World Trade Grows Without the U.S.

Other nations are busy expanding commercial ties, as the U.S. economy is increasingly isolated

By Phil Gramm and Donald J. Boudreaux. Excerpts:

"After President Herbert Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, 25 countries imposed retaliatory tariffs"

"the real value of world trade plummeted by more than 65% between 1929 and 1933."

"fear that under the gold standard, countries hit by U.S. tariffs would have to settle their trade deficits in gold, depleting their gold reserves and money supply"

"Governments no longer have to worry about trade deficits causing deflation."

"Our 10 largest trading partners on average export and import 55.5% more of their gross domestic product than the U.S. does."

"Canada has responded to U.S. tariffs by launching a trade expansion effort, including a meeting between Mr. Carney and Xi Jinping"

"Dramatic improvements in transportation and communications have made it much easier for exporters and importers to find alternative markets"

"The rise of small-volume carriers such as FedEx, UPS and DHL along with the significant fall in freight rates have made trade diversion and diversification easier and more profitable. As important, the cost of instant international communication and search has fallen to near zero."

"Chinese exports to the U.S. fell by 69% from February through September, but Chinese exports to other regions rose."

"China will close out 2025 having exported 8.3% more than last year"

"U.S. exports, by contrast, are projected to fall next year by 3.4%."

"Before tariffs, well over half of U.S. imports were inputs used by American producers." 

"Obliged by Mr. Trump’s protectionism to produce goods we could buy cheaper abroad and shielded from the competition that drives peak performance, U.S. producers will become less efficient and less competitive on the world market." 

FDR’s Faulty Economics

Americans are as capable of shopping on a Nov. 23 that falls before Thanksgiving as on a Nov. 23 that falls after

Letter to The WSJ. 

"Allen Torrey claims that if Thanksgiving were allowed to fall on the last Thursday of November instead of the now-established fourth Thursday, the result in years with five Thursdays would be to “curtail the Christmas shopping season and harm the national economy” (Letters, Dec. 2).

Not so. Americans are as capable of shopping on a Nov. 23 that falls before Thanksgiving as on a Nov. 23 that falls after. Why? Because the amount of money we spend on Christmas gifts is determined by our incomes, our consumer confidence and the price of goods. The number of calendar days between the two holidays is economically irrelevant.

Even if fewer days caused us to spend less on presents, that foregone money would either go toward other consumer purchases or be kept in savings that fund investments. There’s no reason to suppose that “aggregate demand” is affected by how much Americans spend on Christmas gifts—and, hence, no reason to suppose the economy would be harmed if holiday spending fell.

Veronique de Rugy

Arlington, Va." 

Scott Sumner on The Great Depression.

See The Great Depression: Elevator pitch. Excerpts:

"Between 1929 and early 1933, NGDP in the US fell by roughly 50%. So why didn’t all wages and prices also fall by 50%, leaving output and employment unchanged?" 

"The answer is “sticky wages and prices”, which is the key assumption in business cycle theory." 

"when smaller and more unpredictable changes in the purchasing power of money occur, wages and prices are slow to reflect this reality. The economy moves into “disequilibrium”, with either labor shortages (as in 2022), or huge labor surpluses (as in 1933.) A surplus of labor is called unemployment. When NGDP fell in half during the early 1930s, wages and prices did move somewhat lower, but the adjustment was far too small to prevent a major fall in output and employment."

"You can say that the Great Depression was “caused” by sticky wages and prices, but to me that’s like saying an airplane crash was caused by gravity. Sticky wages and prices are a given, what we need is a monetary policy that stabilizes total nominal spending and income, i.e., a stable path of NGDP. We didn’t have that policy in the early 1930s, and this policy failure resulted in the Great Depression."

"In the early 1930s, there were two media of account, US currency notes and gold. There was a fixed exchange rate between them at $1 = 1/20.67 ounces of gold (which is smaller than a dime)."

In 1929, changes in US nominal variables could be modeled in one of two ways, changes in the value of US currency or changes in the value of gold. I found the gold modeling approach to be more useful, as it was a global gold standard and a global depression, so the best explanation needs to look beyond what was happening in the US. For example, the Canadian currency stock fell sharply during the early 1930s. But it’s not useful to think in terms of Canadian monetary policy causing the Canadian Great Depression. Their dollar was also tied to gold, and Canada was an innocent bystander, dragged into depression by monetary disturbances in bigger countries like the US and France, which boosted the global purchasing power of gold.

The US price level fell by roughly 25% during the early 1930s (depending how you measure it.) That means the two media of account (currency and gold) gained much more purchasing power. One ounce of gold could buy a lot more stuff in 1933 than in 1929, as the purchasing power of money is inversely proportional to the price of goods and services. But wages and prices did not fall anywhere near as much as the 50% decline in NGDP and as a result, real output and employment also fell sharply.

In a sense, the economic slump of 1929-33 was caused by a nominal shock—a sharp increase in the value of currency and gold, which depressed spending and output. To explain what “caused” the Great Depression, therefore, we need to explain what caused this nominal shock. Why did the purchasing power of gold rise so sharply during the early 1930s?

Supply and demand is our workhorse model for explaining changes in the value of any good, service, or asset, and gold is no different. Each year, the global supply of gold (the total stock of existing gold) gets a little bit bigger due to the output from gold mines, combined with the fact that very little gold is lost. Gold supply was not the problem.

If there was no decline in the total stock of gold, then any big increase in its value had to be due to an increase in gold demand. (The same is true of Bitcoin.) I argued that the Great Depression was caused by a big increase in gold demand between 1929 and 1933. But it doesn’t take 500 pages to make that simple point. Therefore, I also analyzed the various factors that led to increased gold demand. 

During the early 1930s, major central banks held huge reserves of gold, indeed they held most of the gold that had been mined since the beginning of human history. This gold was held as “reserves”, backing up paper money. People could take a $20 bill to the US government and redeem it for roughly an ounce of gold. A typical government might hold a 40% gold reserve ratio—$4 million worth of gold backing up each $10 million in currency. But the gold reserve ratio was not constant. So why did global gold demand rise so sharply during the early 1930s? Three reasons:

1. Individuals and banks were hoarding currency due to fear of bank failures, and more gold was needed in reserve to back up this extra currency demand.

2. Central banks also hoarded gold, by increasing their gold reserve ratios. They became “cautious”, which individually might make sense but at the global level was counterproductive.

3. Individuals hoarded gold in fear of currency devaluation, especially after countries such as Britain and German left the gold standard in 1931.

The decision of people, banks, and governments to hoard gold was often prudent at an individual level, but socially destructive. The first year of the Depression is the easiest to explain, as it was almost entirely caused by central bank gold hoarding—a higher gold reserve ratio—especially in the US, France and the UK. In each case the motivation for hoarding was complex and it differed from one country to another. After late 1930, bank failures increased and people began hoarding more currency. After mid-1931, private gold hoarding began increasing due to devaluation fears.

In the early 1930s, there was an almost perfect storm of bad luck and bad decision-making, which is why “Great Depressions” are so rare. When you look at other theories of the Great Depression, they generally imply that huge depressions should happen quite often, but they don’t. Thus the 1987 stock market crash was almost identical in size to the late 1929 stock crash but had no measurable impact on the broader economy. The stock crash didn’t cause the depression.

In late 1937, there was a smaller (but still sizable) secondary depression, partly caused by a renewed bout of gold hoarding. You can think of 1929-33 and 1937-38 as the two parts of the Depression that were caused by adverse nominal shocks. Gold hoarding increased for a variety of complex reasons, and this led to lower NGDP and a lower price level. Because nominal wages are slow to adjust, falling NGDP generally leads to much higher unemployment and lower real output, at least in the short run.

Part 3: Counterproductive wage policies

Both President Hoover and President Roosevelt misdiagnosed the Depression. But Roosevelt’s policies were more successful. That’s because while both had counterproductive labor market policies, Roosevelt had an expansionary monetary (gold) policy.

Although wages were “sticky” (slow to adjust) during pre-WWII depressions, workers eventually would accept wage cuts. After 1929, however, Hoover pressured large corporations to refrain from their usual nominal wage cuts, and thus wages were even stickier than during the previous depression of 1920-21. Hoover probably thought that stable wages would help to maintain aggregate demand (NGDP), but in fact the policy reduced aggregate supply, as companies laid off workers when prices fell below the cost of production.

After taking office in March 1933, Roosevelt gradually devalued the dollar, from 1/20.67 ounces of gold to 1/35 ounces in early 1934. To use the analogy at the beginning of this post, this is like making the measuring stick smaller, in order to make all objects you measure appear larger. Normally, that would be pointless, as nothing changes in real terms. But when wages and prices are sticky, a less valuable dollar leads to more output and employment.

By March 1933, industrial production had fallen to roughly one half of its pre-depression level. Just 4 months later, industrial production had risen by 57%, regaining over half of the ground lost during the previous 4 years. That brief boomlet was mostly due to dollar depreciation. If that had been Roosevelt’s only policy, the Depression likely would have ended within a couple more years. Instead, Roosevelt took other (counterproductive) actions, and the Depression dragged on until 1941.

Like Hoover, Roosevelt believed that higher wages would boost aggregate demand. He was confusing cause and effect. Yes, wages often decline somewhat in a deep slump. But that’s an effect of the depression, not the cause. Rich people often have Rolls Royces. But buying a Rolls Royce makes you poorer.

In mid-July 1933, Roosevelt issued a proclamation that essentially forced employers to raise nominal wages by 20% almost overnight. The explosive economic recovery immediately ground to a halt, and by the time the Supreme Court declared this policy unconstitutional in May 1935, industrial production was actually lower than in July 1933. But the Supreme Court was doing Roosevelt a favor, as industrial production immediately began rising rapidly after the Orwellian named National Industrial Recovery Act was rejected by the Court. (Will our Supreme Court do Trump a similar favor on tariffs?)

In my book, I discussed no less than five different wage shocks imposed by the Roosevelt administration, each of which led to a pause in the recovery."

"What are the policy lessons?

"During and after the Depression, the gold standard was gradually weakened, before being phased out entirely in March 1968. Today, we no longer need to worry about gold hoarding causing a depression. When there is currency hoarding, the central bank can now meet the extra demand by supplying additional fiat currency. And US government no longer uses wage policies in the aggressive fashion employed by Hoover and Roosevelt. Yes, we technically have a $7.25 federal minimum wage, but it’s largely meaningless. In many states, wages are now set by the market.

Monetary policy continues to be more erratic than I would like. It was much too contractionary in 2008-09 and much too expansionary in 2021-22. Even so, it has become more stable than earlier in US history. That’s why we haven’t seen a repeat of the Great Depression."

Here is what Timothy Cogley said in 1999 when he was at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (1999). He is now at New York University:

"First, stock prices were not obviously overvalued at the end of 1927. Second, starting in 1928 the Fed shifted toward increasingly tight monetary policy, motivated in large part by a concern about speculation in the stock market. Third, tight monetary policy probably did contribute to a fall in share prices in 1929. And fourth, the depth of the contraction in economic activity probably had less to do with the magnitude of the crash and more to do with the fact that the Fed continued a tight money policy after the crash. Hence, rather than illustrating the dangers of standing on the sidelines, the events of 1928-1930 actually provide a case study of the risks associated with a deliberate attempt to puncture a speculative bubble."

See Monetary Policy and the Great Crash of 1929: A Bursting Bubble or Collapsing Fundamentals? 

A year end blessing: No net neutrality

By Brian A. Rankin of CEI.

"As we approach the end of the year, it’s a natural time to reflect on what we’re grateful for. While many blessings come to mind, one worth highlighting is something we don’t have: net neutrality.

After all the years of arguments, FCC orders, and appeals, one might recoil from the mere mention of the topic. We may not look back on the net neutrality saga fondly, but it is worth recognizing what the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’s reversal of the Biden FCC’s net neutrality order makes possible today.

Rather than heavy-handed utility-style net neutrality regulation, the United States has a light-touch broadband regulatory regime – one that emphasizes investment, innovation, and flexible network management. The results are measurable. According to the USTelecom 2025 Broadband Pricing Index, real broadband prices have continued to fall while speeds have continued to climb.

From 2024 to 2025, the price of providers’ most popular service tiers (100 Mbps to 940 Mbps) fell by 8.7 percent, and since 2015, inflation-adjusted prices for those plans have dropped 63.4 percent. Meanwhile, download speeds have doubled, and upload speeds have increased by more than 80 percent. Consumers are getting far more value for every broadband dollar they spend.

The evidence leads to a clear conclusion: light-touch regulation is working. Americans continue to access any lawful website or video service they choose, and they benefit from a wide range of broadband plans and providers. None of the dire predictions made during the net neutrality debates – slowed traffic, blocked websites, or ISP-driven censorship – came to pass.

We should appreciate a regulatory environment that recognizes the importance of continued network investment, innovation, and competition. The strong performance of US broadband under a light-touch framework is a reminder that sometimes what we avoid is as important as what we achieve." 

Austin and Atlanta have pulled off something rare: rent declines. Their rapid construction and intentional growth offer a model for the rest of the country. 

By Patrick Carroll of AIER. Excerpts:

"In a September article, Realtor.com highlighted three metros that are seeing the biggest declines. 

“Rents in Las Vegas (-13.6 percent), Atlanta (-13.6 percent), and Austin, TX (-13.4 percent), are seeing the largest price cuts from their peaks, highlighting prime opportunities in these markets,” writes Joy Dumandan."

"Economist Jiayi Xu offered an explanation for these trends. 

“Las Vegas, Austin, and Atlanta saw the largest rent declines from their peaks due to rapid rent growth during the pandemic, when many people moved to warm Sun Belt areas, creating a high starting point for corrections,” she said. “Migration trends have slowed, and significant new multifamily supply has increased options for renters, exerting downward pressure on prices,” she continued. “Combined, these factors have pushed rents down more sharply than in other markets.”

Xu’s comment about “significant new multifamily supply” is key."

"Markets with the biggest rent deflation over the last 3 years: 

Austin: -21% 

Fort Myers: -19% 

CoSprings: -15% 

Phoenix: -14% 

Raleigh: -13% 

San Antonio: -12% 

Atlanta: -11% 

Denver: -11%" 

"An August report from RentCafe looked at new apartment construction in 2025 across the US and identified the places that are building the most units. The South overall had a strong showing, accounting for 52.5 percent of the 506,353 units that are expected to be opened nationwide by the end of the year. Within the South, Texas is experiencing some of the biggest housing growth, fueled especially by growth in Austin.

The report presented a ranking of the US cities that are building the most housing this year, as well as a separate ranking for US metros. Austin took the top spot in the country on the city level, with an estimated 15,195 units expected to be completed this year. Austin came third in the country on the metro level with 26,715 units expected to be built, behind Dallas (28,958) and New York City (30,023)."

"Atlanta came sixth in the country on RentCafe’s list of cities, with 6,359 new units expected to be completed this year. The Atlanta metro area took fifth place on the metros list, with 17,512 units expected."

"How can we add more supply? One of the best ways is deregulation. As economist Bryan Caplan explains in his recent illustrated book Build, Baby, Build, the main reason housing is so expensive is because of manufactured scarcity — restrictions on the supply of housing created by government regulations. 

“Housing prices stay high in desirable areas,” Caplan writes, “because most governments strictly regulate new construction.”

Caplan anticipates a common reaction: “Sounds more like Right Wing Ideology 101 to me.” This is understandable, but Caplan stresses that housing deregulation is a bipartisan issue that even non-right-wingers should be able to champion. He points to progressive thinkers like Paul Krugman, Obama-advisor Jason Furman, and Matt Yglesias as people whose left-wing credentials are not in doubt, yet who acknowledge that strict regulation really is a big part of America’s housing problem."

Mass Incarceration and Mass Crime

By Alex Tabarrok.

"In our Marginal Revolution Podcast on Crime in the 1970s, I pointed out that blacks were often strongly in favor of tough on crime laws:

Tabarrok:  [P]eople think that mass incarceration is a peculiarly American phenomena, or that it came out of nowhere, or was due solely to racism. Michelle Alexander’s, The New Jim Crow, takes this view.

…[But] back then, the criminal justice system was also called racist, but the racism that people were pointing to was that black criminals were let back on the streets to terrorize black victims, and that black criminals were given sentences which were too light. That was the criticism back then. It was black and white victims together who drove the punishment of criminals. I think this actually tells you about two falsehoods. First, the primary driver of mass imprisonment was not racism. It was violent crime.

Second, this also puts the lie, sometimes you hear from conservatives, to this idea that black leaders don’t care about black-on-black crime. That’s a lie. Many Black leaders have been, and were, and are tough on crime. Now, it’s true, as crime began to fall in the 1990s, many blacks and whites began to have misgivings about mass incarceration. Crime was a huge problem in the 1970s and 1980s, and it hit the United States like a brick. It seemed to come out of nowhere. You can’t blame people for seeking solutions, even if the solutions come with their own problems.

A new paper The Racial Politics of Mass Incarceration by Clegg and Usmani offer more evidence challenging the now conventional Michelle Alexander view:

Public opinion data show that not just the white but also the black public became more punitive after the 1960s. Voting data from the House show that most black politicians voted punitively at the height of concern about crime. In addition, an analysis of federally mandated redistricting suggests that in the early 1990s, black political representation had a punitive impact at the state level. Together, our evidence suggests that crime had a profound effect on black politics. It also casts some doubt on the conventional view of the origins of mass incarceration.

As the authors note, the fact that blacks supported tough-on-crime laws doesn’t mean racism was absent. Racial overtones surely influenced the specific ways fear of crime was translated into policy. But the primary driver of mass incarceration wasn’t racism—it was mass crime."

Barriers to Affordable Housing (zoning and regulation)

By Tyler Watts & Joel Watts. Tyler Watts is a professor of economics at Ferris State University. His brother, Joel Watts, is a homebuilder. Excerpt:

"Economists have long recognized that zoning restrictions are one of the largest factors holding back housing supply growth. Urban-planner-turned-anti-zoning-crusader Nolan Gray wrote the authoritative critique of zoning, Arbitrary Lines (excellently reviewed by David Henderson). Gray spells out exactly how zoning raises housing costs:

The most obvious way is by blocking new housing altogether, whether by prohibiting affordable housing or through explicit rules restraining densities. This results in less housing being built, resulting in the supply-demand mismatches we see in most US cities today. A subtler way that zoning drives up housing costs is by forcing the housing that is built to be of a higher quality than residents might otherwise require, through policies such as minimum lot sizes or minimum parking requirements. Beyond these written prohibitions and mandates, zoning often raises housing costs simply by adding an onerous and unpredictable layer of review to the permitting process. (p. 52–53)

There’s plenty of evidence supporting the theory that zoning plays a major part in limiting housing supply and raising home prices. Exhibit A is Houston, the most famous example of a non-zoned large city, which, consequently, is one of the most affordable large cities in the United States. No zoning means Houston can easily add houses, particularly in response to even small price increases. As Gray notes, “Houston builds housing at nearly three times the per capita rate of cities like New York City and San Jose… in 2019, Houston built roughly the same number of apartments as Los Angeles, despite the latter being nearly twice as large.” (p. 144) This larger supply elasticity in Houston allows the housing stock to grow in tandem with demand and accordingly keeps price increases in check. For big cities, Houston is tops in affordability as measured by the ratio of median home prices to median household incomes.

Building Codes Raise Costs

Continuing a family tradition begun by Grandpa Watts in 1948, we built several spec homes in 2005–2006, raking in cash until we were derailed by the emergence of the subprime mortgage crisis. 

Joel started building again after an almost 10-year hiatus, while Tyler headed off into academic economics. Touring one of Joel’s builds after the restart, Tyler noticed that all exterior walls were now constructed with 2×6 lumber, instead of 2x4s as had been standard practice since the advent of stick framing. Joel indicated this was due to changes in the building code, primarily for the purpose of adding more exterior insulation and making homes more energy efficient. This code upgrade was just one of the more noticeable examples of a steady trend of ever-more-stringent requirements, usually aimed at marginal improvements in safety and energy efficiency.

A series of studies commissioned by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) tracked the total cost impact, on a per-home basis, of specific changes in the International Residential Code (IRC). These studies found that, over the 2009–2018 IRC update cycles, code changes increased costs for construction of typical homes in Joel’s area by an estimated $13,225 to $26,210. With ongoing updates, IRC has the potential to continue ratcheting up costs indefinitely. 

Another study by NAHB found that government regulations overall (zoning, building code, design, safety, etc.) accounted for nearly 24% of the sales price of a single-family home—$93,870 when applied to the median new home price in 2021.

 

Small + Simple = Affordable  

Homes in the United States have gotten a lot bigger since the supposed golden age of home affordability in the 1950s and 1960s. Average home size grew from 1,500 square feet in 1960 to a peak of 2,700 in the mid-2010s. Currently, new homes in the United States average about 2,400 square feet, and builders appear to have largely abandoned construction of small starter homes. 

Homes under 1,400 square feet, once the majority, have collapsed to well under 10% of new home starts—despite the fact that the per-household head count shrank significantly since 1960.

 

ny push for more affordability should emphasize smaller and simpler houses—true starter homes. At the 2024 national average construction cost of $195 per square foot (including everything except land), today’s 2,400 square foot home costs over $200,000 more to build than a 1,200 square foot starter home would cost. Take out expensive amenities such as granite counters, premium appliances, high-end trim, etc., and we reckon site-built homes in the 1,200 square foot range, even in the priciest metros, could be built and sold profitably for a full $100,000 less than today’s national median price of about $410,000. 

So why don’t we see more builders producing smaller, more basic homes to meet the crying need for affordable housing? Put simply, the large cost burden of regulations—zoning and building codes in particular—makes starter homes relatively unappealing for both buyers and builders. 

Allow us to illustrate by comparing the costs of a sample 1,200 square foot starter home against a high-end 2,400 square foot McMansion. We’ll assume the all-in costs of regulation add $100,000 per single-family home. Basic construction costs are, roughly speaking, directly proportional to home size and quality. Thus, in the absence of an extraneous regulatory cost burden, a 2,400 square foot home should run about double the cost-to-build of a 1,200 square foot home (land costs notwithstanding). The costs of a strict regulatory regime, however, are not proportionate to home size and amenities, but rather a roughly fixed amount for any size home. In other words, regulatory compliance adds almost the same amount of dollar outlay to the starter home as it does to the McMansion. The overall effect is to shrink the price gap between starter homes and McMansions, making the latter relatively less expensive compared to the former. Economists know this as the Alchian-Allen Effect. 

In a less-regulated world, a starter home might be ½ the price of a McMansion, but once the regulatory burden is factored in, the starter home is instead 2/3 the price, and the larger the fixed cost of regulations, the smaller this relative price gap becomes. As the cost of regulations grows, the relative price of large, well-appointed houses declines. Unsurprisingly, builders and buyers increasingly eschew relatively more expensive starter homes.

 

Let there be “low quality” goods

The inimitable Walter Williams, our favorite econ teacher, used to say, “Low quality goods are part of the optimal stock of goods.” Of course—for how else could the material needs of poorer people be met? By this, Williams didn’t mean unsafe or non-functional, but rather made with cost in mind. In the case of homes, this would mean that they are smaller and simpler."