Interesting post from John Cochrane of The University of Chicago.
New vs. Old Keynesian Stimulus.
"While fiddling with a recent paper, "
The New-Keynesian Liquidity Trap" (
blog post),
a simple insight dawned on me on the utter and fundamental difference
between New-Keynesian and Old-Keynesian models of stimulus.
Old-Keynesian. The "Keynesian cross" is the
most basic mechanism. (If you are worried that I'm making this up, see
Greg Mankiw's Macroeconomics, p. 308 eighth edition, "Fiscal policy and
the multiplier: Government Purchases.")
Consumption follows a "consumption function." If people get more income Y, they consume more C
C = a + m Y.
Output Y is determined by consumption C investment I and government spending G
Y = C+ I + G.
Put the two together and equilibrium output is
Y = a + mY + I + G
Y = (a + I + G)/(1-m).
So, if the marginal propensity to consume m=0.6, then each dollar of
government spending G generates not just one dollar of output Y (first
equation), but $2.5 dollars of additional output.
This model captures a satisfying story. More government spending, even
if on completely useless projects, "puts money in people's pockets."
Those people in turn go out and spend, providing more income for others,
who go out and spend, and so on. We pull ourselves up by our
bootstraps. Saving is the enemy, as it lowers the marginal propensity to
consume and reduces this multiplier.
New-Keynesian. The heart of the New-Keynesian model is a completely different view of consumption. In its simplest version
Here consumption C, relative to trend, equals the sum of all future real
interest rates i less inflation π i.e. all future real interest rates.
The parameter σ measures how resistant people are to consuming less
today and more tomorrow when offered a higher interest rate.
(This is just the integrated version of the standard first order condition, in discrete time
People in this model think about the future when deciding how much to
consume and allocate consumption today vs. tomorrow looking at the real
interest rate. I've simplified a lot, leaving out trends, the level and
variation of the "natural rate" and so on.)
In this model too, totally wasted government spending can raise
consumption and hence output, but by a radically different mechanism.
Government spending raises inflation π . (How is not important here,
that's in the Phillips curve.) Holding nominal interest rates i fixed,
either at the zero bound or with Fed cooperation, more inflation π means
lower real interest rates. It induces consumers to spend their money
today rather than in the future, before that money loses value.
Now, lowering consumption growth is normally a bad thing. But
new-Keynesian modelers assume that the economy reverts to trend, so
lowering growth rates is good, and raises the level of consumption today with no ill effects tomorrow. (More in
a previous post here)
Comparing stories
This new-Keynesian model is an utterly and completely different
mechanism and story. The heart of the New-Keynesian model is Milton
Friedman's permanent income theory of consumption, against which
old-Keynesians fought so long and hard! Actually, it's more radical than
Friedman:
The marginal propensity to consume is exactly and precisely zero
in the new-Keynesian model. There is no income at all on the right
hand side. Why? By holding expected future consumption constant, i.e. by
assuming the economy reverts to trend and no more, there is no such
thing as a permanent increase in consumption.
The old-Keynesian model is driven completely by an income effect with no
substitution effect. Consumers don't think about today vs. the future
at all. The new-Keynesian model based on the intertemporal substitution
effect with no income effect at all.
Models and stories
Now, why is Grumpy grumpy?
Many Keynesian commentators have been arguing for much more stimulus.
They like to write the nice story, how we put money in people's
pockets, and then they go and spend, and that puts more money in other
people's pockets, and so on.
But, alas, the old-Keynesian model of that story is wrong. It's just not
economics. A 40 year quest for "microfoundations" came up with nothing.
How many Nobel prizes have they given for demolishing the old-Keynesian
model? At least Friedman, Lucas, Prescott, Kydland, Sargent and Sims.
Since about 1980, if you send a paper with this model to any half
respectable journal, they will reject it instantly.
But people love the story. Policy makers love the story. Most of
Washington loves the story. Most of Washington policy analysis uses
Keynesian models or Keynesian thinking. This is really curious. Our
whole policy establishment uses a model that cannot be published in a
peer-reviewed journal. Imagine if the climate scientists were telling us
to spend a trillion dollars on carbon dioxide mitigation -- but they
had not been able to publish any of their models in peer-reviewed
journals for 35 years.
What to do? Part of the fashion is to say that all of academic economics
is nuts and just abandoned the eternal verities of Keynes 35 years ago,
even if nobody ever really did get the foundations right. But they know
that such anti-intellectualism is not totally convincing, so it's also
fashionable to use new-Keynesian models as holy water. Something like
"well, I didn't read all the equations, but Woodford's book sprinkles
all the right Lucas-Sargent-Prescott holy water on it and makes this all
respectable again." Cognitive dissonance allows one to make these
contradictory arguments simultaneously.
Except new-Keynesian economics does no such thing, as I think this
example makes clear. If you want to use new-Keynesian models to defend
stimulus, do it forthrightly: "The government should spend money, even
if on totally wasted projects, because that will cause inflation,
inflation will lower real interest rates, lower real interest rates will
induce people to consume today rather than tomorrow, we believe
tomorrow's consumption will revert to trend anyway, so this step will
increase demand. We disclaim any income-based "multiplier," sorry, our
new models have no such effect, and we'll stand up in public and tell
any politician who uses this argument that it's wrong."
That, at least, would be honest. If not particularly effective!
You may disagree with all of this, but that reinforces another important
lesson. In macroeconomics, the step of crafting a story from the
equations, figuring out what our little quantitative parables mean for
policy, and understanding and explaining the mechanisms, is really hard,
even when the equations are very simple. And it's important. Nobody
trusts black boxes. The Chicago-Minnesota equilibrium school never
really got people to understand what was in the black box and trust the
answers. The DSGE new Keynesian black box has some very unexpected
stories in it, and is very very far from providing justification for
old-Keynesian intuition."