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Suppressing Competition from Migrant Doctors
From Jeffrey Miron of Cato.
"The claim for physician licensure is that it protects consumers
from “quacks;” it is just a coincidence that licensure also reduces
competition and raises doctors’ incomes! In this case, the strength of
licensing should be similar across states, and licensure requirements
should determine whether a prospective doctor is competent, not whether a
U.S. native or a migrant.
Recent research by Brenton Peterson, Sonal Pandya, and David Leblang (University of Virginia), however, finds the opposite:
Licensure regulations
ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence, but they
can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants.
From a collective action perspective, skilled natives can more easily
secure sub-national, occupation-specific policies than influence
national immigration policy. We exploit the unique structure of the
American medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public
interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure
regulations. We show that over the 1973–2010 period, states with greater
physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent
requirements for migrant physician licensure and, as a consequence,
received fewer new migrant physicians. By our estimates over a third of
all US states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10
percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure
requirements.
Little evidence
suggests that professonal licensure promotes quality or protects the
public, but arbitrary discrimination against migrant physicians (many
trained in the United States!) is particularly insane. As are all
restrictions on high-skill (or other) immigration."
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