Friday, October 31, 2025

3 Reasons Why Zohran Mamdani's City-Run Grocery Stores Will Fail

Zohran Mamdani’s plan to open government-run grocery stores would waste taxpayer money solving a problem NYC doesn’t have

By Natalie Dowzicky of Reason

"New York City Mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani says City Hall needs to get into the grocery business because New Yorkers are being "priced out" of private supermarkets. If elected, Mamdani says he'll spend $60 million on opening one government-run grocery store in each of the five boroughs that would deliver healthier produce at lower prices. Here's why that's a terrible idea.

1. Mamdani-Marts Can't Compete With Discount Grocery Chains

Mamdani says that New Yorkers should think of city-run grocery stores as a "public option" that would deliver cheaper food by saving on rent and taxes. And they wouldn't need to make a profit.

Except profit margins for grocery stores are typically below 2 percent, and private grocers keep costs down by utilizing complex supply chains and economies of scale that Mamdani's stores won't have access to.

"The grocery business is really tough," says Scott Lincicome, who is the vice president of general economics at the Cato Institute. Private grocery stores provide "a vast variety of fresh frozen produce and other goods that everybody wants all the time, which is actually really difficult to do, particularly at reasonably low prices." In Kansas City, a government-run grocery store scheme lost nearly $900,000 just last year. 

Lincicome says that if New York politicians want to give their constituents access to cheaper groceries, they could allow Walmart in the Big Apple. But New York politicians have used zoning regulations to keep the nation's largest and most affordable supermarket from opening a store anywhere in the five boroughs. 

"Walmart is the absolute leader in supply chain efficiencies," Lincicome told Reason. It "does this via a truly global network of warehouses and trucks and airplanes and all of these amazing things that shave off fractions of a penny off of every transaction." The idea that New York "could somehow try to replicate Walmart's global supply chain and entire business model is just laughable."

2. New York Has Fewer "Food Deserts" Than Any Other City 

Mamdani says his grocery stores will help address the problem of neighborhoods lacking easy access to fresh food. But Lincicome cites a recent study showing that "ranked the Big Apple the No. 1 U.S. metro area in terms of residents' 'equitable access' to a local supermarket."

"You can basically walk almost everywhere in New York City in 10 minutes and find a grocery store," he told Reason.

Lincicome cites multiple studies (1, 2, 3) showing that new grocery stores don't improve food access. But this is old news: In 2012, Reason covered three earlier studies that exploded the myth that adding neighborhood supermarkets improves the diets of their surrounding communities.

3. It's a waste of money

Mamdani said that he is going to pay for his grocery stores by "redirecting" $140 million worth of city funding that is already being spent subsidizing corporate grocers. As the Washington Examiner's Timothy Carney was the first to notice, that number is based on a misreading of a city website. The city subsidizes some private grocery stores at a cost of about $3.3 million per year. As some Bronx residents told Fox News' Kennedy in a new video published by Reason, the city should focus instead on helping the homeless, dealing with "rats the size of cats," and cleaning "all of the needles on the street."

Direct assistance is a more cost-effective and less destructive way to support low-income households than government-run supermarkets, and it's something the federal government already does in abundance. Through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or food stamps, 1.79 million New Yorkers—20 percent of the city's population—receive help purchasing groceries each month.

As one New Yorker told Kennedy in Reason's latest video, "you're focusing on the wrong things, Mamdani.""

Careers of Minimum Wage Workers

By Sari Pekkala Kerr, William R. Kerr & Louis J. Maiden. NBER working paper.

"We characterize the careers of minimum wage workers by merging SIPP panels covering 1992-2016 into the LEHD. A long-run analysis shows strong earnings growth for these workers in subsequent decades, becoming indistinguishable from peers earning modestly more initially. Most of this growth is due to the steep earnings trajectories of young workers. Older workers earning minimum wages show a modest dip in earnings at that moment compared to earlier and later periods. Increases in state minimum wages do not significantly alter the future careers of workers who are on the minimum wage when the increases occur."

Thursday, October 30, 2025

A Value-Added Tax is a Bad Idea

Its reduction of deadweight loss from taxes would be less than the added deadweight loss from government spending.

By David R Henderson. Excerpt:

"The evidence is strong that a VAT makes it easier for the government to tax more. The VAT is, in short, a revenue machine for big government. All other things being equal, the higher taxes are, the lower economic growth is. Moreover, even if the higher taxes did not hurt growth, they would put more money in the hands of government, which spends more recklessly and wastefully than we spend our own money. (italics added)

Take Europe, where the VAT is a major source of government revenue. When Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands adopted a VAT—all between 1968 and 1971—their stated revenue goal was neutrality: Gains in revenue from the VAT were to be fully offset by reduced taxes elsewhere. (France already had a VAT but needed to revise it to meet European Economic Community Standards.) All failed. Government revenues—and spending—rose substantially as a percentage of GDP. In 1967 in France, the year before that country adopted its EEC-compliant VAT, total government revenues were 33.4% of GDP. In 1968, France adopted a VAT rate of 13.6%. By 2014, its VAT rate was 20% and government revenues were a whopping 45.2% of GDP. When Britain adopted a VAT, the government’s stated goal was to reduce revenue. That failed too. Only one country, Denmark, adopted a VAT to increase revenues. It succeeded.

Why does a VAT make it easier for government to raise revenue? One possible reason is that a VAT is nearly invisible. When you pay for an item and don’t see the tax itemized on your receipt, you may not be aware of how big the tax is. And VATs tend to be hidden. Ironically, another possible reason VATs have led to government growth is that because VATs are more efficient at raising revenue, governments are tempted to raise VATs. Whichever explanation is correct, the sad truth is that VATs are not an engine of economic growth but, rather an engine of government growth."

The TrumpRx medicine will prove worse than the disease

By Jeremy Nighohossian of CEI. Excerpt:

"Essentially, by committing to participate in TrumpRx, Pfizer and AstraZeneca have given in on pricing. In return, the president has committed to limit the tariffs imposed on their products and refrain from using the executive branch to go after their companies.

Judging only by immediate consequences, it seems like a win-win. The companies keep developing and selling drugs, even making some of them in the US, and start offering them at lower prices, and President Trump gets to celebrate a victory for Americans. What this happy outcome hides, though, are the incentives it creates for the future and the additional powers that corporations have just recognized.

Perhaps Trump will stop after this win. Given his history, that could go either way. The more concerning problem is what his successor will do with the knowledge that threatening companies works. Will the next president want to out-Trump Trump and actually extort companies for even further reduced drug prices, unilaterally shifting the industry to be lower profit and less innovative? Perhaps a future Democratic president will threaten to break up the drug companies unless they provide drugs to Medicare and Medicaid and the new public option at a loss.

If TrumpRx is a big success and more people buy their drugs through it, it will give the government even more leverage to compel drug companies to meet their policy demands. Drug research and manufacturing will need to be ESG-complaint, carbon-neutral, and DEI-adherent. Pills will need to be dyed to be more diverse and representative of America. And the pharmacies we know and who know us and our needs will be replaced by government bureaucracy.

Americans might be happy that Trump has jawboned his way to one positive outcome—a lower price, offered voluntarily with only minor downsides; and companies and their shareholders may be glad they dodged a bigger bullet. However, giving in to government threats for short-term relief paves the way for bigger demands and more pain in the long run."

Wednesday, October 29, 2025

Welfare in the 21st century: Increasing development, reducing inequality, the impact of climate change, and the cost of climate policies

By Bjorn Lomborg.

"Abstract

Climate change is real and its impacts are mostly negative, but common portrayals of devastation are unfounded. Scenarios set out under the UN Climate Panel (IPCC) show human welfare will likely increase to 450% of today's welfare over the 21st century. Climate damages will reduce this welfare increase to 434%.
 
Arguments for devastation typically claim that extreme weather (like droughts, floods, wildfires, and hurricanes) is already worsening because of climate change. This is mostly misleading and inconsistent with the IPCC literature. For instance, the IPCC finds no trend for global hurricane frequency and has low confidence in attribution of changes to human activity, while the US has not seen an increase in landfalling hurricanes since 1900. Global death risk from extreme weather has declined 99% over 100 years and global costs have declined 26% over the last 28 years.
 
Arguments for devastation typically ignore adaptation, which will reduce vulnerability dramatically. While climate research suggests that fewer but stronger future hurricanes will increase damages, this effect will be countered by richer and more resilient societies. Global cost of hurricanes will likely decline from 0.04% of GDP today to 0.02% in 2100.
 
Climate-economic research shows that the total cost from untreated climate change is negative but moderate, likely equivalent to a 3.6% reduction in total GDP.
 
Climate policies also have costs that often vastly outweigh their climate benefits. The Paris Agreement, if fully implemented, will cost $819–$1,890 billion per year in 2030, yet will reduce emissions by just 1% of what is needed to limit average global temperature rise to 1.5°C. Each dollar spent on Paris will likely produce climate benefits worth 11¢.
 
Long-term impacts of climate policy can cost even more. The IPCC's two best future scenarios are the “sustainable” SSP1 and the “fossil-fuel driven” SSP5. Current climate-focused attitudes suggest we aim for the “sustainable” world, but the higher economic growth in SSP5 actually leads to much greater welfare for humanity. After adjusting for climate damages, SSP5 will on average leave grandchildren of today's poor $48,000 better off every year. It will reduce poverty by 26 million each year until 2050, inequality will be lower, and more than 80 million premature deaths will be avoided.
 
Using carbon taxes, an optimal realistic climate policy can aggressively reduce emissions and reduce the global temperature increase from 4.1°C in 2100 to 3.75°C. This will cost $18 trillion, but deliver climate benefits worth twice that. The popular 2°C target, in contrast, is unrealistic and would leave the world more than $250 trillion worse off.
 
The most effective climate policy is increasing investment in green R&D to make future decarbonization much cheaper. This can deliver $11 of climate benefits for each dollar spent.
 
More effective climate policies can help the world do better. The current climate discourse leads to wasteful climate policies, diverting attention and funds from more effective ways to improve the world."

Tracking the Short-Run Price Impact of U.S. Tariffs

By Alberto Cavallo, Paola Llamas & Franco Vazquez

"Abstract 

We use high-frequency retail microdata to measure the short-run impact of the 2025 U.S. tariffs on consumer prices. By matching daily prices from major U.S. retailers to product-level tariff rates and countries of origin, we construct price indices that isolate the direct effects of tariff changes across goods and trading partners. Prices began ris- ing immediately after the tariffs were implemented in March and continued to increase gradually over subsequent months, with imported goods rising roughly twice as much as domestic ones. Our estimated retail tariff pass-through is 20 percent, with a cumula- tive contribution of about 0.7 percentage points to the all-items Consumer Price Index by September 2025. Our results show that tariff costs were gradually but steadily transmitted to U.S. consumers, with additional spillovers to domestic goods."  

Economic Stagnation May Be Over (If We Can Avoid a Recession Soon)

By Jeremy Horpedahl

"The Census Bureau recently released a massive amount of new data on Americans and the US economy, as they do each year with their “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States” release. The latest data cover the year 2024 and contain a lot of good news about how Americans are faring. In this post, I will focus on the income data that was released in this report

The most recent data show a convincing, optimistic story: contrary to the pessimistic, populist narrative that dominates our current political moment, the data show that last year, Americans of all stripes enjoyed record incomes and that gains appear to have accelerated since the mid-1990s. We should probably expect more gains in the years ahead—unless another recession ruins them.

It will probably not surprise you that the past five years have been a rocky time in the US for household and family incomes. The brief but sharp recession in 2020 knocked down incomes, and then the inflation that ramped up in 2021 and peaked in 2022 made it hard for incomes to keep up. And we can see this in the data. Thankfully, real (inflation-adjusted) income growth resumed in 2023, and by 2024, most measures of income in this report had returned to or even exceeded their 2019 levels.

This first chart shows inflation-adjusted median incomes for US households and families (which are a subset of households that contain related people living together), but we can get into more detail than just the median with this data release, too. Here are the long-run outcomes: since 1967, real median family income has increased by 74 percent, household income has increased by 53 percent, and personal income has increased by 71 percent. That’s all adjusted for inflation.

 

For the wonks interested in different inflation adjustments, I am using the Census’s preferred measure of inflation, the chained CPI back to 2000 and the retroactive CPI before that. If we had used a chained inflation measure throughout the series, such as the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index, the gains would have been even larger (e.g., 88 percent for family income, rather than 74 percent).

Five years of no or slight growth in incomes might not seem like much to celebrate, unless you realize this was probably the most turbulent economic period in the living memory of most adults today. It’s also useful to put those 2019 and 2024 peaks in historical perspective. And the return to growth and recovery of pre-pandemic income levels happened rather swiftly, at least as compared to recent history. 

For example, if we were looking at this data a decade later in 2014, we would notice that there had been essentially no improvement in median incomes since the year 2000, thanks to the slow recovery from two recessions in the 2000s. We observe this pattern throughout the history of the income data: when recessions happen frequently, median income stagnates, never getting a chance to surpass its prior peak. That’s the cautionary tale of this history: if another recession hits the US soon, we could be returning to a long stagnation of staying near the 2019 peak in income.

The chart above shows median income, the middle of the distribution. But it is also useful to look across the distribution of income to see if all are benefiting from economic growth. As the chart below shows, real household income declined across the distribution, bottoming out in 2022, and then recovered to at least the level of 2019. It’s true that growth has been best at the top of the income distribution, but the recovery happened across the distribution. In other words, Americans at all income levels are now at record high incomes (as always, adjusted for inflation).

 

Another way we can examine income changes across the distribution is to take a longer historical perspective and look at the percent of families (here I am switching from households) that fall within certain income ranges. 

 

Where the breaks between groups should be isn’t an exact science, but I use about $50,000 above and below the median family income as reasonable cutoffs for the middle-income group. As we can see, the middle-income group was over half of the total in 1967, but this group’s size gradually shrank by about 10 percentage points over the next almost six decades. But notice that the lower-income groups shrank too. That’s because this chart shows one astonishing fact: the number of rich American families has skyrocketed, with over one-third now having at least $150,000 in income.

These trends are not sensitive to choosing different income cutoffs: if we use $200,000 as our definition of rich, the number has grown from 2 percent of families in 1967 to 21 percent in 2024. It also is not a trick of using families instead of households, as Mark Perry’s similar chart using households (and different income cutoffs than my chart) shows the same general trends.

What can we learn from these income trends?

The long-run positive trends show us that the American Dream is not dead, incomes are rising, more and more Americans are becoming quite wealthy, and the gains are spread across the distribution. While free markets in the US are infringed on by governments and special interests using government to tilt outcomes in their favor, the market continues to deliver the goods.

The decline of incomes through 2022 and the continued uncertainty equally show the folly of those government interventions. Government restrictions on business activity caused or, at the very least, contributed to the economic downturn in 2020. And the federal response through both monetary and fiscal policy in response to the downturn in many ways made things worse, especially the disastrous inflation of 2021–2023. The dramatic expansion of the money supply in 2020 was combined with multiple rounds of fiscal stimulus. Especially noteworthy is the 2021 American Rescue Plan, which was passed well after the initial crisis when the labor market had already been in recovery mode for almost a full year."

Tuesday, October 28, 2025

This Virginia Company Says Donald Trump's Tariffs Make 'Rational Business Planning Impossible'

Crutchfield Corporation, a Charlottesville-based and family-owned electronics retailer, has submitted an amicus brief in support of challenges to the president’s reciprocal tariffs.

By Jack Nicastro of Reason

"President Donald Trump's "reciprocal" tariffs have impacted $2.2 trillion worth of imported goods, including the wines and spirits sold by V.O.S. Selections and educational toys sold by Learning Resources, whose consolidated lawsuits against the tariffs will be heard by the Supreme Court next Wednesday. The family-owned Crutchfield Corporation is another American business harmed by the president's tariffs. On Friday, the company filed an amicus brief, explaining the havoc that Trump's trade policies have caused on its operations.

Bill Crutchfield founded his company in 1974 as a car stereo mail-order business operating out of his mother's basement in Charlottesville, Virginia. Despite nearly filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy the year of its founding, Crutchfield successfully pivoted from a traditional retail business to an audio equipment information company in 1975. Since then, the company has grown to over 600 employees, and last year, the consumer electronics retailer celebrated its semicentennial, but Trump's International Emergency and Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs threaten the future of this American success story.

Like many American businesses, "the only available suppliers and vendors" for many of Cruthfield's products "are overseas," according to the company's brief. China alone accounts for 60 percent of Crutchfield's products, making the 145 percent tariff on Chinese imports threatened in April particularly galling. Although this triple-digit duty was lowered to 55 percent in June, the initial tariff rate and the trade war that has escalated since have impacted Crutchfield, which makes "decisions to cancel or scale back purchase orders from overseas vendors…long before retailers know if their worst fears are realized."

Crutchfield explains that "tariffs imposed today, and the threat of additional tariffs imposed tomorrow, matter." If the president has "unprecedented, unilateral, and unreviewable authority to set tariffs…then Crutchfield cannot plan for the short term [or] the long run because it cannot possibly predict what the household electronics it sells will cost." Compounding the unseen cost of unrealized revenue, Trump's tariffs could amount to a $200 billion annual tax on small businesses, according to the Chamber of Commerce.

Crutchfield asserts that the plain language of IEEPA does not grant the president the authority to levy tariffs at all. Indeed, the text of IEEPA does not mention "tariff" or any of its synonyms once, which goes a long way to explain why "no other President has claimed…that [IEEPA] conferred authority on the President to set tariffs." If the law did, it would violate the major questions and the nondelegation doctrines by implicitly granting congressional powers to the president without any limiting principle.

The company also dismisses the emergency declared by the administration to invoke IEEPA: the "large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits [that] constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States," which the U.S. has had for decades. The firm says that the real threat is the president's large and variable tariffs, which make "rational business planning impossible."

Crutchfield isn't the only business that opposes Trump's reciprocal tariffs. On Friday, We Pay the Tariffs, a coalition of over 700 businesses, filed an amicus curiae brief opposing the president's IEEPA tariffs. The coalition claims the tariffs pose "an existential threat to [the] survival" of many small businesses, and were "imposed without legal authority and with no public participation, comment, or even sufficient notice." The Supreme Court's ruling in V.O.S. Selection and Learning Resources will determine whether the survival of small businesses like Crutchfield may be subject to the whim of the president without explicit congressional approval."

Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement

By William D. Nordhaus.

"The present study examines the importance of Schumpeterian profits in the United States economy. Schumpeterian profits are defined as those profits that arise when firms are able to appropriate the returns from innovative activity. We first show the underlying equations for Schumpeterian profits. We then estimate the value of these profits for the non-farm business economy. We conclude that only a minuscule fraction of the social returns from technological advances over the 1948-2001 period was captured by producers, indicating that most of the benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers rather than captured by producers."

Monday, October 27, 2025

Gavin Newsom, Pharma Baron: The California Governor has some insulin to sell you—and it’s no bargain

WSJ editorial. Excerpts:

"The state is chasing the leading insulin manufacturers, which have capped out-of-pocket costs for patients at $35 for a month’s supply. Patients will pay more for California’s generic than for similar insulins already on the market."

"Mr. Newsom at first wanted to manufacture insulin in the state. When this proved too challenging, he pivoted in 2023 to contract with nonprofit generic manufacturer Civica Rx, which was founded by large hospitals and philanthropies. He claimed this drug-making partnership would reduce the insulin price by 90%."

"the typical patient in 2019 paid $9 per insulin prescription. Only 20% of patients paid more than $70 in 2019"

"all Americans regardless of insurance can get a month’s supply of insulin for $35." 

Chicago’s Union Boss Gets a Promotion: Stacy Davis Gates will bring her educational failures to Springfield

WSJ editorial. Excerpts:

"Less than a third of Chicago eighth grade students are proficient in reading and math."

"In 2024 she told a Chicago radio station that academic testing “at best is junk science rooted in white supremacy” and “you can’t test black children with an instrument that was born to prove their inferiority.”"

"Yes, grading is racist, so stop using tests to judge students"

"Ms. Davis Gates sends her own son to a private school."

"Ms. Davis Gates recently memorialized black activist Assata Shakur, who killed a New Jersey police officer in 1973 as “a leader of freedom whose spirit continues to live in our struggle.”" 

Sunday, October 26, 2025

Deregulation Can Make Medications Cheaper

If the FDA policed only safety, not efficacy, the result would be more innovation at lower cost

By Charles L. Hooper and Solomon S. Steiner. Mr. Hooper is president of the life-science consultancy Objective Insights. Mr. Steiner is an emeritus professor of neuroscience at City University of New York and an adjunct professor of molecular pharmacology, physiology and biotechnology at Brown University Alpert Medical School. Excerpts:

"From 1938 through 1962, the Food and Drug Administration required proof of safety before drug approval but not proof of efficacy. The approach was abandoned due to a significant misunderstanding of the thalidomide tragedy—when thousands of babies outside the U.S. were born with severe birth defects."

"Congress required, through the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962, proof of efficacy before granting marketing approval. The new rule addressed a problem that didn’t exist"

"bringing one successful drug to market costs about $9 billion on average."

"if a clinical trial shows that a drug works for 60% of patients, no one knows in advance if it will work for a particular patient." 

"Some patients respond well to [anticoagulants like] Pradaxa but not Xarelto, and vice versa. A drug might fail for one patient but be the right one for another. Fewer approved drugs means fewer chances for patients to find their match." 

"Drug companies would still run efficacy trials because it is in their interest to do so. Doctors, insurers and patients want assurances that a new drug actually works. But those trials would be designed to answer the medical community’s pressing questions, not to satisfy a bureaucratic checklist" 

A Tax-Reform Alternative to Tariffs Is a Trap

The DBCFT is a clever acronym for an old Beltway habit: spend more, tax more and call it reform

Letter to The WSJ

"Paul Ryan and Kyle Pomerleau propose a destination-based cash-flow tax as “A Tax-Reform Alternative to Trump’s Tariffs” (op-ed, Oct. 15). But their argument mistakes a novel blackboard theory for sound policy. A DBCFT would grant Washington a new money spigot while leaving protectionism intact.

President Trump believes tariffs are fundamentally good. If the Supreme Court reins in his use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, he will turn to other authorities such as Section 301. If Congress grants him the power to impose a new border-adjusted tax, we will get both.

The notion that a DBCFT would address Mr. Trump’s trade concerns by being a smarter way to tax imports and that currency appreciation will offset its effects are mutually exclusive. If the dollar appreciates enough to neutralize the tax, the market will adjust and trade flows and the real trade deficit won’t change much. If it doesn’t, the DBCFT will raise prices, invite retaliation and disrupt supply chains.

The policy’s supposed fiscal virtue is precisely what makes it dangerous. The tax is popular in Washington because it’s a money machine. We should remember why Congress abandoned the policy in 2017. The DBCFT is a clever acronym for an old Beltway habit: spend more, tax more and call it reform. The solution to Mr. Trump’s tariffs is more mundane: Congress must reassert its power to levy tariffs and limit spending.

Adam Michel and Veronique de Rugy

Cato Institute and Mercatus Center

Saturday, October 25, 2025

Differences in people’s age explains most wealth inequality in Canada

Christopher A. Sarlo. He is Professor of Economics at Nipissing University.

  • Wealth inequality in Canada is little changed over the past five decades, according to data from Statistics Canada.
  • The top 10% of households in 1970 held 53.3% of total wealth; in 2019, they held 47.8%.
  • Age explains much of the variation in wealth, confirming earlier findings. This is a natural phenomenon in which younger people accumulate debt, begin paying it down as they enter the workforce, and then begin to accumulate wealth over time.
  • In 2019, for instance, 77.3% of households in the top 20% for wealth were aged 50 or higher; households under 50 made up 64.8% of the bottom 20% of households.
  • The age pattern of average wealth holdings is found to be hill-shaped, with net worth peaking at $1.17 million for those aged 60 to 64 in 2019.
  • Reviews of Statistics Canada’s survey data indicate it is likely missing key information about wealth for households in the top 1%. Adjustments made to include that information suggest that wealth inequality may be increasing.
  • However, Statistics Canada’s survey data also excludes other kinds of wealth such as the present value of public retirement programs that, if included, are likely to show wealth inequality declining.
  • Overall, it is not possible to conclude anything definitively about the level or change in wealth inequality in Canada.
  • Much of the controversy about wealth inequality stems from a failure to distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate sources of wealth—namely the differences between ill-gotten gains from theft, fraud, corruption, cronyism, and so on and wealth produced by providing goods and services demanded by consumers. 

Who Pays for Tariffs Along the Supply Chain?

From Tyler Cowen.

"This paper examines the effects of tariffs along the supply chain using product-level data from a large U.S. wine importer in the context of the 2019-2021 U.S. tariffs on European wines. By combining confidential transaction prices with foreign suppliers and U.S. distributors as well as retail prices, we trace price impacts along the supply chain, from foreign producers to U.S. consumers. Although pass-through at the border was incomplete, our estimates indicate that U.S. consumers paid more than the government received in tariff revenue, because domestic markups amplified downstream price effects. The dollar margins per bottle for the importer contracted, but expanded for distributors/retailers. Price effects emerge gradually along the chain, taking roughly one year to materialize at the retail level. Additionally, we find evidence of tariff engineering by the wine industry to avoid duties, leading to composition-driven biases in unit values in standard trade statistics.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Aaron B. Flaaen, Ali Hortaçsu, Felix Tintelnot, Nicolás Urdaneta & Daniel Xu."

Friday, October 24, 2025

The Fed’s MBS Problem: How QE Helped Inflate Housing Markets

By Norbert Michel and Jerome Famularo of Cato.

"On October 14, Fed Chair Jerome Powell delivered a speech about the Fed’s balance sheet, and to start, he joked that this topic is comparable “to a trip to the dentist, but that comparison may be unfair—to dentists.” As people who frequently write about this topic, we empathize.

Hardly anyone cared about the Fed’s balance sheet prior to the 2008 financial crisis, but the Fed’s decision (in December 2008) to start purchasing long-term Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) changed all that. By 2014, the Fed had engaged in three separate rounds of these purchase programs, known as quantitative easing (QE), and it held more than five times the securities it had prior to 2008. While the Fed eventually began a slow runoff of these securities after 2014, it engaged in massive securities purchases during the COVID-19 pandemic, bloating the balance sheet far above the previous peak.

Agency MBS, the securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have always been one of the more controversial components of these purchases. Rather than provide liquidity on an economy-wide basis, these MBS purchases helped allocate credit directly to housing markets. Moreover, they helped prop up the market for Fannie’s and Freddie Mac’s debt while the companies were in federal conservatorship. During the COVID-19 pandemic, these purchases opened the Fed to even more criticism because they occurred after eight years of increasing housing prices and coincided with mortgage rates declining to their lowest levels in decades.

In his speech, Chair Powell acknowledged recent research that suggests the Fed’s MBS purchases between 2020 and 2022 were related to increasing home prices. Powell also noted, correctly, that the Fed’s MBS purchases were not the only factor driving house price appreciation during the pandemic. There were likely other causes, such as the increase in demand stemming from the rise in remote work.

Still, some research, including a paper from the Kansas City Fed, suggests that these MBS purchases affected both borrowing rates and housing prices. Given the size of the Fed’s purchases, this relationship is not too surprising.

As Figure 1 shows, during its initial QE programs, agency MBS purchases resulted in the Fed taking a 21 percent share of the MBS market in 2010 and nearly a 30 percent share by 2014. Their share of the market fell prior to 2020 but soon increased to almost 30 percent. During these purchase programs, the Fed was the second largest investor in the MBS market—combined, the Fed and the banking sector held more than a 50 percent share of the MBS market.

 

Given such a large volume, it would be strange if the Fed’s MBS purchases had no effect on home prices or interest rates. Additionally, compared to purchasing Treasury securities, MBS purchases should have a more direct effect on mortgage rates and house prices because they artificially increase demand for mortgages.

This paper by the Kansas City Fed estimates that the Fed’s MBS purchases between 2020 and 2021 led to a 0.4 percent decrease in the difference between mortgage rates and Treasury yields, a difference known as the mortgage spread. During much of this period, mortgage rates were decreasing, and long-term Treasury yields were increasing. The paper reports that “banks and the Fed were each responsible for about a 40-bps reduction in the mortgage spread during 2020/21,” leading to “a cumulative increase in mortgage originations of about $3 trillion and net MBS issuance of about $1 trillion, with banks responsible for about half of this increase.”

When mortgage rates drop, more people can afford mortgages, which increases demand for houses. This surge in demand, all other things held constant, increases house prices until supply increases to meet the new demand. There is a range of estimates for the effect of mortgage rates on house prices, and recent estimates suggest that the effect has been increasing and was particularly strong during the pandemic.

What began as a temporary emergency response to a crisis has morphed into a primary feature of modern central banking. As a result, the Fed’s balance sheet has ballooned to historic proportions, from less than $1 trillion in 2007 to nearly $9 trillion at its peak in 2022, largely due to successive rounds of QE. Whether QE worked as intended is debatable, but it has undoubtedly expanded the Fed’s balance sheet and drawn the Fed into financial markets and fiscal policy beyond its traditional role.

In particular, the Fed’s MBS purchases have distorted the housing market, pushing prices higher and fueling calls for even more government intervention. To prevent direct credit allocation and to minimize the Fed’s footprint on financial markets, Congress should require the Fed to trade only short-term US Treasury securities. That process might be politically difficult, but it wouldn’t be as bad as going to the dentist."

'I, Sharpie' As An Antidote to 'I, Pencil' Is Truly Ridiculous

By Caleb Petitt of the Independent Institute.

"American Compass recently attacked economists again. Writing on the conservative think tank’s Substack, Chris Griswold attempted to debunk Leonard Read’s pro-global-division-of-labor essay “I, Pencil” with a post entitled “I, Sharpie.”

Read’s essay was written to inspire awe over the unplanned, spontaneous order of the market.  In it, a pencil explains the complex process involved in making such a seemingly simple thing. A pencil is made from wood, glue, graphite, clay, castor oil, brass, rubber, and more--materials that come from all corners of the earth to be assembled in a single factory. 

The pencil narrator draws attention to all the things involved in getting those inputs to the factory: the tools used by the various workers, the coffee they drink, the ships that transport the goods, the lighthouses that guide the ships, and the hydroelectric dam that powers the factory. The reader gets a good lesson in how the market’s price system coordinates the concatenation of countless efforts underlying the assembly of a mere pencil. 

The point of Read’s essay is not that human skill, knowledge, ingenuity, or entrepreneurship do not matter. It also does not argue that government policy does not or cannot shape incentives to change human action. Yet these are somehow the takeaways that Griswold attacked. The Sharpie narrating Griswold’s essay praises the judgment of the Newell Brands CEO for moving production to America. It criticizes the pencil’s awe at the “millions of tiny know-hows configurating naturally and spontaneously in response to human necessity and desire and in the absence of any human masterminding” by pointing out that pencils are made offshore. 

The Sharpie further praises the knowledge and skill of the people who made him and says that it had not “seen any invisible hands fix a single machine.” It claims that its story reveals an astounding fact: “business leaders decide where things are made, and policy can push them toward one decision or another. There is no mystery here, just political economy.”

If the Sharpie thought that would astound economists, it was wrong. Every economist knows that policies shape decision-making, and most economic research attempts to estimate the effects of policy on economic outcomes. Economists like Joseph SchumpeterRonald Coase, and Israel Kirzner pioneered the study of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm; thus, business leaders’ entrepreneurial decisions about how to run their firms fit well within the scope of economic research. 

That pencils and Sharpies are made by skilled workers in factories does not conflict with the notion of the invisible hand. No economist claims that an invisible hand will fix a machine on a factory floor. Rather, the metaphor communicates the order that emerges unplanned in markets. 

Markets comprise billions of people with an incredible variety of plans. Prices guide those people as they attempt to coordinate their plans with others. The pencil’s praise of trade is a critique of autarky, or self-sufficiency; trading in the market frees people from the horrors of autarky. 

Finally, the Sharpie praises policymakers who shape incentives to bring manufacturing to America. The Sharpie could use some economics education on this point especially. The problem most economists are concerned about with government intervention is the second-order effects, not the immediate effect. For example, when the Trump administration raised tariffs on steel in 2018, it created about 1,000 jobs in the steel industry, but it destroyed approximately 75,000 jobs in manufacturing industries that use steel as an input. Economists are trained to look for those second-order effects that the Sharpie failed to notice. 

The Sharpie could learn from Read’s pencil or Adam Smith’s woolen coat: markets and prices help people coordinate to accomplish things beyond the wildest dreams of someone working in isolation. Interfering with those interactions can cause undesirable effects. Anyone, even a Sharpie, who advocates government industrial policy, which interferes with free trade, needs to account for the full scope of its economic consequences."

Thursday, October 23, 2025

Government Promised Healthcare for All. It Gave Us Waiting Lines

By Vance Ginn. Excerpt:

"The average family with employer-sponsored insurance now pays nearly $25,000 a year in premiums. Those dollars are siphoned out of paychecks before workers ever see them, enriching bureaucracies instead of delivering care. Meanwhile, US healthcare spending hit $4.9 trillion in 2023, almost 18 percent of GDP.

Where does all this money go? Too much is consumed by what we call BURRDEN: Bureaucratic, Unaccountable, Rigid, Regulated, Distorted, Expensive, and Needless costs. 

My co-authored research with Dr. Deane Waldman shows that these hidden costs could account for as much as 50 percent of total healthcare spending — up to $2.5 trillion every year wasted on forms, delays, compliance, and red tape, instead of healing.

Death by Queue

The most tragic result of BURRDEN is not financial waste but human loss. Medicaid now covers more than 80 million Americans, yet “coverage” does not equal access. Because government reimbursement rates are so low, fewer US physicians accept new Medicaid patients. Those who do are often overwhelmed, leading to months-long waits for appointments.

This is what we call death by queue. A Medicaid card promises care, but in practice, it too often means waiting in line while conditions worsen. Medicaid patients are more likely to experience poor outcomes, not because doctors treat them differently once in the operating room, but because they can’t get timely access to care in the first place. In economics, this is a shortage: demand outstrips supply because the government suppresses prices.

More funding won’t fix this. As long as bureaucrats cap reimbursement rates, providers will be forced to limit access to stay in business, and patients will continue to die waiting.

A Workforce Out of Balance

The structure of the healthcare workforce highlights the imbalance. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, medical and health services managers — administrators — are projected to grow 23 percent over the next decade, while physicians will grow just three percent. America is producing far more paper-pushers than doctors.

This explosion of administration mirrors the money trail. A landmark study found administrative costs account for 34 percent of US health spending. Add regulatory compliance, licensing barriers, and insurance bureaucracy, and BURRDEN consumes nearly half of every healthcare dollar.

Why More Government Fails

Washington’s instinct is to impose more rules and more price controls. The Inflation Reduction Act and the May 2025 Most Favored Nation Executive Order tied US drug prices to European systems that ration care and free-ride on American innovation.

But price caps don’t lower costs — they reduce supply. A National Bureau of Economic Research study found that a 40–50 percent drop in expected drug prices would cut new drug development by up to 60 percent. That means fewer cures and longer wait times."

The causal effect of economic freedom on female employment & education

By Robin Grier of Texas Tech.

"Abstract

While there are decades of evidence that economically free economies grow faster and are more productive than less free ones, there is less knowledge about the effect of economic freedom on groups that have traditionally been disadvantaged. I study the causal effects of large and sustained jumps in economic freedom on women's labor force participation and primary school enrollment. I find that these jumps have a positive and statistically significant effect in both cases–economic freedom is good for women's labor force opportunities and female education."

Wednesday, October 22, 2025

What Went Wrong with Capitalism

Matthew E. Brown reviewed the book by Ruchir Sharma.

"It can be reasonably argued that the last half-century or so has witnessed the largest, broadest sustained increase in income, and thus human well-being, in the history of the world. While the immediate benefits of the first sustained increase in economic growth in the 1700s and 1800s were primarily concentrated in small countries in northwestern Europe and North America, recent decades have witnessed even faster economic takeoffs across vast portions of the world’s population. In China and India average incomes have soared, lifting over two billion people above subsistence levels for the first time in history. Add to this the many millions more who have enjoyed sustained growth in the former communist sphere and you can make a solid case for the positive world-historic contribution that economic liberalism has made to human well-being.

So, what is everyone complaining about?

In his unfortunately titled book, What Went Wrong with Capitalism, financier Ruchir Sharma provides some interesting arguments—primarily focusing on easy money, financial markets, and inequality—for why we, at least many in the West, aren’t loudly singing the praises of free markets. However, the most compelling statement may be found not in his explorations of, primarily, twentieth-century economic episodes, but on the book’s dust jacket, which declares: “Capitalism didn’t fail, it was ruined. . . .” This is an important argument that free-market economists have been making for a long time. Frustratingly, all of those well-reasoned arguments have largely failed to take root in the broader social consciousness and discourse about economics. Deeper understanding of this failure would be of great value. Sharma’s exploration, while thoughtful, doesn’t move forward much our understanding of that failure.

The common hundred thousand foot-level overview of the last 35 years goes something like this: communism failed, the world embraced an era of neoliberalism, the era of big government was over, and then mounting crises of capitalism culminating in record inequality, a growing billionaire class, and the ascendance of oligarchy have left everyone disillusioned with capitalism and clamoring for government interventions. This is a tidy story; the reality is much messier. Sharma does an admirable job dispelling some of that historical mythology. Certainly, communism failed. But Sharma accurately disabuses the reader of the commonly held notion that the West, or the United States in particular, led a movement toward smaller government and freer markets. The broad sweep of the historical narrative needs more nuance. There is no doubt that in many parts of the world communist countries, such and China and Poland, and socialist countries, like India and Sweden, made enormous progress by moving away from command-and-control and toward liberalism. But in much of the developed world—the United States, Western Europe, Japan—the immense drag of intervention, redistribution, and easy money, continued to weigh down progress.

Sharma makes a solid case that expansionary monetary policy and the evolution of central bankers into guarantors against the financial failure of major firms (sorry, Lehman Brothers) has promoted a system in which ever more money leads to Hayekian malinvestment. Financial markets are flooded with money looking for a place to land. The security of bailouts results in socially inefficient risk taking, and the crucial system of Schumpeterian creative destruction is replaced with the tyranny of the status quo rather than innovation. It is perhaps not surprising that given his background in financial markets, Sharma focuses much of his narrative on the failure of easy money and the destructiveness of too big to fail. There are deep roots to inform this perspective in Austrian economics and other criticisms of the Federal Reserve. However, there is much more to the story of how capitalism was ruined. It can’t all be laid at the foot of central bankers. A broader sociology of economic change and government growth are needed to handle this issue adequately.

Part of the problem arises from the disconnect between political and popular rhetoric and the reality on the ground. While much of the world did make substantial moves toward liberalized economies in the last few decades, the rhetoric of a neoliberal consensus was never realized in legislatures or the sprawling Kafkaesque regulatory burdens of countries around the world. India’s “permit Raj” was somewhat weakened; it wasn’t eliminated. The specter of a streamlined, competitive Europe ’92 gave way to the reality of a bloated, stagnant European Union in the twenty-first century. The era of big government being over is over (or more accurately never was), and in much of the world government budgets, redistribution, and regulations continue to increase their immense burdens on economies. In the “battle of ideas” the victory of free markets over socialism was brief—or perhaps it never really was.

The twenty-first century has seen the pendulum of ideas swing away from liberalism. The explanation for the increasing political movement in the United States against income inequality, against the rise of the billionaire class, and against oligopoly is more complex than Sharma’s focus on easy money and credit allows. And indeed, the threats represented by those factors are over exaggerated for political gain as usual. Again, rhetoric and reality are at odds. Unfortunately, Sharma seems to accept much of the rhetoric at face value, and his narrative begins to breakdown trying to force an era of easy credit, increasing inequality, stagnation, and the dominance of a billionaire class into a neat box. He observes, “the rise in income inequality since 1980, like the rise in wealth inequality, coincides exactly with the era of easy money and easy-to-get government bailouts” (p. 224). But correlation is not causation, and you need not call upon Paul Volcker to disabuse you of the notion that the era of easy money began in 1980.

Yet it is true you can find signs of these phenomena around us today. By standard measures, income inequality and wealth inequality have increased. But this has not been a case of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. Virtually everyone has gotten richer, within and across countries. Quantitative measures of inequality are not reliable indicators of qualitative differences. The rise of the recently-much-maligned billionaires club (some 3,000 members by recent count) has less to do with easy money than it does with the remarkable innovations of the last several decades. Elon Musk certainly benefits from government largess, but of the subsidy and contract kind; and it is hard to understand how the likes of Bezos, Gates, the Kochs, Bloomberg, Zuckerburg, the Pritzkers, Soros, Adelson, etc. are built on just easy credit and not innovation and wealth creation. And while easy money is certainly a great scourge, it is hard to build lasting fortunes on easy money. If it were all a house of cards, it would blow over. Demand curves still slope down.

The evils foisted upon us by stagnation and oligopoly are also exaggerated. Tyler Cowen and others have made strong cases for explaining the whys and wherefores of an age of stagnation, the stubborn flatline in productivity numbers in recent decades. But it is hard to lay the blame for this measured stagnation, to the extent that it is translated into lived reality, at the feet of easy credit. Indeed, lived reality has been transformed by innovation and rapid technological change in the last thirty years. Almost magically placing access to the entirety of human knowledge into small devices in the hands of the average person is not a phenomenon achieved by inflationary policy, or well-suited to measurement by standard national income accounting. And arguments about oligopoly do not explain why we are not still using Netscape and America Online. Microsoft and Apple survive in dominant form because they successfully revolutionized or sidelined their once core businesses.

Yet capitalism does remain in crisis, not so much for its own inherent flaws, but for ours. The crisis of faith in capitalism is an old story. Its newest chapter is heavily influenced by 9/11, the Global War on Terrorism, the Great Recession, and the Covid pandemic. Recently, political coalitions against maintaining a liberal economic order are on the rise. But capitalism continues to deliver for us, just as we continue to fail to deliver for it."

Claims of data center water use are laughably wrong

By Mark Lisheron. He is the Managing Editor of the Badger Institute. Excerpts:

"Early on in the proposals made by Vantage and Microsoft, developers explained that both campuses would be using something called a closed loop cooling system. Rather than perpetually passing cold, fresh water past hot computer units, a closed loop system uses a kind of antifreeze that circulates in the system and is cooled by a chiller.

The evaporative cooling systems used by most older data centers, including Microsoft’s five centers in West Des Moines, Iowa, spend millions of gallons of fresh water that is either lost in evaporation or is reclaimed by the local water utility.

In a closed loop system, no liquid is lost or needs to be replaced. Such systems are heavier on power use but much lighter on water use than open-air evaporative systems."

"The data center will get its water from Lake Michigan, just as Port Washington residents have since 1901. But Vantage’s plan calls for the use of only up to 10,000 gallons of water for the daily operation — not unlike the uses in a factory or an office building, and about the same amount of water used by the people living in 65 homes."

"“It sounds like a big number; 2.8 million gallons [per year],” Smith said, from a transcript obtained by the Badger Institute, “is the amount of water that it would take to build four Olympic-sized swimming pools.

“Just to compare that, when Foxconn was planning to build here, they were permitted to use more than 7 million gallons every day. So, 2.8 million a year is tiny compared to 7.8 million a day.

“Lake Michigan has enough water to fill 2 billion swimming pools. Good news. Lake Michigan has nothing to fear from our data center.”"

"Microsoft has five data centers and a sixth in the works in West Des Moines, for example. The data centers are regularly the largest single water users in West Des Moines, Christina Murphy, general manager of the West Des Moines Water Works, said. 

At their peak usage, the data centers represent between 2 percent and 7 percent of the city’s peak usage, Murphy told the Badger Institute.

“Microsoft has been a good corporate partner,” she added.

Northern Virginia, with the greatest concentration of data centers in the country (more than 250), has had no problem supplying water to them and no violations of water use limits, according to a report by Virginia’s Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission.

More than 80 percent of the data centers in the state use about 6.7 million gallons of water a year, not per day, the report said. Eleven used more than 50 million gallons a year, but at least as many used less water annually than a typical household, the report said."

Tuesday, October 21, 2025

Creative Destruction in a Nutshell

From Alex Tabarrok of Marginal Revolution

"A good figure from the Nobel Prize Foundation’s Scientific Background to the Mokyr, Aghion and Howitt Nobel. The figure shows that firm exit rates and job destruction rates are positively correlated with growth in labor productivity; creative destruction in a nutshell."

 

Creative Destruction

See Creative Destruction by Richard Alm and W. Michael Cox. Excerpt:

"Joseph Schumpeter
(1883–1950) coined the seemingly paradoxical term “creative destruction,” and generations of economists have adopted it as a shorthand description of the free market’s messy way of delivering progress. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), the Austrian economist wrote:

The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. (p. 83)

Although Schumpeter devoted a mere six-page chapter to “The Process of Creative Destruction,” in which he described capitalism as “the perennial gale of creative destruction,” it has become the centerpiece for modern thinking on how economies evolve."

But also see this link which suggests that the idea goes back even before Schumpeter to other scholars: Creative Destruction in Economics: Nietzsche, Sombart, Schumpeter by Hugo Reinert and Erik S. Reinert.

"Abstract

This paper argues that the idea of ‘creative destruction’ enters the social sciences by way of Friedrich Nietzsche. The term itself is first used by German economist Werner Sombart, who openly acknowledges the influence of Nietzsche on his own economic theory. The roots of creative destruction are traced back to Indian philosophy, from where the idea entered the German literary and philosophical tradition. Understanding the origins and evolution of this key concept in evolutionary economics helps clarifying the contrasts between today’s standard mainstream economics and the Schumpeterian and evolutionary alternative."

Related posts:

The Power of Creative Destruction (That is the title of a book co-authored by Philippe Aghion, one of this this year's winners of the Nobel Prize in economics) (2025)

Marginal Revolution has great posts on this year's winners of the Nobel Prize in economics (Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt and Joel Mokyr): This is a prize for economic growth & creative destruction (2025)

Monday, October 20, 2025

Death of a ‘Clean Energy’ Debacle

A new ‘endangerment’ study shows that the climate battle is over except for the lawfare

Holman W. Jenkins. Excerpts:

"Not only are U.S. emissions too small a share of the global total to matter; in practice, EPA actions mostly just drive U.S. emissions offshore."

"President Obama was taking office amid the 2008-09 financial crisis. Money printing was popular; new energy taxes weren’t. So he abandoned his party’s long-standing advocacy of a carbon tax in favor of turning green energy into just another thing government money printing could support."

"Energy consumption has simply grown overall."

"Last year a study put paid to magical thinking. Of 1,500 climate policies adopted in 41 countries over two decades, less than 5% have resulted in any reduction of emissions."

"A warmer world isn’t only hotter, it’s also less cold. An atmosphere slightly richer in CO2 doesn’t only produce ocean acidification, it also speeds plant growth and terrestrial greening." 

A Brief History of Bad Housing-Finance Policy

The 30-year fixed rate, low-down-payment mortgage pays down too slowly for those with weak credit and volatile incomes.

Letter to The WSJ

"Patrick Brenner cogently argues “The Case Against 30-Year Mortgages” (op-ed, Oct. 9), but a fuller history is in order. The Federal Housing Administration began offering such mortgages for new construction in 1948 and for existing homes in 1954, not the 1930s. Its mission: “The possession of a home, free and clear of all debt at the earliest possible date, should be the goal of every American family.”

In 1954 FHA loan terms averaged 21 years, and down payments averaged 20%. Defaults rounded to zero, and mortgage burning was common. The intense period of liberalization of loan terms that began that year was the result of federal monetary decisions made to help finance World War II. The Federal Reserve was pressured by the U.S. Treasury to buy, if necessary, sufficient debt to keep the prices from falling below par. This kept rates fixed and low, and FHA rates averaged about 4%.

The Fed soon rebelled and entered into an accord with the Treasury, which transferred rate-setting policy back to the central bank. This led to Chairman William Martin’s quip that he was “in the position of the chaperone who has ordered the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up.”

The Fed did remove the punch bowl and both Treasury and mortgage rates began to rise. Congress increased FHA loan terms and reduced down payments through the 1950s to keep monthly payments roughly unchanged. By 1959 FHA loan terms had risen to 27 years, and down payments dropped to 10%. Default rates began to balloon within a few years.

The truth is that the 30-year fixed rate, low-down-payment mortgage pays down too slowly for those with weak credit and volatile incomes. These same borrowers have a history of buying late and exiting early given the cyclical nature of the housing market. Since they lack the staying power that shorter loan terms would provide, they have a hard time accumulating generational wealth from home ownership. Every year from 2000 to 2009 at least 20% of FHA first-time buyers were reportedly unable to sustain ownership, either defaulting or returning to renting for at least three years.

The law of supply and demand dictates that easing credit during a period of short supply—a seller’s market—gets capitalized into higher home prices. As Fed Chairman Eccles warned Congress in 1947: “If [expanded credit] calls forth more production it will be desirable. If it only permits one borrower to bid against another would-be buyer for scarce goods & thus adds to upward pressure on prices, it is dangerous.”

During the pandemic, the Fed ignored Martin and Eccles when it pushed 30-year mortgage rates below 3% through quantitative easing and kept them there for way too long. The result was as predicted: exploding home prices and growing housing affordability.

Ed Pinto

American Enterprise Institute

Sunday, October 19, 2025

Racial Gerrymandering Is a Bad Idea Whose Time Has Gone

The Supreme Court takes up segregated political maps, a temporary remedy that has lingered on

By Jason L. Riley. Excerpts:

"In 1940, 87% of blacks lived below the poverty line. In 2023 it was less than 18%, and the poverty rate for black married couples was 6.5%."

"According to 2020 census data, there are more than nine million black people with incomes above the white median."

"Liberals insist that every provision of the Voting Rights Act is as necessary today as it was six decades ago. But times have changed for the better, thankfully, and the real reason that liberals oppose modernizing the statute has nothing to do with protecting the black franchise, which was the original intent of the law. As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), “the Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem.” Unfortunately, today’s Democrats won’t acknowledge that it’s no longer 1965."

"Citing data on black voting patterns in recent decades, the court concluded that the formula, which hadn’t been updated since 1972, was outdated. Liberals derided the ruling and accused the court of “gutting” the Voting Rights Act. But the positive black voting trends cited by Chief Justice Roberts have persisted. An empirical analysis of black voter participation since the decision by economist Kyle Raze found that “the removal of preclearance requirements did not significantly reduce the relative turnout or registration of eligible Black voters. If anything, Black turnout may have increased relative to white turnout in covered jurisdictions after Shelby.”"

"In 1964, a year before the Voting Rights Act passed, black voter registration in Mississippi was less than 7%, the lowest in the region. Two years later, it was nearly 60%. Black voter registration in the South today is higher than it is in other parts of the country, and black voter registration nationwide has been rising for the past three decades."

"black voter turnout peaked with the elections of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, when it exceeded the white turnout rate. In 2016 it receded somewhat, but only to the pre-Obama norm. In 2020 black turnout was the third highest on record, behind 2008 and 2012. It declined in 2024, but so did turnout for whites and Hispanics." 

Tricolor and Treasury’s Seal of Approval

Did a political blessing from the feds encourage a lack of due diligence by lenders to the failed subprime auto lender?

WSJ editorial. Excerpts:

"For example, Texas regulators had cited Tricolor more than 130 times between 2019 and 2022, including for selling cars for which it didn’t hold title. The dealer also sold cars at prices on average 46% more than Kelley Blue Book’s “fair purchase price” value. Many customers defaulted in short order, resulting in cars being repossessed, which Tricolor then resold.

Yet the Treasury Department in 2019 designated Tricolor as a Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI). Congress established the program in 1994 with the goal of expanding credit for minority and lower-income folks. The CDFI designation makes businesses eligible for special grants. It can also lower their borrowing costs. 

Banks can meet their Community Reinvestment Act obligations to invest in low-income communities by lending to CDFIs."

"Much of Tricolor’s marketing was hype, but investors didn’t notice or care. Tricolor borrowed billions of dollars from banks to make loans to customers, which were then packaged and sold as part of asset-backed securities to investors such as Pacific Investment Management Co. and AllianceBernstein.

Tricolor said last year that a bond offering “was oversubscribed by nearly 6.5 times.” The Treasury imprimatur and financing by sophisticated institutions may have given investors a false sense of security and caused them to relax underwriting standards. An eternal lesson relearned the hard way."

Understanding and Addressing Temperature Impacts on Mortality

NBER working paper.

"A large literature documents how ambient temperature affects human mortality. Using decades of detailed data from 30 countries, we revisit and synthesize key findings from this literature. We confirm that ambient temperature is among the largest external threats to human health, and is responsible for a remarkable 5-12% of total deaths across countries in our sample, or hundreds of thousands of deaths per year in both the U.S. and EU. In all contexts we consider, cold kills more than heat, though the temperature of minimum risk rises with age, making younger individuals more vulnerable to heat and older individuals more vulnerable to cold. We find evidence for adaptation to the local climate, with hotter places experiencing somewhat lower risk at higher temperatures, but still more overall mortality from heat due to more frequent exposure. Within countries, higher income is not associated with uniformly lower vulnerability to ambient temperature, and the overall burden of mortality from ambient temperature is not falling over time. Finally, we systematically summarize the limited set of studies that rigorously evaluate interventions that can reduce the impact of heat and cold on health. We find that many proposed and implemented policy interventions lack empirical support and do not target temperature exposures that generate the highest health burden, and that some of the most beneficial interventions for reducing the health impacts of cold or heat have little explicit to do with climate."