay and Drew Hinshaw of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"Dr. Briand, the agency’s director of global infectious hazard preparedness, drew up a list of questions for Chinese health officials.

By the time the WHO received answers, the Covid-19 pandemic was stumbling into emergency rooms on three continents. Its spread around the world had already begun on Jan. 30 when the WHO declared a global public-health emergency, its one and only level of alert.

The announcement was a dud. Few countries paid enough attention.

Over the next weeks, the WHO warned nations the virus was headed their way."

"that same day (Feb. 4), the WHO also asked nations not to close borders—following its standard protocol, as such restrictions might discourage governments from reporting outbreaks."

"the virus moved faster than the United Nations agency, exposing flaws in its design and operation that bogged down its response when the world needed to take action."

"an agency whose budget—roughly $2.4 billion in 2020—is less than a sixth of the Maryland Department of Health’s. Its donors, largely Western governments, earmark most of that money for causes other than pandemic preparedness."

"o write its recommendations, the WHO solicits outside experts, which can be a slow process. It took those experts more than four months to agree that widespread mask-wearing helps"

"the agency’s bureaucratic structure, diplomatic protocol and funding were no match for a pandemic as widespread and fast-moving as Covid-19."

"Many institutions were slow to realize that the new coronavirus was spreading before its victims showed symptoms, helping it slip through fever checkpoints at the borders the WHO encouraged to stay open."

"A short notice in Chinese soon followed on the website of the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, reporting 27 cases."

"The WHO’s electronic system receives hundreds of notices daily. Still, “every time we see a cluster of unexplained pneumonia, especially in China, it always catches our attention,” Dr. Briand said. Anything beyond five cases was cause for alarm.

Following protocol, the WHO formally requested verification from Chinese health officials. By now it was Jan. 1.

On Jan. 3, representatives of China’s National Health Commission arrived at the WHO office in Beijing. The NHC acknowledged a cluster of pneumonia cases, but didn’t confirm that the new pathogen was a coronavirus, a fact Chinese officials already knew. That same day, the NHC issued an internal notice ordering laboratories to hand over or destroy testing samples and forbade anyone from publishing unauthorized research on the virus.

China’s failure to notify the WHO of the cluster of illnesses is a violation of the International Health Regulations, said Lawrence Gostin, professor of global health law at Georgetown University"

"China also flouted the IHR by not disclosing all key information it had to the WHO"

"it’s up to member states to decide whether a country has complied with international health law"

"While Chinese scientists had sequenced the genome and posted it publicly, the government was less forthcoming about how patients might be catching the virus. WHO scientists pored over data they did get, and consulted with experts from national health agencies, including the CDC, which has 33 staff detailed to the WHO."

"On Jan. 28, Dr. Tedros and the WHO team arrived for their meeting with Mr. Xi. Dr. Briand was overtaken by the enormous room and the formality and protocol.

Leaning across three wooden coffee tables, Dr. Tedros pressed for cooperation. In the absence of information, countries might react out of fear and restrict travel to China, he repeated several times throughout the trip.

Mr. Xi agreed to allow a WHO-led international team of experts to visit. It took until mid-February to make arrangements and get the team there."