Occupational licensing requirements also place a barrier between
low-skilled workers and employment. Although licensing is framed as a
protection against low-quality services that could cause substantial
harm, it often restricts low-skill occupations. Professions such as bus
driver, truck driver, and cosmetologist having licensing requirements in
every state. Additionally, professions such as florist, interior
designer, and taxidermist all have licensing requirements in at least
one state. These jobs require little education and are perfectly suited
to young workers who lack a college education. However, the required
experience, tests, courses, and fees are prohibitively expensive to
those young workers.
Finally, there is a lack of evidence to support the notion that
licensing increases quality. Some economists have argued that
restricting competition reduces the quality of the services provided. If
they are correct, then the minimum quality standards established with
licensing requirements become both a ceiling and a floor for quality.
Because of the reduction in supply and competition, service providers do
not have an incentive to innovate. This undermines the potential for
improvements in quality by restricting supply to the highly qualified
professionals. The academic literature finds that this undermining
effect largely cancels out the ability of licensing to ensure quality,
and McLaughlin, Ellig, and Shamoun’s survey of the literature finds a
neutral or unclear effect on quality in most studies.
Solutions to Quality Problems
Because of the costs of occupational licensing, policymakers should
look for alternatives that help ensure quality without increasing
prices, favoring incumbents, or discouraging innovation. One possible
alternative is voluntary certification. Under certification, free entry
into a profession is allowed, but professionals are able to signal their
quality with a certificate, which has similar requirements to
licensing. Because certification allows free entry, it does not
discourage innovation or restrict supply. In their study on the effects
of optician licensing, Edward Timmons and Anna Mills found no evidence
that certification of Texas opticians caused an increase in optician
wages. They also found no evidence to support any difference in earnings
or quality between certified opticians in Texas and opticians in
unlicensed states.
Bhai and Horoi studied the voluntary certification of teachers by the
National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) and the
success of that certification in identifying teacher quality. NBPTS
certification provides a framework for how a voluntary certification
program can achieve the same goals as occupational licensing without the
costs to society that occupational licensing imposes. In order to be
certified, teachers have to create a portfolio and complete an
assessment with four major components. These measures help evaluate how
well teachers meet NBPTS’s five major goals (see table 1). This
voluntary certification is costly to obtain, and many states provide
additional compensation in exchange for having this certification. Thus,
the costs of the NBPTS portfolio and the benefits of potentially higher
wages incentivize high-quality teachers to apply for certification.
Bhai
and Horoi compare student achievement within twins and within siblings,
and they examine the proportion of NBPTS teachers at a particular grade
level to measure the effect of NBPTS certification on student
achievement. Separating the effect of teacher quality from the sorting
of students to schools and even within schools is a fundamental
challenge in education economics. Bhai and Horoi’s family design reduces
these concerns because twins and siblings share the same parents and
common backgrounds.
Bhai and Horoi show that NBPTS teachers raise student achievement on
end of year subject exams. For math, they find that an NBPTS-certified
teacher raises average achievement by 0.03 to 0.04 standard deviations.
For reading, they find that an NBPTS teacher raises achievement by 0.01
to 0.03 standard deviations. Overall, they show that NBPTS certification
is successful in identifying teachers that can significantly benefit
student outcomes.
The success of the NBPTS in identifying superior teachers highlights
the ability of voluntary certification programs to act as a signaling
device for higher-quality professionals. When voluntary certification is
costly enough to discourage inferior professionals, but not costly
enough to discourage high-quality professionals, consumers will be able
to use the certificate as a measure of competency. While consumers will
still be free to choose the lower-quality, uncertified professionals,
those seeking the higher-quality ones have the knowledge to find them.
Meanwhile, the low-skilled workers who are prevented from working by
licensing requirements can still work without a certificate, earning
money and learning the skills necessary to eventually become certified.
Conclusion
The case of NBPTS certification shows that concerns about quality can
be addressed through market-oriented solutions. The need to measure the
quality of teachers created an opportunity for organizations such as
the NBPTS to create and provide certification. Since teachers, parents,
and principals value this information about quality, a market for NBPTS
teachers emerged. The main takeaway from their study is that less costly
mechanisms than occupational licensing can provide consumers with
information about quality without the restrictions and costs of
occupational licensing."
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