1. The report seems to ignore the fact that fiscal stimulus failed
to produce the effects the administration claimed it would produce. Now
I'm willing to cut them some slack on that point, as
ceteris is never
paribus.
They claimed that the recession turned out to be more severe than they
expected, although to be honest it was very clear by early 2009 when
Obama took office that the recession was extremely severe. But let's
give them the benefit of the doubt.
2.
In 2013 the Federal government switched to a policy of fiscal
austerity, which should have slowed growth. Instead growth in 2013
accelerated. This time there was no "the recession of 2009 was deeper
than we thought" excuse. The fiscal multiplier model simply failed.
3. Instead of comparing actual to predicted results,
they have lots of graphs showing the success of fiscal stimulus based on models of the economy that simply assume the policy was successful. How is that supposed to convince anyone?
4. These models are defended with a very inadequate discussion of
the theoretical and empirical research that underpins the multiplier
model. Let's start with by far the biggest problem, monetary offset.
They correctly point out that there are new Keynesian models that show a
fiscal multiplier can work when monetary policy is constrained by the
zero bound. But those models assume the Fed does not engage in
unconventional stimulus such as QE and forward guidance. In fact, the
Fed does both, which makes those
NK models completely inappropriate for
evaluating fiscal stimulus in the US. They also
ignore international
evidence of the failure of fiscal stimulus at the zero bound, such as
the Japanese fiscal stimulus of the 1990s and 2000s
5. They cite studies of fiscal stimulus using wartime spending,
which is of little applicability to this crisis. These
models are based
on the notion that people work harder when military spending depresses
consumption. Military spending during WWII did boost RGDP, but also
depressed consumption and living standards (recall
the Great Depression
was basically over by early December 1941, before Pearl Harbor.) In
contrast, only about 18% of ARRA plus subsequent stimulus was in the
form of public investment, it was mostly tax cuts and transfers.
Military spending declined. Given monetary offset, there's
no reason to
assume that tax cuts had much demand-side effect. And they
failed to
do the sorts of tax cuts that might have boosted the supply side, such
as the employer-side payroll tax cut that Christina Romer recommended
6. If it's really true (as they claim) that fiscal stimulus was
needed in 2009 because monetary policy was constrained by the zero
bound,
why didn't Obama appoint some people to the Fed in 2009 who would
adopt Paul Krugman-style unconventional stimulus, such as the forward
guidance that was eventually adopted in late 2012? After all, the Dems
had a filibuster-proof majority in 2009. I think we all know the
answer. Larry Summers says he prefers fiscal to monetary stimulus, even
where monetary stimulus is possible. Indeed Summers is so pro-fiscal
that progressive blogger
Matt Yglesias
once characterized his views as "socialist." (Yes, I'm sure Matt was
half joking, but there has to be some truth in any joke.) The report
suggests fiscal stimulus was needed to save the economy, whereas it was
actually adopted for ideological reasons. Obama has not adopted a far
left set of public policies. But his actual views (as far as I can
tell) are left wing on almost every single economic issue. He's smart
enough to know he rules over one of the most conservative developed
economies, and hence is cautious in his policy initiatives. But make no
mistake about it, he'll use any and all opportunities to expand
government, and he'll never try to scale it back in any important way.
He's not a Clinton.
7. The report also discusses cross-sectional studies of the effect
of fiscal stimulus, despite the fact that
cross sectional studies tell
us nothing about the aggregate fiscal multiplier. Even if it were zero
at the national level, building a billion dollar air force base in Fargo
would boost Fargo's GDP. Everyone agrees on that. While the report
does acknowledge the monetary offset issue at the state level, they go
on to discuss data from eurozone countries that seems to ignore the
monetary offset issue with cross-sectional studies within a single
currency. Mark Sadowski re-estimated the effect for countries with
independent monetary policies, and found little impact. The report
seems to have been written by people living within the liberal Keynesian
echo chamber, who have little knowledge of important criticisms of the
fiscal multiplier model.
8. The report brushes aside any concern about the effect of
UI
insurance on the unemployment rate. Admittedly we don't have conclusive
evidence in this area, but
most of the studies I've seen (including
studies cited by Brad DeLong) point to effects on the order of 1/2%.
Not huge, but not trivial either.
9. There are widely implausible estimates of the impact of ARRA on GDP:
Despite the differences in the models, these private-sector
forecasters all estimated that the Recovery Act would raise GDP
substantially from 2009 to 2011, including a boost to GDP of between 2.0
and 3.4 percent in 2010.
Any private sector forecaster who thinks the Fed would have allowed 2010
GDP to be about 2.7% less than it actually turned out to be needs to
have their forecasting license revoked, that estimate is an insult to
Ben Bernanke. He was not about to preside over another depression.
Bernanke would have instituted price level targeting long before that
outcome materialized. People working in this area need to have common
sense about plausible outcomes, otherwise nothing they say will be taken
seriously. Again, look at some of the absurd NK predictions as to how
the 2013 austerity would impact 2013 GDP growth. Here's what the report
says about 2013:
Second, the economy has encountered a long list of
additional headwinds in recent years. . . . It includes fiscal
austerity at the State and local level that intensified as the Recovery
Act began to phase out and has cost hundreds of thousands of additional
job losses even during the expansion period. And it includes measures
like the sequester which CBO estimated took 0.6 percentage point off
growth in 2013, the 16-day government shutdown which the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) estimated directly subtracted 0.3 percentage
point from growth in the fourth quarter, and dangerous brinksmanship
around the debt limit in 2011 and 2013.
They forgot to mention to big payroll tax increase, or the income tax
increases, both occurred at the beginning of 2013. Quite a fiscal drag
(the
Economist
magazine estimated the effect at 1.9% of GDP, even without the
shutdown), and
yet RGDP growth accelerates from 1.95% in 2012 to 2.7% in
2013. Nor is there a discussion of the fact that
fiscal austerity in
the U.S. was slightly greater than in the eurozone in recent years. Yet
the US economy did far better, solely due to the greater willingness of
the Fed to do monetary offset.