By David Gordon. A review of the book
Unequivocal Justice by Christopher Freiman. David Gordon is Senior Fellow at the Mises Institute.
"Christopher Freiman has in this brilliant book uncovered a flaw at
the heart of much contemporary political philosophy, especially the sort
of ideal theory influenced by John Rawls. Freiman wishes “to examine
the version of ideal theory that focuses on institutions. More
specifically, I’ll investigate the idealizing assumption that
institutions function under conditions that exhibit ‘strict compliance’
with justice: that is, conditions in which everyone accepts and abides
by the principles of justice.” (p.5)
The objection that Freiman
raises to ideal theory is that its advocates face a dilemma. If everyone
behaves with perfect justice, the state has no role to play. People
will voluntarily comply with the requirements of justice and no coercive
agency is necessary. If, as Rawls and his followers assume, people will
in the free market act with at most “limited altruism”, then why do
they imagine those who control the state will act with perfect justice?
(Objectivists and others would raise difficulties here about the
connection between justice and altruism; but I will not pursue these
worries here.)
An example will clarify Freiman’s argument. A
common criticism of the free market is that it fails to produce “public
goods” In sufficient quantity. In Freeman’s example, a town is
threatened by a flood, Building a levee would benefit the townspeople,
but people have an incentive not to contribute to building it. A person
who fails to contribute can free ride on those who do. His failure to
contribute will make almost no difference, but he cannot be excluded
from the benefits of the levee.
Unfortunately, everyone will reason in
like fashion; and, as a result, the levee will not be built, to the
general disadvantage. (Freiman does not discuss difficulties with the
concept of public goods of the sort raised, e.g., by Murray Rothbard)
For
this reason, Rawls argues, the state must be brought in, to ensure that
everyone contributes to the public good. Here Freiman’s challenge
arises. Why should one assume that those in control of the state would
act in a way more in accord with justice than would actors on the
private market? Would they not be at least equally as motivated to act
in a self-interested way? If one assumes that the state would act
justly, why wouldn’t individuals voluntarily produce the public good?
Freiman objects to the failure to observe what he calls, following
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, “behavioral symmetry.” This concept
“involves consistently applying your behavioral models across different
institutions.” (p.26)
Freiman has made a cogent point; but, in
order for this to count as a challenge to ideal theory, we must add the
premise, “Justice requires that public goods be produced.” [Of course,
this is just a first approximation, but details do not for our purposes
matter here] Neoclassical economics would call failures to produce
public goods inefficient; but more seems required to show them unjust.
Further,
we should distinguish two separate problems for the state and public
goods. One is the problem just raised: why assume that, if people on the
market act in a self-interested fashion, those in control of the state
would not? The other is that to bring into existence democratically a
state that follows the principles of justice raises a public goods
problem. To do this requires that people vote after careful study of the
candidates and issues; but this is costly. Will there not be an
incentive to free ride on other voters to do this? To call in the state
to solve the public goods problem thus brings in another public goods
problem.
This is an ingenious argument, but it applies only to
democratic states. But because Rawls himself accepts democracy, he could
not evade this argument by appealing to a non-democratic state. (Such
states would of course be subject to the earlier argument raised against
the state.) Further, Freiman’s argument is valuable for showing that
the paradox of voting is stronger than often assumed. In the usual
account, the minute chance of determining the outcome in an election
with many voters is compared with the costs of voting. It is then
concluded that it is irrational to vote. Against this, the costs of
voting normally are not high either: so the irrationality, if it exists,
is a minor matter. But if Freiman’s point about intelligent voting is
taken into account, the costs are much greater.
Freiman applies
his fundamental insight to a number of areas stressed by Rawls and his
disciples. If, for example, justice requires that everyone have a
sufficient amount of certain economic goods, then perfectly just people
would voluntarily provide these goods to those who did not have them.
The state would have no need to coerce them to do so. If it is countered
that the state is needed because people would act from self-interest,
not justice, why assume that those in charge of the state would have
different motives? Freiman once more decries the double standard used by
Rawls and other proponents of ideal theory. He applies his point to
other vital areas of Rawlsian justice, including political liberty, fair
opportunity, and social equality, to devastating effect; but I will not
examine these separately.
At one place in Freiman’s argument,
Rawls may have a counter; but the fundamental point raised by Freiman
escapes unscathed. Rawls assumes that people have ‘limited altruism.”
”Rawls permits economic inequalities as a means of coaxing more
production from the rich because he’s worried about the substitution
effect [of leisure for labor] caused by excessive taxation.” (p.57). To
this, G.A. Cohen objected that perfectly just people would not be
motivated by selfish desires to have more than others.
Freiman
thinks that Rawls. by his appeal to limited altruism , has adopted “less
stringent idealization” than Cohen, but this is not so. Rawls thinks
that justice does not require more from people than he sets forward. He
is not, by his lights, offering a compromise between the demands of
justice and the exigencies of self-interest. He is rather defending an
alternative conception of justice to the one favored by Cohen. But if
that is so, Freiman’s basic argument still holds. Ideally just people
would voluntarily comply with the demands of justice, as Rawls sees
them. There is no need to bring in the state.
Given Freiman’s
onslaught, does any role remain for ideal theory? One that suggests
itself is to determine the requirements of a just society. Freiman’s
argument does not make that inquiry unnecessary.
Unequivocal Justice is not only a book of outstanding merit; it is very well-written as well."
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