Property Rights Slow Destruction
Despite
these challenges, news from the world of fisheries is not all bad. In
fact, precarious environmental and economic circumstances facing many
fisheries have spurred recent policy innovations, with some areas
adopting formal property-rights-based management approaches.
Whether
known as “individual fishing quotas,” “catch shares,” or another label,
these programs generally have a similar aim: bolster depleted fish
stocks while improving economic performance in fisheries.
Under a
typical catch-share system, biological factors determine a total
allowable catch, but that total is divvied up and assigned to individual
fishers or groups of fishers ahead of the season.
Fishers can trade
their allotted quotas, so if someone catches more than their allotment
of cod, for instance, they can purchase additional quota from another
fisher who has some to spare.
The results of rights-based fisheries management have been impressive. A
2008 study published
in Science analyzed more than 11,000 fisheries worldwide and found that
catch shares can halt or even reverse the collapse of fisheries. And a
study published in Nature earlier this month demonstrates that c
atch shares have slowed the destructive “race to fish” by about a month in North American fisheries.
While
individual fishing quotas (IFQs) have helped improve safety and
economic performance in fisheries, challenges remain. Much commercial
fishing is done by trawling – dragging large nets that scoop up almost
anything in their path. But trawling inevitably leads to fishers hauling
up unwanted species. This “bycatch,” as it’s called, is especially
concerning when it comes to
overfished species.
Traditionally, much of the commercially worthless—but often
ecologically important – bycatch is tossed back into the ocean, and the
discarded fish often die.
The
bycatch challenge poses tough questions for fisheries managers: If
property rights have been so successful when it comes to targeted
commercial species, could they also help conserve fish that are
ecologically important but of little value at the dock?
Protecting Sensitive Species
In
a new report published by the Property and Environment Research Center,
economists Steve J. Miller and Robert T. Deacon explain how one fishery
off the West Coast of the United States has overcome the bycatch
challenge by harnessing property rights and markets.
In 2000,
after years of declining fish stocks and dwindling fishing incomes, the
federal government declared the West Coast groundfish fishery an
economic disaster. In addition, nine species of groundfish were
designated as overfished.
Federal regulators used increasingly
heavy-handed, command-and-control rules to try to remedy the situation
and limit overfishing. Most notably, they set caps for each type of
fish, including overfished species that often ended up in the bycatch,
and if the fishing fleet reached the cap for any single species, the
entire fishery would be closed.
The inflexible cap created
conflicting incentives. As their name implies, groundfish spend most of
their time near the ocean floor, and a trawl net being drug deep
underwater doesn’t discriminate between overfished and abundant species.
The fleet collectively had great reason to avoid overfished species,
because hitting the limit on them would trigger the end of the entire
fishing season – and the fishers’ income stream.
But knowing that an
early closure was a real possibility, each fisher in the fleet had an
incentive to harvest as quickly as possible – even if it meant being
less selective, resulting in more bycatch.
So in 2011, with the
aim of increasing flexibility and efficiency, the West Coast
groundfishery adopted a catch-share system. NOAA Fisheries, the federal
agency that oversees marine resources, apportioned quotas to fishers in
the fleet based roughly on their historical annual harvests.
Under the
new management system, each fisher essentially receives a portfolio of
fishing rights for various species –
Pacific whiting, yellowtail rockfish, Petrale sole, and dozens of
others – at the start of every year. Once a fisherman exceeds his
allotment for any species, he must either cease fishing for the
remainder of the year or purchase additional quota for that species from
another fisher to continue harvesting.
Shares were apportioned
for all species, whether commercially desirable or not.
By including
non-commercial fish, regulators gave each fisher a direct incentive to
avoid overfished species. Fishers who harvest too much of these
threatened fish have to purchase more quota to cover their catch. And
that additional quota doesn’t come cheap. Quota prices for overfished,
non-target species can be several times more expensive than the fish are
worth commercially at the dock. To keep fishers from simply
failing to report their bycatch,
regulators require on-board monitoring
for trawlers. Third-party observers are certified to monitor vessels in
the fleet, and any discards of bycatch are counted against a fisher’s
quota.
The cheapest option quickly became clear to trawlers: Avoid
overfished species. The penalty for hauling up overfished species gives
every fisher in the fleet an incentive to avoid harvesting these fish, a
crucial aspect that the previous prescriptive regulations on fishing
seasons lacked. And the upshot was that fish stocks got the chance to
rebuild.
Replenishing Stocks and Livelihoods
The
effects of IFQs, at least off the West Coast, has been clear – fishers
have adjusted their methods to avoid overfished species, often in subtle
ways that would be impossible to produce via command-and-control
regulations. “Before catch shares, large proportions of the catch of
many non-target species were discarded as bycatch,”
reads a NOAA report from November 2015. “Now, whether in a fishing net or in the ocean, they are treated as the valuable resource they are.”
That
reality was reflected in the fishery’s catch data: The proportion of
overfished species caught by trawlers fell by about half after catch
shares were introduced. As a result, overfished species populations have
begun to rebound.Miller and Deacon note a handful of ways that fishers
changed their behavior to become more selective, even given the
relatively indiscriminate nature of a titanic trawl net. A key aspect,
as they stress, was that the flexibility of catch shares gave fishers
the latitude to decide how to conform with the limits as efficiently as
possible.
One method was simple: night fishing. Some overfished
species move up from the seafloor at night, meaning that trawlers could
avoid these species while still catching certain types of target fish by
changing their timing. The authors also found that
fishers shortened
the duration of their trawls after the adoption of catch shares. Hauling
up nets more frequently gives fishers a better idea of the composition
of fish in an area, and the data showed that fishers checked their nets
even more frequently where they were particularly wary about the
likelihood of encountering overfished species.
In addition, Miller
and Deacon found that
the introduction of catch shares virtually
created “a voluntary expansion of the existing system of marine
protected areas.” Trawling was traditionally restricted in areas with
high concentrations of overfished species. Fishing near these protected
areas meant that overfished species were likely to end up in your net – a
substantial cost once catch shares were implemented. These areas
quickly became unattractive fishing grounds, lessening pressure on the
precarious fish populations there.
The Future of Fish
Rights-based
innovations in fisheries – including using them to manage bycatch –
have improved marine fisheries economically and ecologically. Using
command-and-control regulations to manage bycatch and meet conservation
targets, by contrast, “would require information that is time- and
place-specific and knowledge that is dispersed among resource users and
unavailable to any central manager,” Miller and Deacon write.
Property
rights in the form of catch shares “gave individual fishers incentives
to use their dispersed knowledge to find least-cost solutions.”
A
new generation of innovation in commercial fisheries shows that where
property rights have been made clear, secure, and transferable, the
negative environmental effects of overfishing have been reduced, and the
safety and economic performance of the fishing industry have generally
improved. With many of world’s fishing grounds under ecological and
economic threat, rights-based management approaches could provide the
best boost to the future health of marine fisheries.
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