1. China has been growing very fast.
2. The Chinese government plays a large role in the economy.
3. Therefore Chinese growth is explained by statist policies.
I would hope I don't need to explain what's wrong with that logic, but just in case let's look at the
Economist magazine list of the 10 fastest growing economies for 2015:
OK, so how
should we test the effect of statist policies on an
economy? One method would be to compare the economic performance of
highly statist economies like Greece with more laissez-faire economies
like Switzerland. The problem here is that economic performance can
vary for many reasons, such as cultural differences, natural resource
endowments, etc. To the greatest extent possible, you'd like to compare
different economic systems in culturally similar regions. Here are
three possibilities:
1. Different countries with Chinese culture.
2. Different time periods within China.
3. Different regions within China (especially "Han" China.)
It's pretty well known that the other three ethnic Chinese economies
(Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) are all far less statist than Mainland
China, and far richer.
It's pretty well known that China began growing fast after it started
moving away from communism, and that further growth spurts followed the
liberalization around 1992, and the liberalization around the time
China joined the WTO in the early 2000s.
But what about regional differences? Once again the
Economist, this time describing the most statist part of the Chinese economy:
The wrong mix
Those efforts have borne fruit: state-owned firms produced more than
two-thirds of the region's GDP in the early 2000s. That has fallen to
about 50%, still above the national average of 30%, but progress
nonetheless. The structure of the north-east's economy, however, has
worsened in a more important respect. It has become ever more reliant on
investment and manufacturing, both geared to the now-slowing property
market. State companies and private firms alike have poured into mining,
heavy-equipment factories and construction. Even the car industry, in
which the north-east has been a national leader, is closely linked to
property, as buyers of new homes also tend to buy cars. In any case,
home-grown car brands such as Hongqi and Jinbei are falling further and
further behind foreign rivals in popularity.
Whereas the rest of China's economy has become better balanced, with
services now accounting for more of GDP than manufacturing, the
north-east has gone in the other direction. Manufacturing's share of the
regional GDP rose to 50% in 2013 from 47% a decade earlier, and the
contribution of services declined--the opposite of what the original
revitalisation plan called for. Even more striking, investment accounted
for 65% of the north-east's GDP in 2013, roughly double its
contribution a decade earlier. The national average is a shade under
50%, which is already high by international standards.
An hour's drive east of Shenyang to the new town of Shenfu offers a
glimpse of how much spending has been misallocated. There, rising 150
metres into the air, is a giant upright steel circle--the "ring of life"
(pictured on previous page), which was built as a landmark for the town
even before anyone moved in. It is flanked by half-finished buildings
and faded billboards advertising dream homes.
Shenfu was designed as a dormitory town, roughly equidistant between
the cities of Shenyang and Fushun, to which it is well connected by
multi-lane highways. But with heavy industry in the area struggling, and
Shenyang and Fushun already weighed down by their own gluts of empty
homes, Shenfu has not taken off. "Guys used to walk through the door and
buy two or three homes at a go," says a saleswoman at Deshang
International Garden, a large housing complex. Its occupancy rate is now
about 50%, which, she says, makes it one of the most successful
developments in town.
Over-capacity in heavy industry is also pervasive. The north-eastern
provinces took the extraordinary step of ordering some 100
cement-production lines to close for four months this winter, in part to
alleviate a supply glut. It is estimated that as much as half their
capacity is unneeded. Cement production by itself is a tiny part of the
north-eastern economy, but as a crucial input for construction, which
accounts for 6% of regional GDP, it is symptomatic of the broader excess
in heavy industry.
Poor investment decisions mean less money for spending on social
services. In late November as many as 20,000 teachers went on strike
over low pay and miserly pensions in towns near Harbin, the capital of
Heilongjiang, the slowest-growing of the north-eastern provinces.
Old command-economy habits run deep. After the mass bankruptcies of
state firms in the late 1990s, some cities decided they needed cash from
officials in Beijing to fund yet more state companies. Liang Qidong of
the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, a government research
institution, even argues that the north-east is the world's best example
of a Soviet-style economy, because its central-planning mentality has
persisted for so long. "A lot of people still don't truly understand or
believe in the role of the market," he says.
Of course if we looked at the least statist regions in China (Shenzhen,
Zhejiang, etc.) we'd see exactly the opposite, dynamic growth and great
flexibility.
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